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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: HYBRID PRICE
AND QUANTITY POLICIES AND REGULATION IN
THE PRESENCE OF CO-POLLUTANTS
SEPTEMBER 2017
INSUNG SON, B.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
M.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor John K. Stranlund
This dissertation contains three original essays in the economic theory of
environmental regulation. The main motivations for this work are two problems:
the design of greenhouse gas (GHG) policies when emissions of these gases interact
with so-called co-pollutants and the design of hybrid price and quantity policies to
deal with the uncertainty in the benefits and costs of controlling GHG emissions.
Concerns about how best to control GHGs have generated intense interest in
the co-benefits and adverse side-effects of climate policies. Efforts to reduce CO2
emissions can reduce emissions of flow pollutants that are emitted along with CO2,
which provides a co-benefit of climate policy. However, it is not always the case that
efforts to reduce CO2 emissions have positive co-benefits.
The challenge of climate change has also intensified research in policy design under
uncertainty about the benefits and costs of controlling GHG emissions. Literature on
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this problem suggest that a carbon tax is more efficient than carbon trading. However,
given that many existing GHG control policies feature tradable permit markets, there
have been a lot of interest and innovation in hybrid schemes. The most popular form
of these hybrids involves tradable emissions permits with price controls.
While there is a significant literature on designing hybrid price and quantity
environmental regulations under uncertainty, and another literature on regulating
multiple interacting pollutants, no one has addressed the design of an emission
markets with price controls for a pollutant that interacts with a co-pollutant in
emission control. In Chapter 2, we investigate the optimal regulation of a pollutant
given its abatement interaction with another pollutant under asymmetric
information about firms’ abatement costs. The co-pollutant is regulated, but
perhaps not efficiently. Our focus is on optimal instrument choice in this setting,
and we derive rules for determining whether a pollutant should be regulated with an
emissions tax, tradable permits, or an emissions market with price controls. The
policy choices depend on the relative slopes of the damage functions for both
pollutants and the aggregate marginal abatement cost function, including whether
the pollutants are complements or substitutes in abatement and whether the
co-pollutant is controlled with a tax or tradable permits.
In Chapter 3, we extend the model in Chapter 2 by allowing a pollutant to interact
with a co-pollutant in both abatement and damage. In this situation, we examine the
expected performance of optimal price-based regulations for the primary pollutant.
We find that, given exogenous but possibly inefficient regulation of a co-pollutant,
an optimal permit market, an optimal tax, and an optimal permit market with price
controls all produce the same expected emissions for the primary pollutant, which
deviates from its ex ante optimal emissions if the co-pollutant is regulated inefficiently.
This deviation depends on 1) the interactions of the two pollutants in abatement costs
and damages, 2) the deviation of the expected emissions of the co-pollutant from its
vi
ex ante optimal emissions, and 3) whether it is regulated with a fixed number of
tradable permits or an emissions tax.
Another important concern about permit trading has been how much regulations
induce investments in abatement capital or technology. As concern about cost
containment has increased, the effects of cost-containment policies on abatement
investments have gained attention among researchers. In Chapter 4 we examine the
effects of a hybrid policy on investment in abatement capital. We construct a
dynamic stochastic model to study the decision to invest in irreversible abatement
capital under an emissions market with price controls. We consider investment
decisions in an emissions market with price controls, and compare these to the
decisions in a market without price controls. We found that a price floor tends to
increase the opportunity of investment while a price ceiling always reduces the
opportunity of investment by imposing an upper bound of investment intervals.
Under a hybrid regulation there exists an upper bound of abatement capital stock
such that no additional investment occurs. No such upper bound exists for a pure
permit trading. On the other hand, there may exist investment opportunities for
low marginal abatement costs under a hybrid policy that are not available under a
pure permit trading. However, when investments are required under both
regulations, increases in capital stock under a hybrid regulation are likely to be less
than under pure permit trading.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation contains three original essays in the economic theory of
environmental regulation. The main motivations for this work are two problems
that have received special attention in the literature on formulating policies to
control greenhouse gases that are responsible for global climate change. These
problems are the design of greenhouse gas policies when emissions of these gases
interact with so-called co-pollutants in production processes, and the design of
hybrid price and quantity policies to deal with the immense uncertainty in the
benefits and costs of controlling greenhouse gas emissions.
Concerns about how best to control greenhouse gases have generated intense
interest in the co-benefits and adverse side-effects of climate policies. Perhaps the
most well studied co-benefits of climate policy are the effects on flow pollutants like
sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrous dioxide (NO2), and fine and coarse particulate matter
(PM2.5 and PM10) that are emitted along with CO2 in combustion processes.
Efforts to reduce CO2 emissions can reduce emissions of these pollutants providing a
co-benefit of climate policy. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) has reviewed many empirical studies of these co-benefits in Chapter 6 of
IPCC (2014), and they have concluded that the benefits of reductions in emissions
of CO2 co-pollutants can be substantial. Burtraw et al. (2003) found that a tax of
$25 per ton of carbon emissions would cause further reductions in NOX emissions
and they evaluate health co-benefits at about $8 per ton of carbon reduction (1997
dollars). From a survey of previous research, Nemet et al. (2010) find that
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air-quality co-benefits of climate change mitigation has a mean value of $48 per ton
of carbon reduction (2008 dollars). Groosman et al. (2011) calculate the effects of
U.S. climate policy on local air pollutants and they assess the health co-benefits at
between $103 billion and $1.2 trillion (2006 dollars). Parry et al. (2015) calculate an
average co-benefit of $57.5 per ton of CO2 (2010 dollars) among the top 20 CO2
emitting countries.1 It is not always the case that efforts to reduce CO2 emissions
have positive co-benefits. For example, Ren et al. (2011) show that when the use of
biofuels increases as part of an effort to reduce CO2 emissions, fertilizer runoff can
also increase. Depending on the level of nitrogen runoff regulation, the effects on
social welfare can be negative.
The challenge of climate change has also intensified research in policy design under
uncertainty about the benefits and costs of controlling greenhouse gas emissions. The
seminal work in the area of policy instrument choice under uncertainty is Weitzman
(1974) whose work demonstrates that, under certain conditions, a pure emissions tax
is more efficient than competitively traded emissions permits when the slope of the
aggregate marginal damage function is less than the absolute value of the slope of
the aggregate marginal abatement cost function. Tradable permits are preferred to
taxes if that slope-relationship is reversed. This work is still relevant today, because
the marginal damage associated with carbon emissions is almost perfectly flat over
a relatively short compliance period (e.g., Pizer (2002)). Hence, uncertainty in the
costs and benefits of controlling greenhouse gases suggests that a carbon tax is more
efficient than carbon trading.
However, given that many existing greenhouse gas control policies feature tradable
permit markets, there have been a lot of interest and innovation in hybrid schemes.
1They focus on domestic co-benefits like mortality risks, road congestion, accident risk and road
damage while they exclude the global benefits from reduced CO2 emissions. The cited figures do
not take account of the revenue-recycling effects from a carbon tax and tax-interaction effects with
pre-existing fuel taxes.
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The most popular form of these hybrids, in the literature and in actual practice,
involves tradable emissions permits with price controls. The conceptual foundation
for these policies originated with Roberts and Spence (1976), who demonstrate that
since an emissions tax and a simple permit market are special cases of such a hybrid
policy, emissions markets with price controls cannot be less efficient and will often be
more efficient than either of the pure instruments. The performance of alternative
hybrid policies has been examined theoretically (e.g., Gru¨ll and Taschini (2011)), with
simulations (Burtraw et al. (2010); Fell and Morgenstern (2010); Fell et al. (2012)),
and with laboratory experiments (Stranlund et al. (2014)). Recent theoretical work
has also examined technology choices in emissions markets with price controls (Weber
and Neuhoff (2010)) and the enforcement of these policy schemes (Stranlund and
Moffitt (2014)).
In brief the essays in this dissertation are the following:
Prices versus quantities versus hybrids in the presence of co-pollutants
While there is a significant literature on the economic theory of designing hybrid
price and quantity environmental regulations under uncertainty, and another
literature on regulating multiple interacting pollutants, no one has addressed the
design of an emission markets with price controls ala Roberts and Spence (1976) for
a pollutant that interacts with a co-pollutant in emission control. In this essay we
investigate the optimal regulation of a pollutant given its abatement interaction
with another pollutant under asymmetric information about firms’ abatement costs.
The co-pollutant is regulated, but perhaps not efficiently. Our focus is on optimal
instrument choice in this setting, and we derive rules for determining whether a
pollutant should be regulated with an emissions tax, tradable permits, or an
emissions market with price controls. The policy choices depend on the relative
slopes of the damage functions for both pollutants and the aggregate marginal
3
abatement cost function, including whether the pollutants are complements or
substitutes in abatement and whether the co-pollutant is controlled with a tax or
tradable permits.
Second best regulation in the presence of co-pollutants
The second essay builds on the first essay by examining the expected
performance of optimal price-based regulations for a pollutant when it interacts
with a co-pollutant in both abatement cost and damage under asymmetric
information about abatement costs. By allowing its co-pollutant to be regulated
exogenously but possibly inefficiently, we take a second-best approach to regulating
the primary pollutant. We find that, given the regulation of a co-pollutant, an
optimal permit market, an optimal tax, and an optimal permit market with price
controls all produce the same expected emissions for the primary pollutant, which
deviates from its ex ante optimal emissions if the co-pollutant is regulated
inefficiently. This deviation depends on 1) the interactions of the two pollutants in
abatement and damages, 2) the deviation of the expected emissions of the
co-pollutant from its ex ante optimal emissions, and 3) the form of the regulation
for the co-pollutant, that is, whether it is regulated with a fixed number of tradable
permits or an emissions tax.
Irreversible investments in emissions control under a hybrid price and
quantity regulation
Despite its theoretical efficiency, implementing emissions permit market has
generated some practical concerns. Containing costs has been one of those concerns.
Another important concern about permit trading has been how much regulations
induce investments in abatement capital or technology. As concern about cost
containment has increased, the effects of cost-containment policies on abatement
investments have gained attention among researchers (Phaneuf and Requate (2002);
4
Burtraw et al. (2010); Nemet (2010); Park (2012)). The third essay in this
dissertation contributes to this literature by studying the effects of a hybrid policy
on investment in abatement capital. Our approach to the problem is to construct a
dynamic stochastic model based on the real option approach to study the decision
to invest in irreversible abatement capital under an emissions market with price
controls. Our model is an extension of Zhao (2003), who considered the differences
in investment under a pure emissions market and an emissions tax. In contrast, we
consider investment decisions in an emissions market with price controls, and
compare these to the decisions in a market without price controls. We found that a
price floor tends to increase the opportunity of investment while a price ceiling
always reduces the opportunity of investment by imposing an upper bound of
investment intervals. Under a hybrid regulation there exists an upper bound of
abatement capital stock such that no additional investment occurs. No such upper
bound exists for a pure permit trading. On the other hand, there may exist
investment opportunities for low marginal abatement costs under a hybrid policy
that are not available under a pure permit trading. However, when investments are
required under both regulations, increases in capital stock under a hybrid regulation
are likely to be less than under pure permit trading.
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CHAPTER 2
PRICES VERSUS QUANTITIES VERSUS HYBRIDS IN
THE PRESENCE OF CO-POLLUTANTS
2.1 Introduction
Concerns about how best to control greenhouse gases have generated intense
interest in the co-benefits and adverse side-effects of climate policies. Perhaps the
most well studied co-benefits of climate policy are the effects on flow pollutants like
NOX, SO2 and PM that are emitted along with CO2 in combustion processes.
Efforts to reduce CO2 emissions can reduce emissions of these pollutants, thereby
providing a co-benefit of climate policy. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) has reviewed many empirical studies of these co-benefits in Chapter
6 of IPCC (2014), and they have concluded that the benefits of reductions in
emissions of CO2 co-pollutants can be substantial.
1 On the other hand, climate
policy can also have adverse consequences, some of which come from increases in
related pollutants. For example, Ren et al. (2011) suggest that increased use of
biofuels as part of a policy to reduce CO2 emissions can result in greater water
pollution from agricultural runoff.2
1Nemet et al. (2010) surveyed empirical studies of air pollutant co-benefits of climate change
mitigation and found a mean value of $49 (2008 dollars) per ton of CO2 reduction. Similarly, Parry
et al. (2015) calculated the average co-benefits for the top 20 CO2 emitting countries to be about
$57.5 for 2010 (in 2010 dollars). These values are about the same magnitude as estimates for the
climate-related benefit per ton of CO2 reduction developed by the US Interagency Working Group
on the Social Cost of Carbon. Using a 3% discount rate, the Interagency Working Group proposes
a schedule for the social cost of carbon dioxide to be used in regulatory impact analysis that starts
at $31 (2007 dollars) per ton CO2 in 2010 and rises to $69 per ton in 2050 (IAWG (2013)).
2The IPCC considers many more ancillary consequences of climate policy besides those generated
by co-pollutants. These include the effects of climate policy on other social goals like food security,
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The presence of co-benefits or adverse side-effects presents challenges for efficient
pollution regulation. The efficient regulation of one pollutant must account for how its
control affects the abatement of its co-pollutants, and how the abatement interactions
translate into changes in the damages associated with its co-pollutants. In addition,
accounting for existing regulations of co-pollutants is critical for determining the net
co-benefits or adverse consequences of pollution control. Of course, full efficiency
would require that the regulations of multiple interacting pollutants be determined
jointly to maximize the net social benefits of a complex environmental regulatory
system, but this may not be realistic. Instead environmental regulations tend to focus
on single pollutants, not joint regulation of multiple pollutants, and these single-
pollutant regulations may be inefficient for a host of reasons. At best, regulation
of a particular pollutant may strive for efficiency, given the not-necessarily-efficient
regulation of its co-pollutants.
That is the situation we address in this paper. In particular, we investigate the
second-best optimal regulation of a pollutant given its abatement-interaction with
another controlled pollutant under asymmetric information about firms’ abatement
costs. The co-pollutant is regulated, but perhaps not efficiently.3 Like most of the
related literature the pollutants in our analysis interact in terms of abatement:
consequently, we are concerned with pollutants that are either complements or
substitutes in abatement. Our focus is on optimal instrument choice in this setting,
preservation of biodiversity, energy access, and sustainable development. In this paper we focus on
regulation in the presence of co-pollutants.
3The theory of second-best Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) suggests in the environmental policy
context that inefficient control of a related activity may lead to optimal regulation of a pollutant
that deviates from first-best control. For example, Ren et al. (2011) present a general equilibrium
model of interacting pollutants and show that second-best optimal tax on a pollutant may deviate
from the first-best tax. The design of environmental policy in the presence of other taxes that cause
distortions in the economy is another important example of second-best environmental regulation
(e.g., Goulder et al. (2010)).
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and we derive rules for determining whether a pollutant should be regulated with an
emissions tax, an emissions market, or a hybrid market with price controls.
Our work contributes to two literatures, instrument choice under uncertainty
and the regulation of multiple pollutants. Like the research interest in regulating
multiple interacting pollutants, the challenge of climate change has also intensified
research in policy design under the immense uncertainty about the benefits and
costs of controlling greenhouse gas emissions. The seminal work of Weitzman (1974)
is still relevant, because the marginal damage associated with carbon emissions is
almost perfectly flat over a relatively short compliance period (Pizer (2002)). Hence,
uncertainty in the costs and benefits of controlling greenhouse gases suggest that a
carbon tax is more efficient than carbon trading. However, the preference in some
circles for emissions markets over emissions taxes has generated much interest and
innovation in hybrid schemes. The most popular form of these hybrids, in the
literature and in actual practice, involve tradable emissions permits with price
controls. This is the form of hybrid policy that we model. The conceptual
foundation for these policies originated with Roberts and Spence (1976), who
demonstrated how an emissions market with price controls can outperform a pure
emissions tax or a pure permit market. The performance of alternative hybrid
policies has been examined theoretically (Gru¨ll and Taschini (2011)), with
simulations (Burtraw et al. (2010); Fell and Morgenstern (2010); Fell et al. (2012)),
and with laboratory experiments (Stranlund et al. (2014)). Recent theoretical work
has also examined technology choices in emissions markets with price controls
(Weber and Neuhoff (2010)) and the enforcement of these policy schemes
(Stranlund and Moffitt (2014)). However, no one has yet examined the design of
emissions market with price controls in the presence of co-pollutants.
While there is a substantial empirical literature on the co-benefits and adverse
side-effects of pollutant interactions in climate change policy, the theoretical literature
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on regulating multiple interacting pollutants is much smaller, and much of it focuses
on integrating markets for co-pollutants. For example, Montero (2001) examines
the welfare effects of integrating the policies for two pollutants under uncertainty
about abatement costs and imperfect enforcement. Woodward (2011) asks whether
firms that undertake a single abatement activity that reduces two kinds of emissions
should be able to sell emissions reduction credits for both pollutants. Under complete
information, Caplan and Silva (2005) demonstrate that a global market for carbon
with transfers across countries can be linked with markets to control more localized
pollutants to produce an efficient outcome. In contrast, Caplan (2006) shows that an
efficient outcome cannot be achieved with taxes. While most models in this literature
are static, the climate change setting has led several authors to examine dynamically
efficient paths for the multiple greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change
(e.g., Kuosmanen and Laukkanen (2011); Moslener and Requate (2007)). None of
these articles consider alternative policy choices under uncertainty in the presence of
co-pollutants.
The only published work that we are aware of that examines instrument choice
in the presence of multiple interacting pollutants under uncertainty is Ambec and
Coria (2013). They focus on the choice between taxes and emissions markets for two
interacting pollutants under the assumption that the policies for the two pollutants
are jointly optimal.4 They also consider a hybrid policy due to Weitzman (1978) that
can designed to achieve the ex-post efficient outcome (i.e., the efficient outcome after
uncertainty has been resolved), and hence, can never be dominated by combinations
of taxes and markets that are only optimal ex ante.
4Evans (2007) conducts a similar analysis in an unpublished dissertation. In contrast to most
of the literature on multiple interacting pollutants, which typically assume one regulator in charge
of multiple pollutants or an exogenous regulation of a co-pollutant (as in our case), Ambec and
Coria (2015) and Burtraw et al. (2012) examine alternative policies for co-pollutants when they
are controlled by different regulators. None of these works include an emissions market with price
controls as an alternative policy.
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While our work complements Ambec’s and Coria’s, we believe that our approach
confronts a more realistic policy environment for two reasons. First, rather than
consider the jointly optimal design of policies for interacting pollutants, we investigate
the second-best regulation of a single pollutant, given the regulation of its co-pollutant
which may not be efficient. Our motivation for taking this approach comes from IPCC
(2014, Chapter 3) which treats the problem of co-benefits or adverse side-effects of
greenhouse gas regulation as one of choosing the appropriate climate policy, given
existing policies for related activities. Second, the hybrid policy of Weitzman (1978)
that Ambec and Coria (2013) employ is not used in actual practice. In contrast,
the hybrid model of Roberts and Spence (1976) that we use, one that consists of a
market with price controls, is very much in line with current policy proposals. See
Hood (2010) and Newell et al. (2013) for several examples of recent proposed and
implemented greenhouse gas markets with some form of price control. In fact, we
are the first to consider the impact of a regulated co-pollutant on the design of an
emissions market with price controls.5
Our main contribution is a set of rules for the choice of regulation of a pollutant
with a tax, an emissions market, or a market with price controls, given the
regulation of its co-pollutant with either a tax or tradable permits. We find that the
policy choice for a pollutant is unaffected by its interaction with a co-pollutant that
is controlled with a fixed number of tradable permits, because changes in emissions
of the primary pollutant do not affect emissions of the co-pollutant. However, when
a co-pollutant is controlled with a tax, the instrument choice for the primary
pollutant must account for its effect on co-pollutant emissions. In particular, how
potential variation in emissions of the primary pollutant affects expected damage of
5There are other differences between our work and Ambec’s and Coria’s. In particular, they
extend their base model to examine pollutant interactions in both damages and abatement costs, as
well as uncertainty about whether two pollutants are substitutes or complements in abatement. We
do not extend our work to these cases, but they may be important extensions for the future.
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the co-pollutant becomes an important determinant of the optimal policy choice. If
damage from the co-pollutant is strictly convex and the two pollutants are
complements, reduced variance of emissions of the primary pollutant decreases
expected co-pollutant damage by decreasing the variance of co-pollutant emissions.
On the other hand, expected co-pollutant damage increases with a decrease in the
variance of the emissions of the primary pollutant if the two pollutants are
substitutes, because the variance of co-pollutant emissions increases. Consequently,
since the variance of emissions of the primary pollutant is highest under the tax,
lower but not zero under a market with price controls, and zero for a pure trading
program, complementarity between the two pollutants tends to favor an emissions
market (perhaps with price controls), while substitutability tends to favor fixed
prices (perhaps as part of a hybrid policy).
Since the rules for determining the optimal policy for a pollutant depend on how
its co-pollutant is regulated, many examples exist in which the optimal policy for the
primary pollutant changes as the form of regulation of the co-pollutant is changed.
For just one example, recall the conventional wisdom that the optimal instrument
for carbon emissions is a tax because the marginal damage function is essentially flat
in a compliance period. This remains true in the multiple pollutant case as long as
the co-pollutant is regulated with tradable permits. However, a constant marginal
damage is neither necessary or sufficient for a tax to be optimal when accounting
for a co-pollutant that is controlled with a tax. A tax may be the optimal choice if
the marginal damage function for the primary pollutant is upward sloping, provided
that the pollutants are substitutes in abatement. Moreover, regulation when the
primary pollutant has a constant marginal damage must involve a market if the co-
pollutant marginal damage is upward sloping and the pollutants are complements.
Many such policy reversals are possible, so the intuition about instrument choice that
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environmental economists have developed over many years must be modified when
policies account for co-pollutants.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section we lay out
the fundamentals of our model and characterize an optimal tax, an optimal emissions
market, and an optimal market with price controls for the primary pollutant, given
that the co-pollutant is regulated with tradable permits or an emissions tax. Section 3
contains the main results of the paper, which are the rules for the policy choice of the
primary pollutant. Since the policy choice rules are very simple when the co-pollutant
is regulated with tradable permits, much of the discussion of this section focuses on
the policy choice when the co-pollutant is taxed. Motivated as we are by greenhouse
gas control, we use section 4 for a largely graphical analysis of the choice between a
tax and a hybrid policy for the primary pollutant when it produces constant marginal
damage. We conclude in section 5.
2.2 Optimal policies in the presence of a regulated
co-pollutant
The analysis throughout considers regulation of a fixed number of n heterogeneous,
risk-neutral firms, each of which emits two pollutants. Both pollutants are uniformly
mixed so that they cause damage that depends only on the aggregate amount emitted.
In this section we specify the fundamental abatement costs and damage functions for
the problem, and then characterize optimal policies for one of the pollutants, given
the exogenous regulation of its co-pollutant.
2.2.1 Model fundamentals: Abatement costs and damages
Assume that a firm i emits qij units of the j
th pollutant, j ∈ {1, 2}, and that its
abatement cost function is Ci (qi1, qi2, u). As is standard, the firm’s abatement cost
function is the reduction in its profit from reducing its emissions of either or both of
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the pollutants. The firm’s abatement cost function is strictly convex in emissions of
the two pollutants and random shocks that affect the abatement costs of all firms are
captured by changes in u. This random variable is distributed according to the density
function f(u) on support [u, u] with zero expectation.6 Throughout the analysis firms
will face prices for emissions of each of the pollutants. These are competitive prices
and they are uniform across firms.7 Consequently, aggregate abatement costs will
be minimized, given aggregate levels of the two pollutants and the realization of u.
Let aggregate emissions of both pollutants be Qj =
∑n
i=1 qij, for j ∈ {1, 2}. The
minimum aggregate abatement cost function for the industry is C (Q1, Q2, u), which
is the solution to:
min
{qi1}ni=1,{qi2}ni=1,
n∑
i=1
Ci (qi1, qi2, u)
subject to Qj =
n∑
i=1
qij, for j ∈ {1, 2}. (2.1)
Like nearly all of the literature on price controls for emission trading, we assume a
quadratic form of the aggregate abatement cost function so that aggregate marginal
abatement costs for both pollutants are linear with the uncertainty in their intercepts.
Accordingly, let the aggregate marginal abatement cost function be
C (Q1, Q2, u) = a0 − (a1 + u) (Q1 +Q2) + a2
2
(
Q21 +Q
2
2
)− wQ1Q2, (2.2)
where a0, a1, and a2 are positive constants.
8
6Introducing abatement cost uncertainty via a common random term is a simplification. Yates
(2012) shows how to aggregate idiosyncratic uncertainty in individual abatement costs to characterize
uncertainty in an aggregate abatement cost function.
7Throughout, we assume that government payments or receipts to and from firms via taxes and
government purchases or sales of permits are simple transfers with no real effects.
8Ambec and Coria (2013) use a similar abatement cost function. It is straightforward to show
that the aggregate abatement cost function (2.2) can be derived from individual firms’ abatement
13
The constant w in (2.2) determines whether the two pollutants are substitutes
or complements in abatement. To see this write the marginal abatement cost of
the jth pollutant; −Cj = a1 + u − a2Qj + wQk, j 6= k, where −Cj = −∂C/∂Qj.
Note that if the two pollutants are complements at the industry level, an increase in
aggregate emissions of pollutant k will increase aggregate marginal abatement costs
for pollutant j. If the two pollutants are substitutes in abatement, an increase in
emissions of pollutant k will lead to a decrease in the marginal abatement costs of
pollutant j.
Assume that the Hessian matrix of C (Q1, Q2, u) is positive definite so that a2 > 0
and a22 −w2 = (a2 +w)(a2 −w) > 0. This implies that the aggregate abatement cost
function is strictly convex and the abatement interaction term w is limited by a2−w >
0 and a2 + w > 0. Moreover, given a realization of u, assume that the minimum of
the aggregate abatement cost function occurs at strictly positive emissions, Qj =
(a1 + u)(a2 + w)/(a
2
2 − w2), for j ∈ {1, 2}. Given a2 + w > 0 and a22 − w2 > 0, the
abatement-cost-minimizing values of aggregate emissions are strictly positive if and
only if a1 + u > 0.
Let damage from emissions of the two pollutants take the following quadratic
forms:
D1(Q1) = d11Q1 +
d12
2
Q21; (2.3)
D2(Q2) = d21Q2 +
d22
2
Q22; (2.4)
with constants d11 > 0, d12 ≥ 0, d21 > 0, and d22 ≥ 0. As noted in the introduction,
we do not model a potential interaction between the two pollutants in the damage
they cause. Both damage functions are convex, though perhaps weakly convex. We
costs that are also quadratic with u affecting the intercepts of the marginal abatement costs of the
two pollutants. The derivation of (2.2) from firms’ abatement costs is available upon request.
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assume that it will never be optimal to choose policies that produce zero emissions of
either pollutant. In part, this requires that the intercept of the marginal abatement
cost function is never below either of the intercepts of the marginal damage functions;
that is, a1 + u > d11 and a1 + u > d21. The damage functions are known with
certainty. Alternatively, we could assume that they are imperfectly known, but that
the uncertainty only affects the intercepts of the marginal damage functions and that
this uncertainty is uncorrelated with the abatement cost uncertainty. In this case, it
is well known that damage uncertainty has no bearing on the optimal choice of policy
instruments.
2.2.2 Optimal policies, given the regulation of a co-pollutant
From here on let us suppose that the primary pollutant in the analysis is pollutant
1, while the co-pollutant is pollutant 2. In this section, we specify optimal regulations
for pollutant 1 given the exogenous regulation of pollutant 2. Control of pollutant
2 is either with an emissions tax t2 or competitively-traded permits L2. Pollutant
1 is controlled by an endogenous tax, tradable permits, or a hybrid. The hybrid
is an emissions permit market with a price ceiling and a price floor that was first
proposed by Roberts and Spence (1976). Specifically in our case, a hybrid policy
for pollutant 1 features λ1 permits that are distributed to the firms (free-of-charge),
the government commits to selling additional pollutant 1 permits at price τ1, and it
commits to buying unused permits from firms at price σ1. Collectively, the hybrid
policy is denoted h1 = (λ1, τ1, σ1). Note that τ1 provides a price ceiling for pollutant
1 permits, while σ1 provides the price floor. Clearly, the price controls are restricted
by τ1 ≥ σ1.
The timing of events in the model is as follows. First, the government chooses and
commits to a pollutant 1 policy, given that a regulation for pollutant has already been
fixed. The uncertainty about aggregate abatement costs is resolved after the pollutant
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1 policy is determined. The firms then choose their emissions. If the pollutant 1
policy involves a market, the firms simultaneously choose their permit holdings and
the permit market clears. If the pollution 1 policy also includes price controls, any
sales of permits to the government or purchases of permits by the government also
occur in this final stage.
To calculate the optimal policies for pollutant 1 given the regulation of pollutant
2, we need aggregate emissions responses for all policy combinations. Of course, if the
emissions of both pollutants are controlled with tradable permits, they are fixed at
Lj, j = 1, 2. However, if both pollutants are controlled by prices, say p1 and p2, then
the aggregate emissions responses are determined by equating the aggregate marginal
abatement costs for each pollutant to these prices; that is,
pj = −Cj (Q1, Q2, u) , for j ∈ {1, 2}. (2.5)
Solving these equations simultaneously for Q1 and Q2 yields the emissions responses
Qj (pj, pk, u) , for j, k ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= k. (2.6)
As one expects, it is straightforward to show that the own-price effect on aggregate
emissions is negative but the cross-price effect depends on whether the pollutants
are complements or substitutes. In particular, the cross-price effect is negative if the
pollutants are complements, and it is positive if the pollutants are substitutes. If one
of the pollutants is controlled by a price and the other with a fixed number of tradable
permits Lk, then the emissions response of the priced pollutant is the solution to
pj = −Cj (Qj, Lk, u) , for j, k ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= k, (2.7)
resulting in
Qj (pj, Lk, u) , for j, k ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= k. (2.8)
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In this case, if the pollutants are complements (substitutes), then an increase in the
supply of permits of the co-pollutant leads to an increase (decrease) in emissions of
the priced pollutant.
We are now ready to specify optimal hybrid policies for pollutant 1, and we will
do so first when pollutant 2 is controlled with L2 tradable permits. To specify the
expected social cost function in this context we must first specify values of u where
the permit supply and the price ceiling bind together, and where the permit supply
and the price floor bind together. Denote these values as uτ1 and uσ1 , respectively,
where uτ1 ≥ uσ1 . Using (2.7), uτ1 and uσ1 are the solutions to
z = −C1
(
λ1, L2, u
z
)
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}, (2.9)
which implicitly define the cut-off values as
uz = uz(λ1, z, L2), for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}. (2.10)
These cut-off values are constrained by uσ1 ≥ u and uτ1 ≤ u. For values of u < uσ1
the price floor binds and the pollutant 1 permit price is equal to σ1. For values
of u between uσ1 and uτ1 the permit supply binds and the permit price is equal to
−C1
(
λ1, L2, u
)
. Values of u above uτ1 cause the price ceiling to bind so the permit
price is equal to τ1. Given this price schedule, equilibrium pollutant 1 emissions are
Q1 =

Q1
(
τ1, L2, u
)
for u ∈ [uτ1 , u]
λ1 for u ∈ [uσ1 , uτ1 ]
Q1
(
σ1, L2, u
)
for u ∈ [u, uσ1 ].
(2.11)
Using (2.10) and (2.11), expected social costs are then
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W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, L2
)
=
∫ u
uτ1(λ1,τ1,L2)
[
C
(
Q1
(
τ1, L2, u
)
, L2, u
)
+D1
(
Q1
(
τ1, L2, u
))
+D2
(
L2
)]
f (u) du
+
∫ uτ1(λ1,τ1,L2)
uσ1(λ1,σ1,L2)
[
C
(
λ1, L2, u
)
+D1 (λ1) +D
2
(
L2
)]
f (u) du
+
∫ uσ1(λ1,σ1,L2)
u
[
C
(
Q1
(
σ1, L2, u
)
, L2, u
)
+D1
(
Q1
(
σ1, L2, u
))
+D2
(
L2
)]
f (u) du.
(2.12)
The optimal policy for pollutant 1, given L2, is the solution to
min
λ1,τ1,σ1
W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, L2
)
, subject to τ1 ≥ σ1, uτ1 ≤ u, uσ1 ≥ u. (2.13)
To determine whether the pollutant 1 policy should be a tax, a pure market, or
a market with price controls (in the next section), we exploit the fact that choosing
an optimal emissions market with price controls admits a pure tax and a pure
emissions market (one without price controls) as special cases. For example, if the
solution to (2.13) produces τ1 = σ1, then the optimal policy is a pure price
instrument because there is no chance that the permit supply will bind. In this case,
the model cannot distinguish between a policy that effectively subsidizes firms for
reducing their emissions at rate σ1 and a policy that taxes their emissions at rate τ1.
This is because there are a fixed number of firms and tax receipts and subsidy
payments are transfers with no real effects. However, since a tax would be superior
to a subsidy in an extended model (e.g., with an endogenous number of firms or
deadweight costs of public funds), we assume that if the optimal policy is a pure
price scheme that it is implemented with a tax. In this case, no emissions permits
are issued and the optimal policy is a tax denoted as t∗1(L2). Similarly, if the
solution to (2.13) produces uτ1 = u and uσ1 = u, then there is no chance that either
of the price controls will bind and the optimal policy is a pure emissions market. In
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this case, the price controls are disabled and the optimal policy is simply L∗1(L2)
tradable permits. If none of the constraints in (2.13) bind at its solution, then there
are strictly positive probabilities that the permit supply, the price ceiling and the
price floor will bind. In this case the optimal policy is the hybrid emissions market
with price controls, h∗1(L2) = (λ
∗
1(L2), τ
∗
1 (L2), σ
∗
1(L2)), for which each element has a
strictly positive probability of being activated.
Given that confusion may arise about the meaning of a hybrid policy, especially
since emissions taxes and pure emissions markets can be viewed as special cases, from
here on we only use the term hybrid to indicate a market with price controls, each
element of which has a strictly positive probability of being activated.
The specification of the optimal policy for pollutant 1, given that pollutant 2 is
controlled with the tax t2 proceeds in the same way as when pollutant 2 is controlled
with tradable permits. Of course, when pollutant 2 emissions are controlled with a
tax they depend on the pollutant 1 policy. Therefore, at uτ1 and uσ1 we have
z = −C1
(
λ1, Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
z
)
, uz
)
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}, (2.14)
which implicitly define uτ1 and uσ1 as
uz = uz(λ1, z, t2), for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}. (2.15)
For values of u < uσ1 the price floor binds and the pollutant 1 permit price is equal to
σ1. For values of u between u
σ1 and uτ1 the permit supply binds and the permit price
is equal to −C1
(
λ1, Q2(λ1, t2, u), u
)
. Values of u above uτ1 cause the price ceiling
to bind so the permit price is equal to τ1. Given this price schedule, equilibrium
emissions of both pollutants are
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(Q1, Q2) =

(
Q1
(
τ1, t2, u
)
, Q2
(
τ1, t2, u
))
for u ∈ [uτ1 , u](
λ1, Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
))
for u ∈ [uσ1 , uτ1 ](
Q1
(
σ1, t2, u
)
, Q2
(
σ1, t2, u
))
for u ∈ [u, uσ1 ].
(2.16)
Using (2.15) and (2.16), expected social costs are
W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, t2
)
=
∫ u
uτ1(λ1,τ1,t2)
[
C
(
Q1
(
τ1, t2, u
)
, Q2
(
τ1, t2, u
)
, u
)
+D1
(
Q1
(
τ1, t2, u
))
+D2
(
Q2
(
τ1, t2, u
))]
f (u) du
+
∫ uτ1(λ1,τ1,t2)
uσ1(λ1,σ1,t2)
[
C
(
λ1, Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
)
, u
)
+D1 (λ1)
+D2
(
Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
))]
f (u) du
+
∫ uσ1(λ1,σ1,t2)
u
[
C
(
Q1
(
σ1, t2, u
)
, Q2
(
σ1, t2, u
)
, u
)
+D1
(
Q1
(
σ1, t2, u
))
+D2
(
Q2
(
σ1, t2, u
))]
f (u) du (2.17)
The optimal policy for pollutant 1 is the solution to
min
λ1,τ1,σ1
W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, t2
)
, subject to τ1 ≥ σ1, uτ1 ≤ u, uσ1 ≥ u. (2.18)
Again, binding constraints in this problem indicate the optimality of pure
instruments. In particular, if the solution to (2.18) involves τ1 = σ1, then the
optimal policy is the tax t∗1(t2). If u
τ1 = u and uσ1 = u, then the optimal policy is a
pure trading policy with L∗1(t2) tradable permits. If none of the constraints bind,
then the optimal policy is the hybrid h∗1(t2) = (λ
∗
1(t2), τ
∗
1 (t2), σ
∗
1(t2)).
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2.3 Policy choice in the presence of a co-pollutant
In this section we present the rules for determining optimal choices from among
t∗1(x2), L
∗
1(x2), and h
∗
1(x2), for pollutant 2 regulations x2 ∈ {t2, L2}. The policy choice
rules are presented in two propositions, one for when the co-pollutant is regulated with
tradable permits and the other when the co-pollutant is regulated with a tax. The
proofs of the propositions derive the policy-choice rules by determining the conditions
under which the constraints in (2.13) and (2.18) bind. For example, for x2 ∈ {t2, L2},
the conditions under which τ1 = σ1 reveal when the pure tax t
∗
1(x2) produces lower
social welfare than a policy with markets, L∗1(x2) or h
∗
1(x2). Likewise, the conditions
under which uτ1 = u and uσ1 = u reveal when a pure market L∗1(x2) dominates a
policy with fixed prices, t∗1(x2) or h
∗
1(x2). The conditions under which the constraints
in (2.13) or (2.18) do not bind tell us when a hybrid emissions market with price
controls h∗1(x2) dominates a pure tax t
∗
1(x2) and a pure market L
∗
1(x2).
We begin with the policy choice rules for pollutant 1 when pollutant 2 is regulated
with tradable permits. The proof of Proposition 1 is in section A.1 in Appendix A.
Proposition 1: If a co-pollutant is regulated with a fixed supply of L2 tradable
permits, then the optimal regulation of the primary pollutant is the emissions tax
t∗1(L2) if d12 = 0 while the hybrid policy h
∗
1(L2) is optimal if d12 > 0. A pure
emissions market is never optimal.
Thus, when a co-pollutant is controlled with a fixed supply of permits, a pure
trading scheme is never optimal and a pure tax is optimal if and only if the marginal
damage function for pollutant 1 is flat.9 In all cases in which the marginal damage for
pollutant 1 is upward sloping, the optimal policy is a hybrid with tradable permits,
a price ceiling and a price floor, each of which has a positive probability of being
9There are cases in which pure trading program would be optimal if a2 = 0, but we do not
consider this possibility in this paper because we would not be able to guarantee the convexity of
the aggregate abatement cost function.
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activated. As Roberts and Spence (1976) noted many years ago, the reason a hybrid
dominates a pure tax and a pure market in this setting is that the policy produces a
price schedule that approximates the marginal damage function.
Notice in Proposition 1 that the pollutant 1 policy choice rules when pollutant 2
is controlled with tradable permits do not depend on the abatement interaction term
w. Consequently, these rules are the same as in the single-pollutant case. The reason
the abatement interaction does not matter in this case is that pollutant 1 regulations
cannot affect pollutant 2 emissions because they are fixed at L2. (Similarly, the
instrument choice rules in Proposition 1 apply when the co-pollutant is controlled
with a set of binding individual emissions standards). However, when the co-pollutant
is regulated with a tax and the pollutants are linked together in abatement, the
regulation of the primary pollutant affects co-pollutant emissions. Consequently, the
policy choice rules for pollutant 1 incorporate features of this dependence. The proof
of Proposition 2 is in section A.2 in Appendix A.
Proposition 2: If a co-pollutant is regulated with an emissions tax t2, then the
optimal regulation of the primary pollutant is the emissions tax t∗1(t2) if d22w/a2 ≤
−d12; the pure trading scheme with L∗1(t2) permits is optimal if d22w/a2 ≥ a2 + w,
and the hybrid policy h∗1(t2) is optimal if d22w/a2 ∈ (−d12, a2 + w).
We will explore this proposition in detail, but first notice in both Propositions 1
and 2 that the specific regulations of the co-pollutant do not appear; that is, L2 is
absent from Proposition 1 and t2 is absent from Proposition 2. It is clear from (2.13)
and (2.18) that the form and level of control of pollutant 2 affects the optimal policies
of pollutant 1; that is, t2 or L2 affects the level of the pollutant 1 tax, the number
of tradable permits, and the elements of a hybrid policy. Moreover, Propositions 1
and 2 imply that the form of pollutant 2 regulation affects the policy choice rules
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for pollutant 1 when the two pollutants interact in abatement.10 However, the policy
choice rules do not depend on the levels of control of the co-pollutant. Therefore, we
have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: While the optimal policies for the primary pollutant depend on the
form and stringency of the co-pollutant regulations, the choice among alternative
policies for the primary pollutant does not depend on the relative efficiency of the
co-pollutant regulations.
Corollary 1 may have an important practical implication for the instrument choice
problem for the primary pollutant: the choice is simplified because it does not depend
on the stringency of co-pollutant regulation.
Since the policy choice rules in Proposition 2 are somewhat complex, it is
worthwhile to analyze them in more detail. In the proposition we have written the
rules as dependent on the level of d22w/a2 to emphasize the role that impacts on
co-pollutant damage play in the policy choice for the primary pollutant. This term
captures the effect of variation in emissions of the primary pollutant on the
variation in the marginal damage of the co-pollutant and, as such, indicates how
variation in pollutant 1 emissions changes expected co-pollutant damage. To
understand this, co-pollutant emissions–given its tax, emissions of pollutant 1 and a
realization of u–is the solution to t2 = −C2(Q1, Q2, u). With the aggregate
abatement cost function (2.2), it is straightforward to calculate
Q2(Q1, t2, u) = (a1 + u− t2 + wQ1)/a2. Note how variation in pollutant 1 emissions
affects the variation in pollutant 2 emissions directly according to w/a2. In
10It is straightforward to show that the rules in Proposition 2 collapse to the sames rules in
Proposition 1 when the two pollutants do not interact in abatement; that is, when w = 0. Thus,
when there is not an abatement interaction between the two pollutants, the instrument choice rules
for the primary pollutant when the co-pollutant is controlled with a tax are the same as when the
co-pollutant is controlled with tradable permits. In turn, these instrument choice rules are the same
as in the single-pollutant case.
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particular, it is straightforward to show that the variance of pollutant 1 emissions
and the variance of pollutant 2 emissions move together if the pollutants are
complements, while they move in opposite directions if the pollutants are
substitutes. Multiplying w/a2 by d22 indicates how the variation of pollutant 1
emissions affects variation in co-pollutant marginal damage and, in turn, expected
co-pollutant damages. Of course, if the co-pollutant damage function is linear
(d22 = 0) then the variance of co-pollutant emissions has no affect on its expected
damage. However, with a strictly convex co-pollutant damage function (d22 > 0),
expected damage is increasing in the variance of co-pollutant emissions. Thus, if the
pollutants are complements a decrease in the variance of pollutant 1 emissions
reduces expected co-pollutant damage by causing a reduction in the variance in
co-pollutant emissions. On the other hand, if the pollutants are substitutes a
decrease in the variance of pollutant 1 emissions increases expected pollutant 2
damage because the variance of pollutant 2 emissions increases. (A formal
demonstration of these results is in section A.3 in Appendix A).
The relationship between the variance of pollutant 1 emissions and expected
pollutant 2 damage is an important component of the policy choice problem for
pollutant 1, because the variance of pollutant 1 emissions is highest under the tax,
lower but not zero under a market with price controls that may bind, and zero for a
pure trading program. Thus, if the pollutants are complements (substitutes),
expected co-pollutant damage decreases (increases) as we move from a simple tax to
a hybrid and then to a pure market. Somewhat loosely, we conclude:
Corollary 2: When the co-pollutant is controlled with a tax, complementarity
between the two pollutants in abatement tends to favor an emissions market for the
primary pollutant, perhaps with price controls. On the other hand, substitutability
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between the pollutants tends to favor fixed prices for the primary pollutant, either
in the form of a simple tax or as price controls under a hybrid policy.11
Given the importance of abatement substitutability and complementarity in the
policy choice problem, we now present two corollaries of Proposition 2 that summarize
the policy choice rules in the two cases separately.
Corollary 3: If the two pollutants are complements in abatement and the
co-pollutant is controlled with a tax, then: (1) A tax for the primary pollutant is
optimal if and only if both pollutants have constant marginal damages. (2) The
regulation of the primary pollutant must involve a market if the marginal damage
function of either pollutant is upward sloping. (3) A pure emissions market is
optimal for the primary pollutant if the reduction in the expected damage of the
co-pollutant from reducing the variation in emissions of the primary pollutant is
large enough.
Part (1) of the corollary follows from the result in Proposition 2 that a tax is
optimal if d22w/a2 ≤ −d12. Clearly, given that the pollutants are complements so
that w > 0, the only way for this inequality to hold is if d12 = d22 = 0. Part (2) of the
corollary follows from the fact that the regulation of pollutant 1 must involve tradable
permits if d22w/a2 ≤ −d12 does not hold, which occurs if either d12 or d22 are strictly
greater than zero. Part (3) of the corollary follows from the result in Proposition 2
that a pure market for the primary pollutant is optimal if d22w/a2 ≥ a2 + w. Since
both sides of this inequality are positive when the pollutants are complements, the
inequality holds only if d22w/a2 is large enough.
11A similar conclusion appears to hold in Ambec and Coria (2013) analysis of jointly optimal taxes
versus quotas. Their Figures 3 and 4 suggest that substitutability tends to favor emissions taxes,
either for both pollutants or as part of mixed scheme of a tax for one pollutant and a quota for the
other. Likewise, complementarity tends to favor fixed quotas, either for both pollutants or as part
of mixed scheme.
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Corollary 3 reveals that there is only one way in which an emissions tax is the
optimal policy choice for pollutant 1 when the two pollutants are complements and
pollutant 2 is controlled with a tax. That is when the marginal damage functions
of both pollutants are flat. In all other cases the control of the primary pollutant
must include a market to limit the variation in emissions of both pollutants. This
result is important for the control of carbon emissions whose marginal damage is
flat. Without considering the impact of control on emissions of co-pollutants, a flat
marginal damage is necessary and sufficient to justify control with a carbon tax.
However, as noted in the introduction, important carbon co-pollutants like NOX,
SO2 and PM are emitted along with carbon. Thus, reducing carbon can also reduce
emissions of these pollutants, suggesting that carbon and these co-pollutants are
complements in abatement. Corollary 3 suggests that if these co-pollutants have
upward sloping marginal damage functions, then the control of carbon must involve
a permit market. It seems likely that such a market would involve price controls, but
part (3) of Corollary 3 reveals that it is possible that a pure emissions market for the
primary pollutant can be optimal if eliminating the variation in pollutant 1 emissions
reduces the expected damage from the co-pollutant enough.
Corollary 4: If the two pollutants are substitutes in abatement and the co-pollutant
is controlled with a tax, then: (1) A tax is optimal for the primary pollutant if its
marginal damage is constant. (2) The regulation of the primary pollutant may involve
a market if its marginal damage is increasing: however, the regulation must involve
a market if in addition the marginal damage of the co-pollutant is constant. (3) A
pure emissions market for the primary pollutant is never optimal.
Part (1) of Corollary 4 also follows from the result in Proposition 2 that a tax
for the primary pollutant is optimal if d22w/a2 ≤ −d12. Clearly, given w < 0, this
inequality holds if d12 = 0. For part (2) of the corollary, note that the inequality may
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be reversed if d12 > 0. In fact, if d22 = 0 in addition to d12 > 0, then d22w/a2 > −d12,
indicating that the pollutant 1 policy must include a market. Part (3) of Corollary 4
follows from the result in Proposition 2 that a pure market for the primary pollutant is
optimal if d22w/a2 ≥ a2 +w. This inequality can never hold when the two pollutants
are substitutes, because the left side is non-positive while the right side is strictly
positive.
In contrast to when the pollutants are complements in abatement, there are
several ways that a tax can be the optimal pollutant 1 policy when the pollutants
are substitutes. The tax for pollutant 1 is optimal if its marginal damage function is
flat, but this is only a sufficient condition, not a necessary one. Consequently, a tax
may be optimal if the marginal damage of the primary pollutant is upward sloping
as long as the reduction in the expected damage of the co-pollutant induced by
increasing the variation of emissions of the primary pollutant is large enough. If the
reduction in expected co-pollutant damage is not large enough and marginal
damage for the primary pollutant is upward sloping, then control of the primary
pollutant must involve a market. In this case, the market must also include price
controls, because a pure market is never optimal when the pollutants are substitutes
in abatement.
We have focused our discussion of Proposition 2 on whether the pollutants are
complements or substitutes in abatement and how policy-induced differences in the
variation of emissions of the primary pollutant affects the expected damage from
co-pollutant emissions. However, it is clear that these features of the problem do
not give us all the information we need to pick the correct policy for the primary
pollutant––the slope of its marginal damage function and the slope of the marginal
abatement cost function are also important elements of the policy choice problem.
The standard intuition about the choice between a pure tax and a pure market in the
single-pollutant case is that a more steeply sloped marginal damage function tends to
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favor a market, while a more steeply sloped marginal abatement cost function tends
to favor a tax. Some of this intuition carries into the choice among the pollutant 1
policies we consider when the co-pollutant is controlled with a tax. For example, a
more steeply sloped marginal damage function for the primary pollutant in our case
also tends to favor a market. The reason is that limiting the variation in emissions
of the primary pollutant reduces expected damage from this pollutant by more when
d12 is larger.
The effects of steeper marginal abatement costs (a higher value of a2) is a bit more
complicated. For the choice between a pure market and a hybrid – which is only
relevant when the pollutants are complements (Corollary 4 part (3)) – a higher value
of a2 tends to favor a hybrid when co-pollutant damage is strictly convex because
d22w/a2 is more likely to fall below a2 + w. In this case, a more steeply sloped
marginal abatement cost function limits the reduction in the variation of co-pollutant
emissions, thereby limiting the benefit of eliminating the variation in pollutant 1
emissions with a pure market. For the choice between a pure tax and a hybrid the
steepness of marginal abatement costs only matters if co-pollutant damage is strictly
convex so that d22w/a2 is non-zero. Moreover, the value of a2 does not matter when
the pollutants are complements and co-pollutant damage is strictly convex because
a pure tax is never optimal in the case (Corollary 3 part (2)). However, when the
pollutants are substitutes, a higher value of a2 will limit the reduction in expected
co-pollutant damage from increasing the variation in the emissions of the primary
pollutant. Consequently, a steeper marginal abatement cost will tend to favor a
hybrid over a tax when the two pollutants are substitutes.
2.4 An example motivated by the control of greenhouse gases
To gain additional insight into the policy choice problem we examine a specific
example in this section. Given the importance of greenhouse gas control in motivating
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our work, we assume throughout the section that the marginal damage function for
the primary pollutant is flat. Of course, this implies that the optimal policy for
the primary pollutant is a tax in the single-pollutant case or when the co-pollutant
is controlled with a fixed number of tradable permits. However, the policy choice
problem is not that simple when two pollutants interact in abatement and the co-
pollutant is controlled with a tax. In particular, given a constant marginal damage
for the primary pollutant and an upward sloping marginal damage function for the
co-pollutant, control of the primary pollutant must involve a market when the two
pollutants are complements, but the pure tax is optimal when the pollutants are
substitutes. The example of this section is designed to illustrate these conclusions.
2.4.1 The pollutants are complements in abatement
Part (2) of Corollary 3 tells us that the optimal policy for pollutant 1 must involve
emissions trading when its marginal damage function is a constant, the marginal
damage function for the co-pollutant is upward sloping, and the two pollutants are
complements in abatement. With the help of Figure (2.1) we will illustrate the policy
choice between an emissions tax and a hybrid policy for pollutant 1 in this setting,
and demonstrate the dominance of a hybrid policy.
In each of the panels of Figure (2.1) we have graphed marginal abatement costs
and marginal damage for the primary pollutant on the left and marginal abatement
costs and marginal damage for the co-pollutant on the right. When the pollutants
are controlled with taxes t∗1(t2) and t2, their marginal abatement cost functions are:
−C1(Q1, Q2
(
t2, Q1, u
)
, u) =
(a1 + u)(a2 + w)− wt2 − (a22 − w2)Q1
a2
; (2.19)
−C2(Q1
(
t∗1(t2), Q2, u
)
, Q2, u) =
(a1 + u)(a2 + w)− wt∗1(t2)− (a22 − w2)Q2
a2
. (2.20)
These marginal abatement cost functions are decreasing in their own emissions, but
their intercepts shift with changes in the tax on their co-pollutant and the direction
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of the shift depends on whether the pollutants are complements or substitutes. The
expected values of these functions, labeled E(−C1) and E(−C2), are drawn in Figure
(2.1a). The corresponding levels of expected emissions are Q01 and Q
0
2. We need to
be clear here that equating E(−C1) and E(−C2) with their corresponding marginal
damage functions in Figure (2.1a) does not give us the ex ante optimal levels of
emissions. This is because the positions of E(−C1) and E(−C2) depend on taxes
that differ from their optimal levels.
In fact, note in Figure (2.1a) that the co-pollutant tax t2 is below its marginal
damage at Q02. (We maintain this assumption throughout this section). In contrast
the optimal pollutant 1 tax t∗1(t2) is above its marginal damage. To understand why
t∗1(t2) must be above its marginal damage, consider the expected social cost function
when both pollutants are taxed,
W
(
t1, t2
)
=E
[
C
(
Q1
(
t1,t2,u
)
,Q2
(
t1,t2,u
)
,u
)
+D1
(
Q1
(
t1,t2,u
))
+D2
(
Q2
(
t1,t2,u
))]
.
The first order condition for minimizing W
(
t1, t2
)
with respect to t1 given t2 is
E
[
C1(· )∂Q1
∂t1
+ C2(· )∂Q2
∂t1
+D11(· )
∂Q1
∂t1
+D22(· )
∂Q2
∂t1
]
= 0. (2.21)
It is straightforward to show that the emissions responses Qj
(
t1, t2, u
)
, for j ∈ {1, 2},
are linear in both prices, so ∂Qj/∂t1, for j ∈ {1, 2}, are constants. (See equation
(A.26) in Appendix A). Substituting t∗1(t2) = −C1(· ) and t2 = −C2(· ) into (2.21)
and rearranging terms allows us to characterize the optimal pollutant 1 tax as
t∗1(t2) = D
1
1(E
[
Q1
(
t∗1(t2), t2, u
)]
)− (t2 −D22(E
[
Q2
(
t∗1(t2), t2, u
)]
)
∂Q2/∂t1
∂Q1/∂t1
. (2.22)
Since Q0j = E
[
Qj
(
t∗1(t2), t2, u
)]
for j ∈ {1, 2} in Figure (2.1a) and the marginal
damage of the primary pollutant is constant, we can write (2.22) as
30
(a) Taxes for both pollutants when they are complements
(b) Optimal emissions following a positive abatement cost shock
(c) A hybrid policy for pollutant 1 may dominate a tax even though its marginal damage is
constant
Figure 2.1: Optimal pollutant 1 policies when it has a constant marginal damage
function and the pollutants are complements
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t∗1(t2) = D
1
1 − (t2 −D22(Q02))
∂Q2/∂t1
∂Q1/∂t1
. (2.23)
In (2.23), ∂Q1/∂t1 < 0. Moreover, ∂Q2/∂t1 < 0 because the pollutants are
complements. Then, since t2 < D
2
2(Q
0
2) in Figure (2.1a), the second term of the
right side of (2.23) is strictly positive, which, in turn, implies t∗1(t2) > D
1
1 as we have
drawn.
Now, like many graphical analyses of the environmental policy choice problem
under uncertainty, imagine that there is a positive shock to abatement costs; that is,
the realized value of u is u+ > 0. (It is easy to conduct the following analysis under
the assumption that there is a negative shock to abatement costs to illustrate the
same results). Then, from (2.19) and (2.20), marginal abatement costs for both
pollutants shift upward from their expected values by u+(a2 + w)/a2 in Figure
(2.1b). Recall that a2 + w > 0 whether the pollutants are complements or
substitutes. Notice how the fact that emissions of the pollutants are complements in
this example amplifies the effect of the increase in u. Ultimately the abatement cost
shock produces marginal abatement costs −C+1 = −C1(Q1, Q2
(
t2, Q1, u
+
)
, u+) and
−C+2 = −C2(Q1
(
t∗1(t2), Q2, u
+
)
, Q2, u
+), as well as Q+1 and Q
+
2 in Figure (2.1b).
Figure (2.1c) adds a hybrid regulation for pollutant 1. This policy consists of
permits λ1 (set equal to Q
0
1, although this is not necessary), a price ceiling τ1 and a
price floor σ1. (One should not presume that this is an optimal hybrid policy–it is
simply used to illustrate the main results of this section). Given the positive shock to
the marginal abatement cost functions, the price ceiling will be the binding pollutant
1 instrument resulting in emissions Qh1 that are lower than under the tax. This
illustrates how a hybrid policy limits the variation in pollutant 1 emissions relative
to a tax. In addition, using (2.20), the higher price of pollutant 1 emissions shifts
the marginal abatement cost for pollutant 2 down by −w/a2, resulting in emissions
Qh2 , which are also lower than pollutant 2 emissions under the optimal pollutant 1
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tax. Note how limiting the variation in pollutant 1 emissions limits the variation in
co-pollutant emissions, because the two pollutants are complements.
Relative to t∗1(t2), the pollutant 1 hybrid has countervailing effects on social costs.
The shaded area in the left panel of Figure (2.1c) indicates an increase in social costs
associated with pollutant 1 of imposing the pollutant 1 hybrid instead of the tax,
which occurs because the hybrid reduces pollutant 1 emissions when its marginal
abatement cost function is above its marginal damage. The shaded area in the right
panel of Figure (2.1c) is the reduction in social costs associated with pollutant 2 of
imposing the pollutant 1 hybrid instead of the tax. It is straightforward to show that
total abatement costs of Q+2 and Q
h
2 are the same, so the decrease in social costs
associated with pollutant 2 is simply the reduction in damage from lower emissions.
It is not apparent in Figure (2.1c) whether the pollutant 1 hybrid leads to higher or
lower social costs than the pollutant 1 tax. However, we can show that there always
exists a hybrid policy that results in lower social costs than the pollutant 1 tax.
To see this, first write the emissions of both pollutants in terms of the price ceiling
for pollutant 1 and the tax for pollutant 2 at the realized value of u as Q1(τ1, t2, u
+)
and Q2(τ1, t2, u
+). Social costs in terms of these emissions are then
C
(
Q1
(
τ1, t2, u
+
)
, Q2(τ1, t2, u
+), u+
)
+D1
(
Q1
(
τ1, t2, u
+
))
+D2
(
Q2(τ1, t2, u
+)
)
.
Differentiate this with respect to τ1 and then substitute τ1 = −C1(· ) and t2 = −C2(· )
into the result to obtain
(D11(Q1
(
τ1, t2, u
+
)
)− τ1)∂Q1
∂τ1
+ (D22(Q2(τ1, t2, u
+))− t2)∂Q2
∂τ1
.
At the equilibrium described in Figure (2.1c), Qj(τ1, t2, u
+) = Qhj , for j ∈ {1, 2}, so
we have
(D11 − τ1)
∂Q1
∂τ1
+ (D22(Q
h
2)− t2)
∂Q2
∂τ1
. (2.24)
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To understand how social costs respond to the relationship between the price ceiling
under the hybrid policy and the emissions tax t∗1(t2), calculate
(t∗1(t2)− τ1)
∂Q1
∂τ1
+ (D22(Q
h
2)−D22(Q02))
∂Q2
∂τ1
, (2.25)
by combining (2.24) with (2.23).12 Since ∂Q1/∂τ1 < 0 and t
∗
1(t2) − τ1 < 0 at the
(Qh1 , Q
h
2) outcome in Figure (2.1c), the first term of (2.25) is positive, which captures
the increase in social costs associated with pollutant 1 of imposing the hybrid instead
of the tax. For the second term, ∂Q2/∂τ1 < 0, because the pollutants are complements
in abatement. Then, sinceD22(Q
h
2)−D22(Q02) > 0, the second term of (2.24) is negative,
which captures the decrease in social costs associated with pollutant 2 of imposing
a hybrid on pollutant 1 rather than a tax. The opposite signs of the two terms in
(2.25) indicate the trade-off of imposing a hybrid on pollutant 1 rather than a tax in
the situation described in Figure (2.1c).
However, there always exists a hybrid with a price ceiling for the pollutant 1
market that is strictly above the optimal tax that results in lower social costs. To
understand why, lower the price ceiling τ1 to t
∗
1(t2). Then emissions of the co-pollutant
increase to Q+2 in Figure (2.1c) and (2.25) becomes
(D22(Q
+
2 )−D22(Q02))
∂Q2
∂τ1
. (2.26)
(2.26) is unambiguously negative because D22(Q
+
2 ) − D22(Q02) > 0 and ∂Q1/∂τ1 <
0. This implies that implementing a market with a price ceiling above the optimal
pollutant 1 tax to limit the potential variation in pollutant 1 emissions reduces social
costs associated with a positive abatement cost shock relative to the optimal pollutant
12More specifically write (2.23) in terms of t2 and substitute the result into (2.24). Then, because
the emissions responses to the taxes are linear, use ∂Qj/∂t1 = ∂Qj/∂τ1 for both j ∈ {1, 2} to
complete the derivation.
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1 tax. This illustrates how a market with price controls for the primary pollutant
can outperform a pure tax even though its marginal damage is flat, as long as the
pollutants are complements and the co-pollutant has an upward sloping marginal
damage function.13
What if the co-pollutant marginal damage was constant instead of upward sloping?
Part (1) of Corollary 3 tells us that the tax for the primary pollutant dominates the
hybrid policy if the marginal damage functions for both pollutants are constants. In
this case, (2.25) reduces to (t∗1(t2)− τ1)(∂Q1/∂τ1), which is strictly greater than zero.
This shows that imposing a hybrid policy rather than a tax when both pollutants
have constant marginal damages produces higher social cost for a given abatement
cost shock.
2.4.2 The pollutants are substitutes in abatement
Now suppose the two pollutants are substitutes in abatement. As with Figure
(2.1), we use Figure (2.2) to illustrate the choice between an emissions tax and a
hybrid policy for pollutant 1 in this case. Part (1) of Corollary 4 tells us that the
optimal pollutant 1 policy in this situation is a tax, so we will illustrate its dominance
over a hybrid policy.
In contrast to the complements case, when the two pollutants are substitutes and
the co-pollutant tax is too low the optimal tax on the primary pollutant is also lower
than its marginal damage. In Figure (2.2a) we again start with the expected outcome
(Q01, Q
0
2) at which the co-pollutant tax is below its marginal damage at its expected
emissions. Considering (2.23), note that t2 < D
2
2(Q
0
2), ∂Q1/∂t1 < 0, and ∂Q2/∂t1 > 0
(because the pollutants are substitutes) imply that t∗1(t2) < D
1
1, which we have drawn
in Figure (2.2a).
13Part (3) of Corollary 3 suggests that it might be optimal to completely eliminate the variation
in pollutant 1 emissions by imposing a pure market instead of a hybrid. This outcome could be
illustrated in Figure (2.1c) by setting the price ceiling so high that it is never activated.
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(a) Taxes for both pollutants when they are substitutes
(b) Optimal emissions following a positive abatement cost shock
(c) A tax on pollutant 1 dominates a hybrid when its marginal damage is constant and the
pollutants are substitutes
Figure 2.2: Optimal pollutant 1 policies when it has a constant marginal damage
function and the pollutants are substitutes
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A positive shock to abatement costs again shifts the marginal abatement costs for
both pollutants upward from their expected values by u+(a2 + w)/a2. Since w < 0
when the pollutants are substitutes, the upward shift is less than if the pollutants
were complements or they did not interact in abatement. Ultimately the abatement
cost shock produces marginal abatement costs −C+1 and −C+2 and emissions Q+1 and
Q+2 as shown in Figure (2.2b).
Figure (2.2c) adds a hybrid regulation for pollutant 1. Given the positive
abatement cost shock, the price ceiling causes lower emissions Qh1 than under the
tax. From (2.20), the higher pollutant 1 price causes a shift of −w/a2 > 0 in the
marginal abatement cost of pollutant 2 to −Ch2 , which in turn leads to higher
emissions Qh2 . Note how limiting the variation in pollutant 1 emissions with a
hybrid policy increases the variation in emissions of the co-pollutant when the
pollutants are substitutes. Relative to a tax on the primary pollutant, a hybrid
decreases social costs associated with pollutant 1 (the shaded area in the left panel
Figure (2.2c)) but increases the social cost associated with pollutant 2 (the shaded
area in the right panel Figure (2.2c)). We can see this trade-off in the marginal
effect of the binding price ceiling on social costs in equation (2.24), where, in the
case of Figure (2.2c), the first term is negative indicating the reduction in social
costs associated with pollutant 1, while the second term is positive indicating the
increase in social costs associated with pollutant 2.
Despite this tradeoff, part (1) of Corollary 4 tells us that the tax on pollutant 1
dominates a hybrid policy in this case. This is clear from equation (2.25), which is
strictly positive because t∗1(t2) − τ1 and ∂Q1/∂τ1 are both negative, while
D22(Q
h
2) −D22(Q02) and ∂Q2/∂τ1 are both positive. Thus, the hybrid increases social
costs associated with a positive abatement cost shock relative to an emissions tax
when the pollutants are substitutes. (2.25) remains strictly positive if the marginal
damage for the co-pollutant is also constant. In this case the second term of (2.25)
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is zero because D22(Q
h
2) would equal D
2
2(Q
0
2), but the first term would remain
strictly positive. This illustrates the result of Corollary 4 that a hybrid for the
primary pollutant can never dominate an emissions tax when its marginal damage is
constant and the pollutants are substitutes.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined the problem of regulating a pollutant that
interacts in abatement with a separately-regulated co-pollutant in a second-best
setting. In particular, we have developed rules for determining whether a pollutant
should be controlled with a tax, a permit market, or a market with price controls,
given the regulation of its co-pollutant. These rules depend on the relative slopes of
the damage functions for both pollutants and the aggregate marginal abatement
cost function, whether the pollutants are complements or substitutes in abatement,
and whether the co-pollutant is controlled with a tax or tradable permits (but not
whether the co-pollutant is regulated efficiently). We have stressed how the
alternative policies for the primary pollutant affect the expected damage of the
co-pollutant through changes in the variance of co-pollutant emissions, and how this
effect helps determine the optimal policy for the primary pollutant. In general, the
conventional wisdom about the instrument choice problem must be reconsidered
when regulation of the primary pollutant affects the variation of emissions of the
co-pollutant. For example, we have illustrated how accounting for carbon
co-pollutants like NOX, SO2 and PM, which are complements with carbon in
abatement, can call for a carbon market when a carbon tax would be the efficient
choice in the absence of co-pollutants.
There are, of course, many ways to extend our work. For example, important
elements of our results depend on how regulation of the primary pollutant changes
emissions of the co-pollutant. We have examined two possible cases, one in which
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co-pollutant emissions do not change because they are controlled with an exogenous
number of fixed permits, and the other in which emissions of the co-pollutant are
variable because they are controlled with a tax. However, other regulations of the
co-pollutant will allow it to vary as emissions of the primary pollutant vary. One
example, among many, is when the co-pollutant is controlled with a performance
standard. Therefore, an interesting area for future work is to determine how the rules
for instrument choice change with different regulations of the co-pollutant than those
we considered in this paper.
Other elements to consider in future research include examining the
consequences of multiple co-pollutants with spatially differentiated damages. While
we have focused on the regulation of a pollutant with one co-pollutant, a pollutant
may have several co-pollutants, some of which may be complements while others are
substitutes. Future work can address how the combination of heterogeneous
abatement interactions of multiple co-pollutants affects the design of environmental
policies, including the instrument choice problem. Moreover, we have assumed that
the two pollutants in our model are uniformly mixed pollutants. However, multiple
interacting pollutants may cause spatially heterogeneous damages. For example,
while carbon is a uniformly mixed pollutant, its co-pollutants NOX, SO2 and PM
are non-uniformly mixed pollutants. This suggests that efficient regulation of a
pollutant that has non-uniformly mixed co-pollutants may have a spatial
component. These and other characteristics of co-pollutants are important factors
to consider in designing efficient environmental regulation.
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CHAPTER 3
SECOND BEST REGULATION IN THE PRESENCE OF
CO-POLLUTANTS
3.1 Introduction
This paper examines the effects of the interactions between two pollutants in
abatement and damages on the form and performance of optimal price-based
policies for a pollutant when its co-pollutant is regulated with either an emissions
tax or pure permit trading. The study of regulation in the presence of co-pollutants
is motivated by efforts to control greenhouse gases (GHGs) to mitigate the threat of
climate change. Most economic activities that emit GHGs also produce other
pollutants like NOX, SO2, and PM simultaneously. Thus, efforts to reduce GHGs
can also decrease the emissions of these other pollutants. These ancillary benefits of
controlling GHGs are one of the co-benefits of climate policies. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has reviewed research that
assesses various GHG mitigation measures and show the potential co-benefits and
adverse side-effects in Chapter 6 of IPCC (2014).1 It has concluded that the
co-benefits of climate policies from co-pollutants can be significant. There are many
studies that focus on evaluating the co-benefits of climate policies (Burtraw et al.
(2003); Nemet et al. (2010); Groosman et al. (2011); Parry et al. (2015)).2 Although
1Apart from the effects on air pollution and health damages through co-pollutants, IPCC (2014)
shows various other co-benefits and side-effects of climate policies like the effects on energy security
and access, employment, biodiversity conservation, water use, and food security.
2For instance, Nemet et al. (2010) survey empirical research on the co-benefits of climate policies
from co-pollutants and find that the estimated co-benefits have a range of $2 to $196/tCO2 with
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the results of these studies often show complementary interactions between multiple
pollutants in abatement, this is not always the case. In some cases, the efforts to
reduce one pollutant can increase the emissions other pollutants. For instance, using
scrubbers to reduce the emissions of SO2 and PM consumes large amount of energy
and thus causes increases in emissions of CO2 (Moslener and Requate (2007);
Ambec and Coria (2013)). Leightner (1999) finds that increasing the concentration
of SO2 by 1% can reduce the average concentration of NOX by 1.54% to 4.03%,
holding inputs and output constant. While this substitution relationship comes
from the technical relationship in a single source, the interaction between pollutants
can also come from more complicated interactions between multiple sources in a
market. For example, Ren et al. (2011) find that increasing biofuel use to replace
fossil fuels can reduce the emissions of CO2, but may also increase nitrogen leaching.
Multiple pollutants can interact not only in abatement but also in the damage
that they cause. Kortenkamp et al. (2009) show that chemicals combined with each
other can produce effects that are larger than the separate effects of each chemical
compound. This implies that the benefits of reducing one pollutant can sometimes
be much greater than the damage that it causes alone. Like the interaction in
abatement, however, the interaction of pollutants in damages can also work in the
opposite direction; that is, the interaction among pollutants may reduce damages.
For instance, in the case of climate change mitigation, the sulphate aerosol formed
from SO2 emissions can have a net cooling effect because they interact with clouds
to reflect sunlight back to space (Forster et al. (2007); Ramanathan and Feng
(2008); Pleijel (2009); IPCC (2014)). Fuglestvedt et al. (2009) show the possible
a mean of $49/tCO2 in 2008 dollars. Groosman et al. (2011) calculate the co-benefits of a policy
to reduce GHGs as the reduced local emissions of local pollutants in transportation and electric
power sectors and they find that the estimated co-benefits can have the range of $1 to $77/tCO2 in
2008 dollars. Parry et al. (2015) estimate nationally efficient carbon prices among top 20 emitting
countries based solely on domestic co-benefits excluding the benefits from the climate change and
they find that the average co-benefits are $57.5/tCO2 for 2010 (in 2010 dollars).
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“double warming” effects of controlling SO2 in shipping sector, one effect is from
CO2 while the other is due to the reduction of SO2. Shindell and Faluvegi (2010)
find similar results from controlling SO2 and NOX in coal-fired power plants.
The regulation of multiple interacting pollutants has received much attention
among researchers. For the efficient control of all pollutants, regulations for each
pollutant should be determined jointly to maximize the social net benefits from all
pollutants, and thus efficient controls should reflect the interactions of pollutants in
abatement and damages. Caplan and Silva (2005) show that joint permit markets
for controlling local and global pollutants from a single source can achieve a Pareto
optimum. Ambec and Coria (2013) derive the efficient combination of policies for
two pollutants that interact in abatement costs and damages. However, since each
environmental regulation usually focuses on its own target pollutant, it’s not likely
that the interactions of pollutants in abatement and damages are considered on
every regulation. This implies that one or both of the regulations may not be set
efficiently from the perspective of controlling all pollutants. The theory of the
second-best (Lipsey and Lancaster (1956)) implies in this case that the optimal
regulation of a pollutant will deviate from its first-best control. We will take this
second-best approach to model control of two pollutants that interact in both
abatement costs and damages. For environmental regulations, there are many
studies which take the second-best approach. Many of them focus on controlling
only one pollutant and consider the effects of other distortionary taxes in the
economy like labor and capital taxes (Bovenberg and Goulder (1996); Goulder et al.
(1999); Bento and Jacobsen (2007); Crago and Khanna (2014)). However, Ren et al.
(2011) consider the case where two processes produce the same output but different
pollutants. When the tax for one of the two pollutants is not set efficiently, they
derive the optimal tax for the other pollutant and show that the optimal tax
deviates from its first-best level.
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Our model considers two pollutants which interact in abatement costs and
damages. In order for efficient outcomes to be achieved, it is required that the
regulations of each pollutant be determined jointly. In this case, we derive the ex
ante optimal emissions and prices of both pollutants which jointly minimize
expected social costs, and we use these ex ante optimal emissions and prices as
benchmarks throughout the analysis.
Although there are two regulations, it is unlikely that efficient outcomes are
achieved because a single environmental regulation usually focuses only on its target
pollutant. Thus, we assume that the regulation of the co-pollutant is exogenously
given and it may deviate from its ex ante optimal price or emissions. We consider
both an emissions tax and a pure permit market for the exogenous regulation of the
co-pollutant. In this situation, we derive the form and performance of optimal
price-based regulations for the primary pollutant under asymmetric information
about abatement costs. Since the regulation for the co-pollutant is likely to deviate
from its ex ante optimal level, we will take the second-best approach to interpret the
results of our model. For the regulation of the primary pollutant we consider an
emissions tax, pure permit trading, and a hybrid policy which imposes a price
ceiling and a price floor on a permit market. We find that, given the regulation of
the co-pollutant, all the optimal regulations for the primary pollutant produce the
same expected emissions. However, inefficient regulation of the co-pollutant leads
the optimal control of the primary pollutant to deviate from its ex-ante optimal
level. We show that this deviation depend on 1) the interactions of the two
pollutants in abatement costs and damages, 2) the deviation of the regulation of the
co-pollutant from its ex ante optimal level, and 3) the form of the regulation for the
co-pollutant.
After presenting general results about the how the stringency and form of the
regulation of the co-pollutant affects the second-best control of the primary pollutant,
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we consider several special cases to illustrate the results. For the simplest case, the
co-pollutant is regulated by tradable permits and the interaction of the two pollutants
is only in abatement. Then, if the two pollutants are complements in abatement and
the number of tradable permits for the co-pollutant is higher (lower) than its ex ante
optimal emissions, then the optimal regulations of the primary pollutant produce
expected emissions that are higher (lower) than its ex ante optimal emissions. Thus,
in this case, the direction of the deviation of the second-best control of the primary
pollutant from its ex ante optimal level is the same as the direction of the deviation
of control of the co-pollutant from its ex ante optimal level. When, the pollutants
are substitutes in abatement the deviations of control from ex ante optimal values of
the two pollutant are in opposite directions.
Cases are more complicated when the co-pollutant is regulated by an emissions
tax, because its emissions are variable and affected by the emissions of the primary
pollutant. This leads to contrary results when the co-pollutant is regulated with
tradable permits. When the pollutants interact only in abatement, if the two
pollutants are complements and a low (high) tax for the co-pollutant results in the
expected emissions that are higher (lower) than its ex ante optimal emissions, the
optimal regulations for the primary pollutant produce expected emissions that are
lower (higher) than its ex ante optimal emissions as long as its marginal damage
function is upward sloping. When the two pollutants are substitutes, the deviations
in expected emissions from their ex ante optimal values of the two pollutants work
in the same direction. That these results are opposite of the case when the
co-pollutant is controlled with tradable permits highlights the importance of the
form of regulation of the co-pollutant on the second-best control of the primary
pollutant.
Not surprisingly, matters are even more complicated for two pollutants that
interact in both abatement and damages. However, our analysis makes it clear that
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it is whether the two pollutants are complements or substitutes in social costs that
partly determines the qualitative impact of inefficient regulation of the co-pollutant
on the second-best control of the primary pollutant, not necessarily the specific
interactions in abatement costs and damages.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we specify
our model and derive the ex-ante optimal emissions and prices for both pollutants.
In section 3, we derive the forms of a hybrid price and quantity regulation for the
the primary pollutant, given that the co-pollutant is regulated with tradable permits
or an emissions tax. Then, as special cases of a hybrid policy, we derive the optimal
emissions tax and tradable permits. In section 4, we show the expected performance
of all the optimal price-based regulations. We conclude in section 5.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Abatement costs and damage functions
Consider n heterogeneous and risk-neutral firms in an industry. Each firm emits
two pollutants which interact in abatement costs and damages. Each pollutant is
assumed to be uniformly mixed so that damages depend only on the aggregate
emissions of each pollutant. In this subsection, first we will specify the structure of
individual firms’ abatement costs, aggregate abatement costs and the damage
functions. Then, in the next subsection, we will derive the ex-ante optimal
emissions and the ex-ante optimal prices for both pollutants. These values minimize
the expected sum of aggregate abatement costs and damages and will be used as
benchmarks throughout the analysis.
3.2.1.1 Firm’s abatement cost function
Suppose that firm i emits qij units of pollutant j, j = 1, 2. We define a firm’s
abatement costs as the sacrificed profits from reducing its emissions for either or both
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of the pollutants. Following much of the literature, we assume that firm i’s abatement
cost function, denoted by Ci (qi1, qi2, u), has the following form:
Ci (qi1, qi2, u) = ci0 − (ci1 + u) (qi1 + qi2) + ci2
2
(
q2i1 + q
2
i2
)− wiqi1qi2, (3.1)
with the constants ci0 > 0, ci1 > 0, and ci2 > 0. The coefficient wi represents the
interaction of the two pollutants in abatement costs. If wi > 0, then the pollutants
are complements in abatement and if wi < 0, then they are substitutes in abatement.
Random shocks that affect abatement costs are captured by changes in the random
variable u, which is distributed according to the probability density function f (u)
over the support of [u, u] with zero expectation. It is assumed that the random
shock u is common to all firms in the industry. Firm i’s abatement cost function is
strictly convex in the two pollutants and thus, c2i2 − w2i > 0. By the definition of
abatement costs, in the absence of regulation, firm i’s emissions for both pollutants
are determined so that abatement costs are minimized. We assume that this minimum
occurs at strictly positive levels of emissions for both pollutants; that is, qi1 = qi2 =
(ci1 + u) / (ci2 − wi) > 0. To guarantee this last assumption, we assume ci1 + u > 0
for all realizations of u and ci2 − wi > 0. In turn, c2i2 − w2i > 0 implies ci2 + wi > 0.
3.2.1.2 Aggregate abatement cost function
Firms in an industry will face uniform prices for the emissions of the pollutants,
which can have the form of either a competitive permit price or an emissions tax.
This guarantees that aggregate abatement costs are minimized for levels of aggregate
emissions of both pollutants and a realization of u. Let the aggregate emissions of
both pollutants be Qj =
∑n
i=1 qij, j = 1, 2. The (minimum) aggregate abatement
cost function, C (Q1, Q2, u), is the solution to the following problem:
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min
{qi1}ni=1,{qi2}ni=1,
n∑
i=1
Ci (qi1, qi2, u)
subject to Qj =
n∑
i=1
qij, for j = 1, 2. (3.2)
It can be shown that when firms’ abatement cost functions have the form of (3.1),
the aggregate abatement cost function has the form
C (Q1, Q2, u) = a0 − (a1 + u) (Q1 +Q2) + a2
2
(
Q21 +Q
2
2
)− wQ1Q2, (3.3)
with the constants a0 > 0, a1 > 0, and a2 > 0. In addition, it is straightforward to
show that given the structure and assumptions of (3.1), a1 + u > 0, a
2
2 − w2 > 0,
a2 − w > 0, and a2 + w > 0.3 Therefore, the aggregate abatement cost function has
the same structure as individual firms’ abatement cost functions. First, it is
quadratic and strictly convex in both pollutants (a22 − w2 > 0). Second, a random
variable u that represents an industry-level random shock causes the marginal
aggregate abatement cost functions to move up or down in parallel. Next, without
any regulations, aggregate emissions of both pollutants are strictly positive for any
realization of u (Q1 = Q2 = (a1 + u) / (a2 − w) > 0). As before, these two factors
limit the interaction parameter w to a2 − w > 0 and a2 + w > 0. Finally, the
interaction parameter w determines whether the two pollutants are complements or
substitutes in abatement. To see this write the marginal abatement cost of the jth
pollutant; −Cj = a1 + u − a2Qj + wQk, j, k = 1, 2 and j 6= k, where
−Cj = −∂C/∂Qj. Note that if the two pollutants are complements at the industry
level (w > 0), an increase in aggregate emissions of pollutant k will increase
aggregate marginal abatement costs for pollutant j. Thus, given a price for
pollutant j, the emissions of pollutant j will also increase, which implies that the
3The proofs of the structure of the aggregate abatement cost function and our assertions about
its characteristics are omitted here to save space. They are available upon request.
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emissions of both pollutants tend to move in the same direction if they are
complements. If the two pollutants are substitutes in abatement (w < 0), an
increase in emissions of pollutant k will lead to a decrease in the marginal
abatement costs of pollutant j. Thus, we can infer that both pollutants will move in
the opposite directions.
3.2.1.3 Damage function
We assume that a damage function has the following form:
D (Q1, Q2) = d11Q1 +
d12
2
Q21 + d21Q2 +
d22
2
Q22 + vQ1Q2, (3.4)
with d11 > 0, d12 ≥ 0, d21 > 0, and d22 ≥ 0. The parameter v in (3.4) represents
the interaction of the two pollutants in damages. Note that we do not impose any
assumptions on the curvature of the damage function at this point. However, since it
is required to limit the interaction parameter v to guarantee the existence of optimal
policies, some restrictions will be specified in the next subsection. To understand
how the interaction of the two pollutants in damages works, consider the marginal
damage function of pollutant j, Dj = dj1 + dj2Qj + vQk, j, k = 1, 2 and j 6= k,
where Dj = ∂D/∂Qj. Then, if v is positive, increases in emissions of pollutant k will
cause the marginal damage of pollutant j to increase. Thus, it is desirable that the
emissions of pollutant j should be reduced more. In this sense, we can say that if
v > 0, the two pollutants are substitutes in damages. On the other hand, for negative
values of v, increases in emissions of pollutant k will decrease the marginal damage of
pollutant j. Thus it is permissible to emit more of pollutant j. That is, if v < 0, then
the two pollutants are complements in damages.4 We assume that zero emissions of
4In terms of abatement, if v > 0, abatement in one pollutant shifts down the marginal damage
of the other pollutant because of some tradeoffs between two pollutants. Thus, the marginal benefit
of the reduction in the other pollutant decreases. On the other hand, if v < 0, abatement in one
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either pollutant cannot be optimal, which requires in part that the intercept of the
marginal abatement cost function will never be below either of the intercepts of the
marginal damage functions; that is, a1 +u > d11 and a1 +u > d21. Finally, we assume
that there is no uncertainty about the damage function.
3.2.2 Ex ante optimal emissions and prices
In this subsection, we will derive the ex-ante optimal emissions and prices of both
pollutants. These values minimize the expected sum of aggregate abatement costs
and damages. However, since we focus on the second-best situation where one of the
two pollutants is not controlled efficiently, all the main results in this paper will be
described by the deviations from these ex ante optimal emissions or prices.
3.2.2.1 Ex ante optimal emissions
Define the ex ante optimal emissions as the amounts of emissions for both
pollutants which minimize the expected sum of the aggregate abatement costs and
damages and denote them as Q̂1 and Q̂2. These are the solutions to
min
Q1,Q2
E [C (Q1, Q2, u) +D (Q1, Q2)] . (3.5)
From (3.3) and (3.4), the ex ante optimal emissions of both pollutants are
Q̂1 =
(a1 − d11) (a2 + d22)− (a1 − d21) (v − w)
(a2 + d12) (a2 + d22)− (v − w)2
; (3.6)
Q̂2 =
(a1 − d21) (a2 + d12)− (a1 − d11) (v − w)
(a2 + d12) (a2 + d22)− (v − w)2
. (3.7)
pollutant shifts up the marginal damage of the other pollutant because of the combined effects of
joint abatement. Thus, the marginal benefit of abatement in the other pollutant also increases.
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To be sure that (3.6) and (3.7) minimize (3.5), we assume that the denominator of
(3.6) and (3.7) is strictly positive, that is:
(a2 + d12) (a2 + d22)− (v − w)2 > 0.
Since this term is the determinant of the Hessian of E [C (Q1, Q2, u) +D (Q1, Q2)],
this assumption is implied by the strict convexity of E [C (Q1, Q2, u) +D (Q1, Q2)].
This assumption also limits the interaction parameter v by
w −
√
(a2 + d12) (a2 + d22) < v < w +
√
(a2 + d12) (a2 + d22). (3.8)
Moreover, since we want the ex ante optimal emissions to be strictly positive, we add
the assumptions that the numerators of (3.6) and (3.7) are strictly positive.
To understand how the damage caused by one pollutant affects the ex ante optimal
emissions for both pollutants, consider the effects of a change in the intercept of the
marginal damage of one pollutant on the ex ante optimal emissions of the other
pollutant:
∂Q̂j
∂dj1
=
− (a2 + dk2)
(a2 + d12) (a2 + d22)− (v − w)2
< 0, j, k = 1, 2, and j 6= k; (3.9)
∂Q̂k
∂dj1
=
v − w
(a2 + d12) (a2 + d22)− (v − w)2
, j, k = 1, 2, and j 6= k. (3.10)
(3.9) shows that increases in the marginal damage function of one pollutant decreases
its own ex ante optimal emissions. However, (3.10) implies that the effect on the
other pollutant depends on the sign of v − w, which represents the net interaction
of the two pollutants both in abatement and damages. If v − w < 0, then the two
pollutants are complements in social costs and thus an increase in the intercept of
the marginal damage function of one pollutant leads to a reduction in the ex ante
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optimal emissions for both pollutants. If the pollutants are substitutes in social costs
(v − w > 0), an increase in the intercept of the marginal damage function of one
pollutant leads to a decrease in the ex ante optimal emissions for that pollutant,
but an increase in the ex ante optimal emissions of its co-pollutant. Note that these
relationships do not necessarily require that both pollutants should be complements
(or substitutes) in abatement and damages at the same time. That is, the overall
interaction effect on social costs can imply complements (or substitutes) even if the
pollutants are substitutes (or complements) in either abatement costs or damages.
3.2.2.2 Ex ante optimal prices
To derive the ex ante optimal prices for emissions of both pollutants, we need
to specify how the aggregate emissions of each pollutant respond to changes in their
prices. For arbitrary prices for emissions of both pollutants, P1 and P2, aggregate
emissions are determined so that the marginal aggregate abatement costs of each
pollutant are equal to each price. That is,
Pj = −Cj (Q1, Q2, u) , j = 1, 2. (3.11)
By solving these equations for Q1 and Q2 simultaneously, we have
Qj (P1, P2, u) =
(a1 + u) (a2 + w)− a2Pj − wPk
a22 − w2
j, k = 1, 2, j 6= k. (3.12)
Note that the own-price effect on aggregate emissions is negative but the cross-price
effect depends on whether the pollutants are complements or substitutes in
abatement. In particular, the cross-price effect is negative if the pollutants are
complements in abatement (w > 0), and it is positive if the pollutants are
substitutes in abatement (w < 0).
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Denote the ex ante optimal prices for emissions of both pollutants as P̂1 and P̂2.
Then they are solutions to
min
P1,P2
E [C (Q1 (P1, P2, u) , Q2 (P1, P2, u) , u) +D (Q1 (P1, P2, u) , Q2 (P1, P2, u))] .
(3.13)
Substituting (3.3), (3.4), and (3.12) into (3.13) and solving the problem for P1 and
P2 yields:
P̂1 =d11+
d12[(a1−d11)(a2+d22)+(a1−d21)w]+v[(a1−d21)a2−(a1−d11)(v−w)]
(a2 + d12) (a2 + d22)− (v − w)2
; (3.14)
P̂2 =d12+
d22[(a1−d21)(a2+d12)+(a1−d11)w]+v[(a1−d11)a2−(a1−d21)(v−w)]
(a2 + d12) (a2 + d22)− (v − w)2
. (3.15)
Now consider the relationship between the ex ante optimal emissions and the ex ante
optimal prices. First, by substituting (3.14) and (3.15) into (3.12), we can find that,
given P̂1 and P̂2, the expected aggregate emissions are equal to the ex ante optimal
emissions:
E
[
Qj
(
P̂1, P̂2, u
)]
= Q̂j, j = 1, 2.
In addition, by rearranging (3.14) and (3.15) and using (3.6) and (3.7), we derive the
following relationships:
P̂j = dj1+dj2Q̂j+vQ̂k = E
[
Dj
(
Q1
(
P̂1, P̂2, u
)
, Q2
(
P̂1, P̂2, u
))]
, j, k = 1, 2, j 6= k,
which implies that the ex ante optimal prices P̂1 and P̂2 are equal to the expected
marginal damages of each pollutant at the ex ante optimal emissions, Q̂1 and Q̂2.
3.3 Optimal price-based regulations
From now on we will denote the primary pollutant as pollutant 1 and the
co-pollutant as pollutant 2. In this section we derive the optimal forms of
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price-based regulations for pollutant 1 when the regulation of pollutant 2 is given
exogenously. While pollutant 2 is regulated through either an emissions tax t¯2 or
competitively tradable permits L¯2, pollutant 1 is regulated by an emissions tax,
pure permit trading, or a hybrid policy which imposes a price ceiling and a price
floor on a permit market that was suggested by Roberts and Spence (1976).
Although we can set up the problem for all policy combinations of both pollutants
and derive the optimal regulation for pollutant 1, instead we first derive the optimal
hybrid policy for pollutant 1 and then derive its optimal emissions tax and its
optimal number of permits by exploiting the well-known fact that a hybrid policy
can encompass an emissions tax and pure permit trading as special cases.
Under the hybrid policy the government issues total permits λ1 and distributes
them across regulated firms free of charge. Firms trade their permits in a competitive
permit market. When the demand of permits is so high that a competitive permit
price would be greater than τ1, firms can buy additional permits from the government
at the price of τ1. Thus a competitive permit price will bind at the price ceiling τ1.
On the other hand, if the demand of permits is so low that a competitive permit price
would be lower than σ1, firms will abate more than required and sell unused permits
back to the government at the price of σ1. Thus a competitive permit price will bind
at a price floor σ1. We will denote the hybrid policy as h1 = (λ1, τ1, σ1). The price
controls are restricted by τ1 ≥ σ1.
To derive the optimal hybrid policy for pollutant 1 given the regulation of pollutant
2, we need to specify how the aggregate emissions of both pollutants respond to all
policy combinations. Obviously, if both pollutants are controlled through pure permit
markets, aggregate emissions will be fixed at the issued permits for each pollutant. For
the case where both pollutants are regulated through emissions taxes, the responses
are given by (3.12). So the remaining case is when one pollutant is controlled through
a price instrument and the other one is limited by a quantity instrument. Suppose
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that pollutant j is regulated by a price Pj and pollutant k is regulated by tradable
permits Lk, j, k = 1, 2 and j 6= k. Then, the aggregate emissions of pollutant j is the
solution to
Pj = −Cj (Qj, Lk, u) , j, k = 1, 2, j 6= k. (3.16)
Applying (3.3) to (3.16) and solving for Qj yields
Qj (Pj, Lk, u) =
a1 + u− Pj + wLk
a2
, j, k = 1, 2, j 6= k. (3.17)
Note that if both pollutants are complements in abatement (w > 0), increases in
permits of pollutant k will lead to increases in the aggregate emissions of pollutant
j. On the other hand, if they are substitutes in abatement (w < 0), they will move
in the opposite direction.
3.3.1 When the co-pollutant is regulated by tradable permits L¯2
We now derive the optimal hybrid policy for pollutant 1 given tradable permits L¯2
for pollutant 2. To specify the expected social costs in this situation, we need to find
the cut-off values of the random variable u where supplied permits λ1 and either of
the price controls bind together. Denote these values of u as uτ1 and uσ1 , respectively,
with uτ1 ≥ uσ1 . From (3.16), uτ1 and uσ1 are defined as the solutions to
z = −C1
(
λ1, L¯2, u
z
)
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1} .
So the cut-off values of u are
uz
(
λ1, z, L¯2
)
= −a1 + z + a2λ1 − wL¯2, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1} , (3.18)
and they are restricted by uτ1 ≤ u and uσ1 ≥ u. For u ≤ uσ1 the competitive permit
price binds at the price floor σ1 and for u ≥ uτ1 the permit price binds at the price
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ceiling τ1. For each case, aggregate emissions of pollutant 1 are determined from
(3.17). For uσ1 ≤ u ≤ uτ1 a competitive permit price is equal to −C1
(
λ1, L¯2, u
)
and aggregate emissions of pollutant 1 are fixed at the supplied permits λ1. Thus,
aggregate emissions of both pollutants can be summarized as
(Q1, Q2) =

(
Q1
(
τ1, L¯2, u
)
, L¯2
)
for u ∈ [uτ1 , u](
λ1, L¯2
)
for u ∈ [uσ1 , uτ1 ](
Q1
(
σ1, L¯2, u
)
, L¯2
)
for u ∈ [u, uσ1 ]
. (3.19)
Given (3.19), the expected social costs under a hybrid policy for pollutant 1 given
tradable permits L¯2 for pollutant 2 are
W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, L2
)
=
∫ u
uτ1(λ1,τ1,L2)
[
C
(
Q1
(
τ1, L2, u
)
, L2, u
)
+D
(
Q1
(
τ1, L2, u
)
, L2
)]
f (u) du
+
∫ uτ1(λ1,τ1,L2)
uσ1(λ1,σ1,L2)
[
C
(
λ1, L2, u
)
+D
(
λ1, L2
)]
f (u) du
+
∫ uσ1(λ1,σ1,L2)
u
[
C
(
Q1
(
σ1, L2, u
)
, L2, u
)
+D
(
Q1
(
σ1, L2, u
)
, L2
)]
f (u) du. (3.20)
The optimal hybrid policy for pollutant 1 given tradable permits L¯2 is the solution
to
min
λ1,τ1,σ1
W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, L2
)
, subject to τ1 ≥ σ1, uτ1 ≤ u, uσ1 ≥ u. (3.21)
Binding constraints in (3.21) determine the optimal regulation for pollutant 1 given
tradable permits L¯2. If none of the constraints bind, then a permit market with a
price ceiling and a price floor is optimal, denoted by h∗1 =
(
λ∗1
(
L¯2
)
, τ ∗1
(
L¯2
)
, σ∗1
(
L¯2
))
.
However, if the solution satisfies the first constraint with equality, that is, τ1 = σ1,
then the optimal policy is a price instrument because the probability that the permit
supply will bind becomes zero. In this case, however, it is not possible for our model
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to distinguish between subsidy σ1 on abatement and emissions tax τ1. However, since
a tax would be preferred to a subsidy in an extended model, we assume that if a price
instrument is optimal, then it is implemented in the form of an emissions tax, denoted
by t∗1
(
L¯2
)
. Finally, if the last two constraints bind, that is, uτ1 = u and uσ1 = u, then
a pure permit market without price controls is optimal, denoted by L∗1
(
L¯2
)
, because
the probability that any of the price controls will bind becomes zero.
In section B.1 in Appendix B, we derive the optimal hybrid policy for pollutant 1
given tradable permits L¯2, h
∗
1 =
(
λ∗1
(
L¯2
)
, τ ∗1
(
L¯2
)
, σ∗1
(
L¯2
))
, as follows:
λ∗1
(
L¯2
)
= Q̂1 − v − w
a2 + d12
(
L¯2 − Q̂2
)
+
E
[
u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ]
a2 + d12
; (3.22)
τ ∗1
(
L¯2
)
= P̂1 +
a2v + d12w
a2 + d12
(
L¯2 − Q̂2
)
+
d12E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u¯]
a2 + d12
; (3.23)
σ∗1
(
L¯2
)
= P̂1 +
a2v + d12w
a2 + d12
(
L¯2 − Q̂2
)
+
d12E
[
u|u ≤ u ≤ uσ∗1]
a2 + d12
, (3.24)
where E
[
u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ], E [u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u¯], andE [u|u ≤ u ≤ uσ∗1] are conditional
expectations of u.5 As explained above, to find the optimal permits for pollutant 1
given tradable permits L¯2, L
∗
1
(
L¯2
)
, we can set uτ
∗
1 ≥ u and uσ∗1 ≤ u to disable the
price controls, which implies that E
[
u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ] = 0. Thus, from (3.22) we find
that
L∗1
(
L¯2
)
= Q̂1 − v − w
a2 + d12
(
L¯2 − Q̂2
)
. (3.25)
On the other hand, to derive the optimal emissions tax for pollutant 1 given tradable
permits L¯2, t
∗
1
(
L¯2
)
, we can set uτ
∗
1 ≤ u to disable the permit supply, which implies
that E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u¯] = 0. (We could also disable the permit supply by setting
uσ
∗
1 ≥ u¯.) Thus, from (3.23) we find that
t∗1
(
L¯2
)
= P̂1 +
a2v + d12w
a2 + d12
(
L¯2 − Qˆ2
)
. (3.26)
5(3.22) through (3.24) are not exact ’solutions’, because the right-hand sides of the equations
include the optimal policy variables in the conditional expectations.
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Note that all policy variables in (3.22) through (3.26) deviate from their ex ante
optimal emissions or ex ante optimal price (Q̂1 or P̂1) unless L¯2 = Q̂. Deviations of
these policy variables depend on 1) the interactions of the two pollutants and 2) the
deviation of the tradable permits L¯2 for pollutant 2 from its ex ante optimal emissions
Q̂2.
To understand how the optimal policy variables deviate from their ex ante
optimal values, suppose that tradable permits of pollutant 2 exceed the ex ante
optimal emissions; that is, L¯2 > Q̂2. First, the deviations of the quantity variables
such λ∗1
(
L¯2
)
and L∗1
(
L¯2
)
are determined by the sign of v − w. As explained in
subsection 3.2.2, this term represents the net interaction of both pollutants in
abatement and damages together. More specifically, v − w represents parallel
movement of the expected marginal social costs of pollutant 1 due to changes in Q2
given emissions of pollutant 1, that is:
∂E [C1 (Q1, Q2, u) +D1 (Q1, Q2)]
∂Q2
= v − w.
By the definition of the ex ante optimal emissions, both Q̂1 and Q̂2 satisfy
E
[
C1
(
Q̂1, Q̂2, u
)
+D1
(
Q̂1, Q̂2
)]
= 0.
Thus, if two pollutants are complements in social costs (v − w < 0), then L¯2 > Q̂2
implies that E
[
C1
(
Q̂1, L¯2, u
)
+D1
(
Q̂1, L¯2
)]
< 0. In this case, the optimal
emissions for pollutant 1 should be adjusted to reflect the inefficiency caused by the
over-supply of tradable permits for pollutant 2. The marginal social cost of
pollutant 1 is an increasing function of pollutant 1, given emissions of pollutant 2;
that is, ∂2 [C (Q1, Q2, u) +D (Q1, Q2)] /∂Q
2
1 = a2 + d12 > 0. This implies that the
optimal emissions for pollutant 1 should exceed its ex ante optimal emissions Q̂1.
By the same reasoning, we can infer that if the two pollutants are substitutes in
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social costs (v − w > 0), then λ∗1
(
L¯2
)
and L∗1
(
L¯2
)
should be less than the ex ante
optimal emissions Q̂1.
Next, from (3.23), (3.24), and (3.26) we know that the deviations of the price
variables such as τ ∗1
(
L¯2
)
, σ∗1
(
L¯2
)
, and t∗1
(
L¯2
)
are determined by the sign of a2v +
d12w. This term represents parallel movement of the expected marginal social costs
of pollutant 1 due to changes in Q2, given a price for the emissions of pollutant 1;
that is,
∂E [C1 (Q1 (P1, Q2, u) , Q2, u) +D1 (Q1 (P1, Q2, u) , Q2)]
∂Q2
=
∂E [D1 (Q1 (P1, Q2, u) , Q2)]
∂Q2
=
a2v + d12w
a2
.
When pollutant 1 is regulated by a price instrument, the emissions of pollutant 1
are adjusted so that its expected marginal abatement cost is always equal to the
price P1. Thus, changes in Q2 can affect only the expected marginal damage of
pollutant 1. Interestingly, when the interactions in abatement costs and damages
show the same relationship, the two interaction effects on marginal damage work in
opposite directions. For instance, suppose that the two pollutants are complements
in both abatement and damages; that is, w > 0 and v < 0. Then, increases in the
emissions of pollutant 2 affect the marginal damage of pollutant 1 through two
channels. First, it will shift down the marginal damage function of pollutant 1
(v < 0). However, increases in the emissions of pollutant 2 lead to increases in the
emissions of pollutant 1 because they are complements in abatement (w > 0). As a
whole, the marginal damage function of pollutant 1 itself moves down, but the
additional emissions of pollutant 1 increases marginal damage. The overall effect is
indeterminate and it is determined by the relative magnitudes of each effect. Since
E
[
C1
(
Q1
(
P̂1, Q̂2, u
)
, Q̂2, u
)
+D1
(
Q1
(
P̂1, Q̂2, u
)
, Q̂2
)]
= 0, if a2v + d12w > 0,
L¯2 > Q̂2 implies that E
[
C1
(
Q1
(
P̂1, L¯2, u
)
, L¯2, u
)
+D1
(
Q1
(
P̂1, L¯2, u
)
, L¯2
)]
> 0.
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That is, given L¯2 > Q̂2, the ex ante optimal price for pollutant 1 cannot be efficient.
Since
∂ [C1 (Q1 (P1, Q2, u) , Q2, u) +D1 (Q1 (P1, Q2, u) , Q2)] /∂P1 = − (a2 + d12) /a2 < 0,
the optimal price for pollutant 1 should be greater than its ex ante optimal price for
a2v + d12w > 0. By the same logic, we can infer that the optimal price should be
less than its ex ante optimal price for a2v + d12w < 0.
3.3.2 When the co-pollutant is regulated by an emissions tax t¯2
Next consider the case in which pollutant 2 is regulated by an emissions tax t¯2.
The derivation of the optimal regulations for pollutant 1 given the tax t¯2 will follow
the same steps as in subsection 3.3.1. Thus, we begin by obtaining the optimal hybrid
policy for pollutant 1, h∗1 (t¯2) = (λ
∗
1 (t¯2) , τ
∗
1 (t¯2) , σ
∗
1 (t¯2)). The cut-off values, u
τ1 and
uσ1 , are solutions to
z = −C1 (λ1, Q2 (t¯2, λ1, uz) , uz) , z ∈ {τ1, σ1} . (3.27)
Explicitly, uτ1 and uσ1 have the following expressions:
uz (λ1, z, t¯2) = −a1 + a2z
a2 + w
+ (a2 − w)λ1 + wt¯2
a2 + w
, z ∈ {τ1, σ1} , (3.28)
and they are restricted by uτ1 ≤ u and uσ1 ≥ u. For u ≤ uσ1 (uτ1 ≤ u), the competitive
permit price of pollutant 1 will bind at the price floor σ1 (the price ceiling τ1), and
the emissions of both pollutants will be determined by (3.12). For uσ1 ≤ u ≤ uτ1 ,
the competitive permit price is −C1 (λ1, Q2 (t¯2, λ1, u) , u) and the aggregate emissions
of pollutant 1 binds at the permit supply λ1. Thus, the emissions of both pollutants
can be summarized as
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(Q1, Q2) =

(Q1 (τ1, t¯2, u) , Q2 (τ1, t¯2, u)) for u ∈ [uτ1 , u]
(λ1, Q2 (t¯2, λ1, u)) for u ∈ [uσ1 , uτ1 ]
(Q1 (σ1, t¯2, u) , Q2 (σ1, t¯2, u)) for u ∈ [u, uσ1 ]
. (3.29)
Given (3.29), the expected social costs can be expressed as
W (λ1, τ1, σ1, t¯2)
=
∫ u
uτ1(λ1,τ1,t¯2)
[C(Q1(τ1,t¯2,u),Q2(τ1,t¯2,u),u)+D(Q1(τ1,t¯2,u),Q2(τ1,t¯2,u))]f(u)du
+
∫ uτ1(λ1,τ1,t¯2)
uσ1(λ1,σ1,t¯2)
[C(λ1,Q2(t¯2,λ1,u),u)+D(λ1,Q2(t¯2,λ1,u))]f(u)du
+
∫ uσ1(λ1,σ1,t¯2)
u
[C(Q1(σ1,t¯2,u),Q2(σ1,t¯2,u),u)+D(Q1(σ1,t¯2,u),Q2(σ1,t¯2,u))]f(u)du.
(3.30)
The optimal policy for pollutant 1, given the tax t¯2, are solutions to
min
λ1,τ1,σ1
W (λ1, τ1, σ1, t¯2) subject to τ1 ≥ σ1, uτ1 ≤ u, uσ1 ≥ u. (3.31)
In section B.2 in Appendix B, we derive the optimal hybrid policy for pollutant 1,
given t¯2, h
∗
1 (t¯2) = (λ
∗
1 (t¯2) , τ
∗
1 (t¯2) , σ
∗
1 (t¯2)), as follows:
λ∗1(t¯2)=Q̂1+
Y
a2X+wY
(
t¯2−P̂2
)
+
[a2 (a2+w)−Y ]E
[
u|uσ∗1≤u≤uτ∗1 ]
a2X + wY
; (3.32)
τ ∗1 (t¯2)= P̂1−
a2Y +wX
a2X+wY
(
t¯2−P̂2
)
+
(a2+w)(a2d12+vw+Y )E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤u≤ u¯]
a2X + wY
; (3.33)
σ∗1(t¯2)= P̂1−
a2Y +wX
a2X+wY
(
t¯2−P̂2
)
+
(a2+w)(a2d12+vw+Y )E
[
u|u ≤u≤uσ∗1]
a2X + wY
, (3.34)
where X = a2 (a2 + d12) + w (v − w), Y = a2v + d22w, and a2X + wY > 0.6
6The strict convexity of C (Q1, Q2, u)+D (Q1, Q2) implies a2X+wY > 0. To see this, we note that
a2X +wY > 0 is required for the strict convexity of C (Q1, Q2 (t¯2, Q1, u) , u) +D (Q1, Q2 (t¯2, Q2, u))
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The term X = a2 (a2 + d12) + w (v − w) represents the effects of Q1 on its own
marginal social costs:
∂[C1(Q1,Q2(t¯2,Q1,u),u)+D1(Q1,Q2(t¯2,Q1,u))]
∂Q1
=
a2 (a2+d12)+w(v−w)
a2
. (3.35)
To exclude the case where increasing the emissions of pollutant 1 decreases its own
marginal social cost, we assume that X = a2 (a2 + d12) +w (v − w) > 0. Then, given
the range of v as (3.8), X > 0 requires
a22 (a2 + d12)− w2 (a2 + d22) ≥ 0 (3.36)
(We will use this condition in analyzing how the interaction in damage between the
two pollutants affects the regulation of pollutant 1, given the tax for pollutant 2).
On the other hand, Y = a2v+ d22w can have any sign but it is limited by X > 0 and
a2X + wY > 0.
As we did for the case in which pollutant 2 is regulated by tradable permits L¯2,
we can derive the optimal number of tradable permits for pollutant 1 under a pure
trading scheme, L∗1 (t¯2), and the optimal emissions tax, t
∗
1 (t¯2), as special cases of a
hybrid policy, resulting in:
L∗1 (t¯2) = Q̂1 +
Y
a2X + wY
(
t¯2 − P̂2
)
; (3.37)
t∗1 (t¯2) = P̂1 −
a2Y + wX
a2X + wY
(
t¯2 − P̂2
)
. (3.38)
in Q1; that is,
∂2 [C (Q1, Q2 (t¯2, Q1, u) , u) +D (Q1, Q2 (t¯2, Q2, u))] /∂Q
2
1
= a22 (a2 + d12) + w
2 (a2 + d22) + 2a2w (v − w)
= a2X + wY > 0.
Moreover, since the range of v where a2X+wY > 0 is larger than (3.8), which is the range of v where
C (Q1, Q2, u) + D (Q1, Q2) is strictly convex in Q1 and Q2, the strict convexity of C (Q1, Q2, u) +
D (Q1, Q2) implies a2X + wY > 0. Throughout, we restrict the range of v on (3.8).
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Note that as the case of given tradable permits L¯2, all policy variables in (3.32)
through (3.38) will deviate from the ex ante optimal emissions or prices, Q̂1 or P̂1,
unless t¯2 = P̂2. The deviations of optimal policy variables also depend on 1) the
interaction effects and 2) the deviation of the emissions tax t¯2 from its ex ante
optimal price P̂2. However, in this case, the multiplier terms of Y/ (a2X + wY ) and
(a2Y + wX) / (a2X + wY ) include parameters associated with pollutant 2. When
pollutant 2 is regulated by a tax, the emissions of pollutant 2 is not fixed and rather
it’s affected by the emissions of pollutant 1. This implies that choosing optimal
policy variables for pollutant 1 should consider the effects on the marginal social
cost of pollutant 2 of changes in the emissions of pollutant 1.
To see how the interactions of the two pollutants and the deviation of the emissions
tax t¯2 from its ex ante optimal price affects the optimal policy variables for pollutant
1, suppose that the emissions tax for pollutant 2 is set too low compared to its ex
ante optimal price; that is, t¯2 < P̂2. First, the deviations of quantity variables such
as λ∗1 (t¯2) and L
∗
1 (t¯2) depend on the sign of Y = a2v + d22w, which captures the
qualitative effects of changes in the price for pollutant 2 on the marginal social cost
of pollutant 1, that is,
∂
∂P2
[
∂ [C (Q1, Q2 (P2, Q1, u) , u) +D (Q1, Q2 (P2, Q1, u))]
∂Q1
]
= −a2v + d22w
a22
. (3.39)
Note that the term in the inner brackets includes marginal abatement costs and
marginal damages of both pollutants, because the emissions of pollutant 2 are also
affected by the emissions of pollutant 1. When this term is evaluated at Q̂1 and P̂2,
it becomes zero:
∂
[
C
(
Q̂1, Q2
(
P̂2, Q̂1, u
)
, u
)
+D
(
Q̂1, Q2
(
P̂2, Q̂1, u
))]
/∂Q1 = 0.
Thus, if Y = a2v + d22w > 0 and t¯2 < P̂2, at Q̂1 and t¯2 we have
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∂
[
C
(
Q̂1, Q2
(
t¯2, Q̂1, u
)
, u
)
+D
(
Q̂1, Q2
(
t¯2, Q̂1, u
))]
/∂Q1 > 0.
Since the optimal emissions of pollutant 1 are chosen so that its expected marginal
social cost is zero and ∂2 [C (Q1, Q2 (P2, Q1, u) , u) +D (Q1, Q2 (P2, Q1, u))] /∂Q
2
1 =
(a2X + wY ) /a
2
2 > 0, the optimal emissions of pollutant 1 should be less than its ex
ante optimal emissions Q̂1. On the other hand, if Y = a2v+d22w < 0 and t¯2 < P̂2, the
term in the inner bracket becomes negative. Thus the optimal emissions of pollutant
1 should be greater than its ex ante optimal emissions Q̂1.
Next, from (3.33), (3.34) and (3.38), we know that the deviations of price variables
such as τ ∗1 (t¯2), σ
∗
1 (t¯2), and t
∗
1 (t¯2) are determined by the sign of a2Y + wX, which is
implied by the effect of changes in the price for pollutant 2 on the marginal social
cost of the price for pollutant 1; that is,
∂
∂P2
[
∂ [C (Q1 (P1, P2, u) , Q2 (P1, P2, u) , u) +D (Q1 (P1, P2, u) , Q2 (P1, P2, u))]
∂P1
]
=
a2Y + wX
(a22 − w2)2
.
As above, note that the term in the inner brackets includes the marginal abatement
cost and marginal damage of both pollutants. By the definition of the ex ante optimal
prices, when this term is evaluated at P̂1 and P̂2, it is zero; that is,
∂
[
C
(
Q1
(
P̂1, P̂2, u
)
, Q2
(
P̂1, P̂2, u
)
, u
)
+D
(
Q1
(
P̂1, P̂2, u
)
, Q2
(
P̂1, P̂2, u
))]
∂P1
= 0.
Thus, if a2Y + wX > 0 and t¯2 < P̂2 at P̂1 and t¯2, we have:
∂
[
C
(
Q1
(
P̂1, t¯2, u
)
, Q2
(
P̂1, t¯2, u
)
, u
)
+D
(
Q1
(
P̂1, t¯2, u
)
, Q2
(
P̂1, t¯2, u
))]
∂P1
< 0.
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Since
∂2 [C (Q1 (P1, P2, u) , Q2 (P1, P2, u) , u) +D (Q1 (P1, P2, u) , Q2 (P1, P2, u))]
∂P 21
=
a2X + wY
(a22 − w2)2
> 0,
the optimal price for pollutant 1 should be greater than its ex ante optimal price P̂1.
On the other hand, if a2Y +wX < 0 and t¯2 < P̂2, then the optimal price for pollutant
1 should be less than its ex ante optimal price P̂1.
3.4 Environmental performance
In this section, we will compare the expected emissions of both pollutants under
each of the optimal price-based regulations for pollutant 1, given the regulations
of pollutant 2. As we did in previous sections, we will use the ex ante optimal
emissions for each pollutant as a benchmark. We will focus on how the deviations
of the expected emissions of each pollutant from its own ex ante optimal level are
related to each other and how the interactions in abatement and damages affect these
relationships. We begin this section with the following findings:
Finding 1: Given regulation of pollutant 2, all the optimal price-based regulations
for pollutant 1 produce the same expected emissions; that is,
E [Q1 (h
∗
1 (x¯) , x¯, u)] = E [Q1 (t
∗
1 (x¯) , x¯, u)] = L
∗
1 (x¯) , x¯ ∈
{
L¯2, t¯2
}
.
In addition, when pollutant 2 is regulated by an emissions tax, the expected emissions
of pollutant 2 are the same among all the optimal price-based regulations for pollutant
1; that is,
E [Q2 (h
∗
1 (t¯2) , t¯2, u)] = E [Q2 (t
∗
1 (t¯2) , t¯2, u)] = E [Q2 (L
∗
1 (t¯2) , t¯2, u)] .
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Derivations of these findings can be found in sections B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B.
The first part of Finding 1 implies that, given the regulation for pollutant 2, all the
optimal price-based regulations for pollutant 1 produce the same expected emissions
for pollutant 1. The only difference among them is the variation around the same
expected outcome. This also implies that different regulations of pollutant 2 can
cause the expected emissions of pollutant 1 to vary although pollutant 1 is regulated
optimally. It is because, depending on the regulation of pollutant 2, the effective
channels through which the two pollutants interact with each other are different.
Finally, if pollutant 2 is regulated by a tax, then all the optimal price-based regulations
for pollutant 1 also produce the same expected emissions of pollutant 2.
To simplify the notation from here on, we denote the expected emissions of both
pollutants as:
E(Q∗1 (x¯)) = E(Q1 (h
∗
1 (x) , x, u)) = E(Q1 (t
∗
1 (x) , x, u)) = L
∗
1(x), x¯ ∈
{
L¯2, t¯2
}
;
(3.40)
E
(
Q∗2
(
t2
))
=E
(
Q2
(
h∗1
(
t2
)
, t2, u
))
=E
(
Q2
(
t∗1
(
t2
)
, t2, u
))
=E
(
Q2
(
L∗1
(
t2
)
, t2, u
))
.
(3.41)
Using this notation, we now describe the interaction of the two pollutants in terms
of the expected emissions as follows.
Finding 2: When pollutant 2 is regulated by tradable permits L¯2, the relationship
between the expected emissions of pollutant 1 and its ex ante optimal value can be
characterized as
E
[
Q∗1
(
L¯2
)]− Q̂1 = − v − w
a2 + d12
(
L¯2 − Q̂2
)
.
On the other hand, when pollutant 2 is regulated by an emissions tax, the relationship
between the expected emissions of pollutant 1 and its ex ante optimal value can be
characterized as
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E [Q∗1 (t¯2)]− Q̂1 = −
a2v + d22w
a2 (a2 + d12) + w (v − w)
{
E [Q∗2 (t¯2)]− Q̂2
}
, (3.42)
provided that X = a2 (a2 + d12) + w (v − w) 6= 0.
Derivations of these findings can be found in section B.5 in Appendix B. When
tradable permits for pollutant 2 or the expected emissions of pollutant 2 under an
emissions tax are equal to the ex ante optimal emissions Q̂2, all the optimal price-
based regulations make the expected emissions of pollutant 1 equal to its ex ante
optimal emissions. However, when the regulation of pollutant 2 fails to achieve its ex
ante optimal emissions, the expected emissions of pollutant 1 also deviates from its
ex ante optimal level. The deviation of the expected emissions of pollutant 1 depend
on 1) the deviation of the expected emissions of pollutant 2 from its ex ante optimal
emissions, 2) the interactions of the two pollutants in abatement and damage, and 3)
whether pollutant 2 is regulated by tradable permits or by an emissions tax. We will
illustrate these relationships in the next two subsections.
3.4.1 Given tradable permits L¯2
Throughout the illustration we suppose that the regulation for pollutant 2 is set
too leniently compared to its ex ante emissions or prices and thus L¯2 > Q̂2 and t¯2 < P̂2.
First, in this subsection we will consider the cases where pollutant 2 is regulated by
tradable permits. The case where pollutant 2 is regulated by an emissions tax will
be treated in the next subsection.
3.4.1.1 Interaction in abatement but not in damages
We begin with the simple case where the interaction between pollutants appears
only in abatement, that is, w 6= 0 and v = 0. Then the relationship between the
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expected emissions of both pollutants can be determined solely by the sign of
interaction term w:
E
[
Q∗1
(
L¯2
)]− Q̂1 = w
a2 + d12
(
L¯2 − Q̂2
)
.
Note, as shown in Figures (3.1a) and (3.1b), that even when pollutant 2 is regulated
with an inefficient number of permits, the expected emissions of pollutant 1 are
adjusted to equate its marginal abatement cost and marginal damage. To see why,
use the fact that all regulations of pollutant 1 produce the same expected emissions
to choose Q1 to minimize E
[
C
(
Q1, L¯2, u
)
+D
(
Q1, L¯2
)]
. The first order condition
is −E [C1 (Q1, L¯2, u)] = E [D1 (Q1, L¯2)]. Expected pollutant 1 emissions under
each optimal policy satisfy this marginal condition. (We will see that this condition
does not hold for pollutant 1 when pollutant 2 is regulated with an inefficient tax).
When the two pollutants are complements (w > 0) and L¯2 > Q̂2, expected emissions
of pollutant 1 exceed its ex ante optimal emissions as shown in Figure (3.1a). Since
the emissions of pollutant 2 are too high, the expected marginal abatement cost of
pollutant 1 at Q̂1 is higher than its marginal damage. Thus, it is required that the
regulation of pollutant 1 results in greater emissions than Q̂1. On the other hand, if
the two pollutants are substitutes (w < 0) as shown in Figure (3.1b), that the
emissions of pollutant 2 are higher than its ex ante optimal level reduces the
marginal abatement cost of pollutant 1 at Q̂1 below its marginal damages. Thus,
the regulation for pollutant 1 reduces its expected emissions below its ex ante
optimal level. In both cases the optimal response of pollutant 1 expected emissions
to the inefficiency of the pollutant 2 regulation reduces the wedge between marginal
abatement cost and marginal damage for pollutant 2. This occurs because
∂E
[
C2
(
Q1, L¯2, u
)
+D2
(
Q1, L¯2
)]
/∂Q1 = v − w.
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3.4.1.2 Interactions in both abatement and damages
Next consider the case where the interactions between the pollutants appear in
both abatement costs and damages. In this case, the relationship between the
expected emissions of both pollutants is determined by −sgn(v − w). As mentioned
in section 3.3.1, the sign of this term represents the net interaction in both
abatement costs and damages and does not require that both interactions in
abatement and damages have the same relationship. If the overall interactions in
abatement and damages imply that the two pollutants are complements, that is,
v − w < 0, then the expected emissions of pollutant 1 deviates from its ex ante
optimal emissions in the same direction as the tradable permits for pollutant 2
deviate from its ex ante optimal emissions. Figure (3.2a) shows the case in which
both pollutants are complements in both abatement costs and damages. That is,
w > 0 and v < 0, and thus, both pollutants are complements in social costs as well.
When supplied permits for pollutant 2 are greater than its ex ante optimal emissions(
L¯2 > Q̂2
)
, the marginal abatement cost function of pollutant 1 moves up and the
marginal damage function of pollutant 1 shifts down (drawn by dashed lines). As
always, when pollutant 2 is regulated by tradable permits, the expected emissions of
pollutant 1 equate its own marginal abatement cost and damage. Thus, in this case
the expected emissions of pollutant 1 are greater than its ex ante optimal emissions.
On the other hand, Figure (3.2b) shows the case in which the two pollutants are
complements in abatement costs (w > 0), they are substitutes in damages (v > 0),
but the overall interaction implies that the two pollutants are substitutes in social
costs (v − w > 0). In this case, tradable permits for pollutant 2, which are greater
than Q̂2, cause both marginal abatement and damage functions of pollutant 1 to
shift up. However, since v > w, the marginal damage function moves up more
than marginal abatement costs. The difference in parallel movements of these two
functions causes the expected emissions of pollutant 1 to move below its ex ante
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optimal emissions. Finally, notice that when both pollutants are complements in
social costs, the qualitative deviations of expected emissions from the ex ante optimal
values is the same for both pollutants. However, when they are substitutes in social
costs, the qualitative deviations of expected emissions from the ex ante optimal values
are opposite for the two pollutants.
3.4.2 Given tax t¯2
In this subsection we illustrate the cases where pollutant 2 is regulated by an
emission tax that is lower than its ex ante optimal price, that is, t¯2 < P̂2.
3.4.2.1 Interaction in abatement not in damages
As before, we start from a simple case where the interaction between the two
pollutants appears only in abatement. Then, the relationship in Finding 2 can be
simplified as
E [Q∗1 (t¯2)]− Q̂1 = −
d22w
a2 (a2 + d12)− w2
{
E [Q∗2 (t¯2)]− Q̂2
}
. (3.43)
In this case, the relationship is determined by two factors, d22 and w. If the marginal
damage function of pollutant 2 is flat, then regardless of the regulation for pollutant
2 and the interaction in abatement the ex ante optimal emissions of pollutant 1
can be achieved by any of the optimal price-based regulations. Unless d22 = 0, the
relationship between the expected emissions of both pollutants is determined by the
sign of w. Notice, however, that the relationship with a given tax for pollutant 2 is
opposite of the relationship with given permits for pollutant 2. If the two pollutants
are complements (w > 0), a low tax for pollutant 2 leads its expected emissions to
be greater than its ex ante optimal emissions. Then, (3.43) implies that the optimal
regulation of pollutant 1 should result in expected emissions of pollutant 1 in the
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opposite direction. That is, the expected emissions of pollutant 1 should be lower
than its ex ante optimal emissions.
This is illustrated in Figure (3.3a). Unlike the case in which pollutant 2 is
regulated with a fixed number of permits, when pollutant 2 is regulated with a tax
the ex ante optimal expected emissions of pollutant 1 does not, in general, equate
the marginal abatement cost and marginal damage of pollutant 1. To see this, note
that expected emissions of pollutant 1 under each of the optimal policies when
pollutant 2 is regulated with a fixed tax is equal to Q1 that minimizes
C (Q1, Q2 (t¯2, Q1, u) , u) + D (Q1, Q2 (t¯2, Q1, u)). The first order condition for this
minimization is
E [C1 (Q1, Q2 (t¯2, Q1, u) , u) +D1 (Q1, Q2 (t¯2, Q1, u))]
+ E [C2 (Q1, Q2 (t¯2, Q1, u) , u) +D2 (Q1, Q2 (t¯2, Q1, u))]
∂Q2 (t¯2, Q1, u)
∂Q1
= 0.
Since −C2 (Q1, Q2 (t¯2, Q1, u) , u) = t¯2 and ∂Q2 (t¯2, Q1, u) /∂Q1 = w/a2, the first order
condition can be rewritten as
− E [C1 (Q1, Q2 (t¯2, Q1, u) , u)]
= D1 (Q1, EQ2 (t¯2, Q1, u))− [t¯2 −D2 (Q1, EQ2 (t¯2, Q1, u))] w
a2
.
The facts that w > 0 in this example and t¯2 < D2 (Q
∗
1(t¯2), EQ2 (t¯2, Q1, u)) in Figure
(3.3a) results in the marginal abatement cost exceeding the marginal damage for
pollutant 1 at Q∗1(t¯2). To understand the intuition behind this result, note that if the
tax for pollutant 2 is so low that its expected emissions will be greater than its ex ante
optimal level, then the marginal abatement cost of pollutant 1 at its ex ante optimal
level becomes higher than its marginal damages. If this was the case when pollutant
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2 is controlled by given tradable permits, the optimal regulation for pollutant 1 would
induce the expected emissions of pollutant 1 to be greater than its ex ante optimal
level (as shown in Figure (3.1a)). However, when pollutant 2 is regulated by a tax,
if regulation of pollutant 1 also caused its expected emissions to exceed its ex ante
optimal value, then the expected marginal abatement cost of pollutant 2 also moves
up due to greater emissions of pollutant 1. This, in turn, would cause the expected
emissions of pollutant 2 to move further away from its ex ante optimal level and
increase the wedge between its marginal abatement cost and its marginal damage.
Therefore to minimize the efficiency loss from the low tax for pollutant 2, the optimal
regulation for pollutant 1 should be stricter than its ex ante optimal emissions as
shown in Figure (3.3a).
The opposite is true if the two pollutants are substitutes in abatement (w < 0). In
this case, if the tax for pollutant 2 is too low, then the optimal regulation for pollutant
1 will also be lenient so that the expected emissions of pollutant 1 exceeds its ex ante
optimal emissions Q̂1 as shown in Figure (3.3b). Interestingly, these mechanisms can
help us understand the effects of a flat marginal damage function for pollutant 2.
When the marginal damage function of pollutant 2 is flat, the difference between the
marginal abatement cost and marginal damage of pollutant 2 is constant and the
wedge between them cannot be reduced by adjusting the emissions of pollutant 1.
Thus, in this case, the optimal regulation for pollutant 1 results in its ex ante optimal
emissions.
3.4.2.2 Interactions in both abatement and damages
Next consider the case in which the interactions between the two pollutants appear
in both abatement and damages. As one might expect these situations are more
complex than the cases discussed above. First, since pollutant 2 is regulated by a tax,
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the emissions of pollutant 2 are not only variable but also affected by the emissions
of pollutant 1 via the interaction in abatement. Second, the marginal damage of one
pollutant is affected by the emissions of the other pollutant via the interaction in
damages. These lead the multiplier in (3.42) to have a more complex form than when
pollutant 2 is regulated by tradable permits L¯2:
E [Q∗1 (t¯2)]− Q̂1 = −
a2v + d22w
a2 (a2 + d12) + w (v − w)
{
E [Q∗2 (t¯2)]− Q̂2
}
.
As shown (3.35) and (3.39) in subsection 3.3.2, X = a2 (a2 + d12) + w (v − w)
represents the effects of changing the emissions of pollutant 1 on its own marginal
social cost, and Y = a2v + d22w represents the effects of changing the price for
pollutant 2 on the marginal social cost of pollutant 1. Since we assume X > 0 to
avoid cases in which increasing emissions of pollutant 1 reduce its marginal social
cost, the relationship between the expected emissions of both pollutants are
determined by the sign of Y = a2v + d22w.
Recall that without the interaction in damage, the optimal regulation for pollutant
1 given an inefficient emissions tax for pollutant 2 results in expected emissions of
pollutant 1 that reduces the inefficiency of the regulation of pollutant 2. When there
exist interactions in both abatement and damage, we focus on how the effect of the
optimal regulations for pollutant 1 on the reduction in the inefficiency from pollutant
2 can be restricted or magnified by the interaction in damages. To see this, we first
look at how the multiplier −Y/X in (3.42) changes over v. Given (3.36), which is the
condition for X > 0 given (3.8), we have
− ∂
∂v
(
Y
X
)
= −a
2
2 (a2 + d12)− w2 (a2 + d22)
X2
≤ 0,
which implies that
− Y/X|v<0 ≥ − Y/X|v=0 ≥ − Y/X|v>0 . (3.44)
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That is, the multiplier −Y/X decreases (weakly) as v increases. We illustrate the
effects of this result in the following examples.
First, Figure (3.4a) shows the case in which the two pollutants are complements
in both abatement and damages (v < 0 and w > 0) and Y = a2v + d22w > 0. Then,
when it is expected that a low tax for pollutant 2
(
t¯2 < P̂2
)
results in expected
pollutant 2 emissions that are higher than its ex ante optimal emissions Q̂2, (3.42)
implies that the expected emissions of pollutant 1, EQ∗1 (t¯2), is lower than its ex ante
optimal emissions Q̂1. Since w > 0, we know that − Y/X|v=0 < 0, which implies
that without the interaction in damages (v = 0), the expected emissions of pollutant
1 would be lower than its ex ante optimal emissions (marked as Q˜1 in Figure (3.4a))
. However, from (3.44), we know that the complementary interaction in damages
(v < 0) increases the multiplier. In addition, for Y = a2v + d22w > 0, the multiplier
is still negative. Thus, we have
− Y
X
∣∣∣∣
v=0
= − d22w
a2 (a2 + d12)− w2 < −
a2v + d22w
a2 (a2 + d12) + w (v − w) = −
Y
X
∣∣∣∣
v<0
< 0.
Therefore, the expected emissions of pollutant 1 deviate less from its ex ante optimal
value than when the pollutants only interact in abatement (marked as EQ∗1 (t¯2) in
Figure (3.4a)).
The reason why the expected emissions of pollutant 1 deviates less with the
interaction in both abatement and damages is as follows. We already know that
when a low tax for pollutant 2 results in higher expected emissions of pollutant 2
than its ex ante optimal emissions, the optimal regulations for pollutant 1 work to
reduce the wedge between the expected marginal abatement cost and marginal
damage of pollutant 2, and thus the expected emissions of pollutant 1 are lower
than its ex ante optimal emissions. However, when there is a complementary
interaction in damages (v < 0), pollutant 1 emissions that are lower than its ex ante
optimal emissions will shift up the marginal damage of pollutant 2 (marked as
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D2
(
Q2, Q˜1
)
and D2 (Q2, EQ
∗
1 (t¯2)) in Figure (3.4a)). If the optimal regulation for
pollutant 1 produced Q˜1, it is possible that the wedge between the expected
marginal abatement cost and damage of pollutant 2 can increase conversely (the
difference between D2
(
Q2, Q˜1
)
and −EC2
(
Q2, Q˜1
)
at Q˜2 in Figure (3.4a)).
Therefore, although the expected emissions of pollutant 1 deviate from its ex ante
optimal emissions, it deviates less than when there is no interaction in damage.
Next, Figure (3.4b) shows the case where the two pollutants are substitutes in
abatement (w < 0) but complements in damage (v < 0) and thus Y = a2v+d22w < 0.
Then, when it is expected that a low tax for pollutant 2
(
t¯2 < P̂2
)
results in higher
expected emissions than its ex ante optimal emissions Q̂2, (3.42) in Finding 2 implies
that the expected emissions of pollutant 1, E (Q∗1 (t¯2)), is also greater than its ex ante
optimal emissions Q̂1. Unlike the above example, the complementary interaction in
damage (v < 0) magnifies the deviation of E (Q∗1 (t¯2)) from Q̂1, because from (3.44)
we have
0 < − Y
X
∣∣∣∣
v=0
= − d22w
a2 (a2 + d12)− w2 < −
a2v + d22w
a2 (a2 + d12) + w (v − w) = −
Y
X
∣∣∣∣
v<0
.
That is, the expected emissions of pollutant 1 will deviate more from Q̂1 than when
there is no interaction in damages (v = 0). Considering the expected emissions of
pollutant 1 without the interaction in damages (marked as Q˜1 in Figure (3.4b)),
both the marginal damage and the marginal abatement cost of pollutant 2 move
down (marked as D2
(
Q2, Q˜1
)
and −EC2
(
Q˜1, Q2
)
in Figure (3.4b)). However,
increasing the emissions of pollutant 1 to EQ∗1 (t¯2) from Q˜1 can further reduce the
wedge between the marginal damage and the marginal abatement cost of pollutant
2 by D2 (Q2, EQ
∗
1 (t¯2)) and −EC2 (EQ∗1 (t¯2) , Q2).
In sum, we have shown that the interaction in damage can affect the response of
the optimal regulation for pollutant 1 to the inefficient tax for pollutant 2.
Although the optimal regulation for pollutant 1 still works to reduce the wedge
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between marginal abatement cost and damage for pollutant 2, the adjustment can
be restricted or magnified depending on the interactions in both abatement and
damage. Interestingly, when the two interactions imply the same relationship–for
instance, the two pollutants are either complements or substitutes in both
abatement and damages–the expected emissions of pollutant 1 will deviate less from
its ex ante optimal value than without the interaction in damage. On the other
hand, when the interactions in abatement and damage are opposite of each
other–for instance, there is a complementary interaction in abatement but the two
pollutants are substitutes in damage, or vice versa– the expected emissions of
pollutant 1 deviate more from its ex ante optimal value than without the interaction
in damages.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated the second-best, price-based regulation for a
pollutants when it interacts with another pollutant in abatement costs and/or
damages. Given that the co-pollutant is controlled by either an emissions tax or
tradable permits, we derived the optimal forms of price-based regulation for the
primary pollutants. We consider an emissions tax, a pure permit market, and a
hybrid policy which is a permit market with price controls. Inefficient regulation of
the co-pollutant leads the optimal regulation for the primary pollutant to deviate
from its ex-ante optimal emissions and price, but all optimal regulations of the
primary pollutant produce the same expected emissions. Our main results reveal
that the deviation of the expected emissions of the primary pollutant from its ex
ante optimal value is determined by: 1) the interactions in abatement costs and
damages, in particular the substitutability and complementarity of the pollutants;
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2) the deviation of the regulation for the co-pollutant from its ex ante optimal level,
and 3) the form of the regulation of the co-pollutant.
We examined several special cases of our main results. In the simplest case the
co-pollutant is regulated by tradable permits and the pollutants interact only in
abatement. In this case, if the two pollutants are complements in abatement, then
if the number of tradable permits for the co-pollutant is higher (lower) than ex ante
optimal emissions, then the optimal regulations for the primary pollutant produce
expected emissions that are higher (lower) than its ex ante optimal emissions. When
we allow the pollutants to interact in damages as well we find that if the interaction
in damages has the same (different) relationship with the interaction in abatement,
then the expected emissions of the primary pollutant deviates more (less) from its ex
ante optimal emissions than without the interaction in damages.
When the co-pollutant is regulated by an emissions tax, alternative cases are
more complicated than when pollutant 2 is regulated with tradable permits, because
the emissions of the co-pollutant are affected by the emissions of the primary
pollutant. This can lead to results that are opposite of the case when the
co-pollutant is regulated with tradable permits. If the two pollutants are
complements and they interact only in abatement, a co-pollutant tax that produces
expected emissions that are higher (lower) than its ex ante optimal emissions results
in regulations for the primary pollutant that produce expected emissions that are
lower (higher) than its ex ante optimal emissions (as long as co-pollutant damage is
strictly convex). Thus, the expected emissions of the primary pollutant deviates
from its ex ante optimal emissions in the opposite direction than in the case of
tradable permits for the co-pollutant. We also show interesting results from the
effects of the interaction in damages. Unlike the case with tradable permits for the
co-pollutant, if the interactions in abatement and damages have the same (different)
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relationship, then the expected emissions of the primary pollutant will deviate less
(more) than its ex ante optimal emissions than without the interaction in damages.
In this paper we were able to examine how the expected performance of the optimal
price-based regulations for the primary pollutant can be affected by interactions in
abatement and damages with another pollutant, inefficient regulations for the co-
pollutant, and the form of the regulation of the co-pollutant. However, there are still
many elements that future research should consider. First, since we have used a static
model, we ignore dynamic properties of pollutants. Although Moslener and Requate
(2007) already showed how the interaction in abatement affects the optimal dynamic
paths of multiple pollutants that interact in abatement, they modeled all pollutants
as stock pollutants. However, some co-pollutants that are emitted along with CO2
such as NOX, SO2 and PM are flow pollutants. In addition, research about climate
change shows that some flow pollutants such as NOX and SO2 can have a net cooling
effect. Thus, it would be interesting to combine our model and Moslener and Requate
(2007) to include these factors and to show how these factors affect the optimal paths
of the pollutants.
Next, although we have considered only two pollutants to simplify the model,
one pollutant can have multiple co-pollutants. It is unlikely that all of them have
the same interaction in abatement. In addition, while some co-pollutants may be
regulated, others may not be. To derive more general results about the effects of the
interactions in abatement and damages of multiple pollutants, we need to consider
multiple co-pollutants that may be regulated differently.
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CHAPTER 4
IRREVERSIBLE INVESTMENTS IN EMISSIONS
CONTROL UNDER A HYBRID PRICE AND QUANTITY
REGULATION
4.1 Introduction
Regulation of pollutants with markets for emissions permits have been examined
both theoretically as well as practically. For example, the European Union has
implemented the world’s largest Emissions Trading System (ETS) to reduce
greenhouse gases (GHGs). Recently, South Korea has introduced its own ETS for
GHGs. China, which is the world’s largest GHG emitter, has been operating a pilot
program of ETS. At the sub-national level, California has implemented its own
cap-and-trade program to reduce GHGs emissions, and nine northeast and
mid-Atlantic states have participated in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) to reduce CO2 from power plants. Of course, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency has succeeded in limiting SO2 and NOX with emissions markets.
Despite its theoretical efficiency, implementing an emissions permit market has
brought about some practical concerns. Containing uncertain costs has been one of
those concerns. Unexpectedly high abatement costs can make it difficult for firms to
comply, and unexpectedly low abatement costs deter investments in new abatement
technologies (Fell et al. (2011)). In addition, high uncertainty in abatement costs can
reduce the incentive to invest in new abatement capital (Zhao (2003)). The most
commonly proposed measures to deal with uncertain abatement costs are allowing
firms to bank and borrow permits and implementing hybrid policies that typically
impose price controls on a permit market. Banking and borrowing permits allow firms
82
to adjust emissions and abatement over time depending on current and expected
permit prices and abatement costs. A firm can save permits for future use when
abatement costs are low and a firm can borrow permits from future years when
abatement costs are high. On the other hand, a hybrid policy imposes a price ceiling
and a price floor directly on a permit market. When abatement costs are high,
the market price binds at the ceiling and firms are allowed to increase their emissions
beyond the emissions permit cap. When the market price is low, a price floor provides
incentives for firms to reduce their emissions below the permit cap.
Another important concern about permit trading has been the extent to which
regulations induce investments in abatement capital or technology. Many studies of
investments in cost-reducing abatement capital focus on comparing incentives from
different policy instruments and ranking them (Jung et al. (1996); Montero (2002);
Van Soest (2005); Requate (2005)). As concerns about cost containment have
increased, the effects of cost containment policies on abatement investments have
gained attention among researchers (Phaneuf and Requate (2002); Burtraw et al.
(2010); Nemet (2010); Park (2012)). Our paper contributes to this literature by
studying the effects of a hybrid policy on investment in abatement capital. The
benefits of investing in abatement capital is the reduction in abatement costs.
Although high abatement costs impose a heavy burden on regulated firms, they also
provide an incentive for investment in abatement capital. Thus, cost-containment
measures which suppress potentially high abatement costs may reduce the incentive
for investment. Another factor which affects investment is uncertainty in the
benefits of new abatement capital, which can come from price volatility or
uncertainty in abatement costs. A typical conclusion from the real-option literature
is that higher uncertainty in the benefits of investment reduces the incentive to
invest and delays investments (Dixit and Pindyck (1994); Pindyck (2006)). In the
environmental regulation context, higher uncertainty in abatement costs can reduce
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the incentive to invest in a permit market (Zhao (2003)). Since cost containment
measures are designed to limit the variations in price and compliance costs, these
measures may have some positive effects on investment. As a whole, limiting the
potential for high permit prices and the volatility of compliance-costs can have
opposite effects on investment in abatement capital.1
Other authors have examined the impact of price controls on abatement
investments. For example, Nemet (2010) shows that a price ceiling (a so-called
safety valve) reduces the incentive to invest in clean technologies because
suppressing high permit prices eliminates the higher payoff from investment.
Burtraw et al. (2010) show that imposing a symmetric price ceiling and price floor
(also known as a symmetric price collar) can amend this problem, because the price
floor can motivate greater investment when abatement costs are low. Both Burtraw
et al. (2010) and Nemet (2010) focus only on the effects of price controls on the
expected benefits from investment. Hence, solely suppressing potentially high prices
reduces the expected price of permits and thus reduces the incentive for investment.
However, imposing the symmetric price ceiling and floor curtails high and low tails
of the price distribution and thus the expected price can stay at a similar level as
without the price ceiling and floor.
Our approach to the problem is to construct a dynamic stochastic model of the
investment decision under an emissions market with price controls. This approach
1For the case of bankable permits (without the ability to borrow permits), Phaneuf and
Requate (2002) show that banking and investments in abatement capital are substitutes in reducing
abatement costs, and thus positive banking reduces these investments. Interestingly, Park (2012),
who extends Phaneuf and Requate (2002) by using a real-option model, argues that permit banking
could generate a greater incentive to invest than a permit market without banking. In a real option
model, holding an option to invest creates an option value which acts as an opportunity cost of
exercising the option. Permit banking lowers the opportunity cost of exercising the investment
option. Thus, when banking is profitable, more permits can be obtained through investment. Park
(2012) shows that for sufficiently large uncertainty in abatement costs, permit banking can give a
larger incentive to invest than permit trading without banking. For low uncertainty, the investment
incentive in a permit market without banking is still larger than in a market with banking.
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allows us to consider the irreversibility of investments in abatement capital, which has
been shown to delay investment in other contexts (Dixit and Pindyck (1994); Pindyck
(2006)). The model is an extension of Zhao (2003), who considered the differences
in investment under a pure emissions market and an emissions tax. In contrast, we
consider investment decisions in an emissions market with price controls, and compare
these to the decisions in a market without price controls.2 We find that the effect
of abatement-cost uncertainty on the expected marginal value of new investment
in a period is non-monotonic under a hybrid policy. This contrasts sharply with the
results of Zhao (2003) who found that the expected marginal values of new investment
is strictly increasing in positive abatement cost shocks under pure permit trading,
while the expected marginal value of new investment is strictly decreasing under an
emissions tax. We show that a large positive shock to aggregate abatement costs in
a period may trigger additional investment under the pure emissions market, but not
under the hybrid scheme. On the other hand, additional investment in abatement
capital may occur in a period with low abatement costs that would not occur under
the pure market scheme. Moreover, we show that there is an upper bound of the
abatement capital stock such that no additional investment occurs under the hybrid
policy, but no such upper bound exists for the pure emissions market. Finally, in
contrast to Burtraw et al. (2010) who argue that symmetric price controls cancel
each other out so that they do not affect the expected benefits from investment, we
2A related work is Weber and Neuhoff (2010) who examine the effects of technological innovation
on the optimal regulation of a pure tax, pure permit trading, and a hybrid price and quantity
regulation. Using a static model, they show how optimal regulations can depend on innovation
effectiveness, a measure of the increase in abatement from innovation, given an emissions price.
The goal of their work is to find optimal regulations, given firms’ investment behavior, in a
static environment. In contrast, we explore firms’ investment decisions given a hybrid price and
quantity regulation in a stochastic dynamic model with irreversible investments in technology. In
addition, Weber and Neuhoff (2010) focus on investment in technology innovation which has an
uncertain impact on abatement costs, while we assume that investments in new abatement capital
automatically reduce abatement costs non-stochastically although abatement costs are uncertain.
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demonstrate that the effects of the price controls on abatement investments may not
be symmetric.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we construct a model
of aggregate incremental investment in irreversible abatement capital under a permit
market with price controls. In section 3, we derive the investment decision rule under
a hybrid policy. Section 4 contains a comparison of investment decisions under a
hybrid policy and under pure permit trading. In section 5, we will show comparative
static results with respect to policy instruments. We conclude in section 6.
4.2 Model
In this section we present a model of abatement capital investment under a
hybrid policy. We specify an aggregate abatement cost function for an industry, the
permit market equilibrium under a hybrid policy, and optimal aggregate
investments in abatement capital. The model is a stochastic dynamic model with
uncertainty in aggregate abatement costs and an infinite time horizon.
4.2.1 Abatement cost function
Throughout we consider an industry under a hybrid price and emissions regulation.
Let the aggregate abatement cost function for the industry at a moment t be
C (a,K, θ) =
1
2
c (K) θa2, (4.1)
where a ≥ 0 is the aggregate abatement level, c (K) > 0 is a stationary function that
partially captures the slope of the aggregate marginal abatement cost function and
is a function of the aggregate abatement capital stock K ≥ 0 in a period. 3 Assume
3Our model is a dynamic model, so the variables a, K, and θ have a time index. However, for
notational brevity, we omit the time index except when it is required. We use t to indicate a certain
time. For instance, K (t) represents firm aggregate capital stock at time t and θ (t) is the realized
value of a random shock at time t.
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that c′ (K) < 0 and c′′ (K) > 0 so that increasing the aggregate capital stock reduces
total and marginal abatement costs at decreasing rates. The variable θ captures
random shocks that affects aggregate abatement costs. It is assumed that θ follows a
geometric Brownian motion
dθ (t)
θ (t)
= αdt+ σdz (t) , (4.2)
with E [dz (t)] = 0 and V ar [dz (t)] = dt. α represents the expected growth rate of
θ, which may have any sign, and σ is the volatility rate of θ. To make sure that
the expected present value of aggregate abatement costs over some time period is
bounded, we assume that
r − α > 0 and r − σ2 + α > 0, (4.3)
for a given interest rate r.
4.2.2 Instantaneous market equilibrium under a hybrid policy
Suppose that at every moment t a government issues a total of L permits to
regulate emissions. Let Q be unregulated aggregate emissions from the industry.
Then, a target abatement level which the government aims to achieve in every time
period is
a¯ = Q− L. (4.4)
For a given permit price p, the aggregate abatement level is determined so that the
permit price is equal to aggregate marginal abatement costs; that is,
a (p,K, θ) =
p
c (K) θ
. (4.5)
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Then, when the target abatement level a¯ is achieved, the equilibrium permit price is
p = c (K) θa¯. (4.6)
Note that the price changes proportionately to the random shock θ and it is decreasing
as the capital stock K increases.
A hybrid price and quantity regulation imposes a price ceiling τ and a price floor s,
with τ > s, on the permit market. Firms are allowed to buy additional permits from
the government at price τ , and they can sell unused permits back to the government
at price s. To specify how firms’ aggregate behavior changes at the price controls, we
must specify cutoff values of θ where p binds at either τ or s without any additional
purchases of permits from the government or sales to the government. Denote these
values by θτ and θs, respectively. Then, using (4.6), it can be shown that:
θτ (K) =
τ
c (K) a¯
; (4.7)
θs (K) =
s
c (K) a¯
. (4.8)
For θ ≥ θτ (K) and thus p = τ , firms can buy additional permits from the government
at the price ceiling τ . Then, aggregate abatement at the price ceiling is
a (τ,K, θ) =
τ
c (K) θ
, (4.9)
which implies that aggregate abatement level is decreasing as θ increases. From (4.8),
it can be shown that
a (τ,K, θ) =
τ
c (K) θ
≤ τ
c (K) θτ (K)
= a¯,
which implies that aggregate abatement can be less than the target abatement level
as firms make use of the price ceiling.
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For θ ≤ θs (K) and thus p = s, firms can sell permits back to the government at
the price floor s. Then, aggregate abatement at the price floor is
a (s,K, θ) =
s
c (K) θ
. (4.10)
From (4.7), it can be shown that
a (s,K, θ) =
s
c (K) θ
≥ s
c (K) θs (K)
= a¯,
which implies that aggregate abatement can exceed the target abatement. At the price
floor s, aggregate abatement increases as θ decreases. Since abatement levels cannot
go beyond the unregulated aggregate emissions Q, we need to define one more cutoff
value of θ where abatement at the price floor s completely eliminates unregulated
emissions Q. Denote this value by θF , which from (4.10), can be expressed as
θF (K) =
s
c (K)Q
. (4.11)
Combining our results, aggregate abatement under a hybrid price and quantity
regulation can be summarized as:
a∗ (K, θ; a¯, Q, s, τ) =

Q for θ ≤ θF
s/ (c (K) θ) for θF ≤ θ ≤ θs
a¯ for θs ≤ θ ≤ θτ
τ/ (c (K) θ) for θτ ≤ θ.
(4.12)
We note that three cutoff values are increasing functions of K. That is,
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∂θs (K)
∂K
= − sc
′ (K)
c (K)2 a¯
= −θs c
′ (K)
c (K)
> 0; (4.13)
∂θτ (K)
∂K
= − τc
′ (K)
c (K)2 a¯
= −θτ c
′ (K)
c (K)
> 0; (4.14)
∂θF (K)
∂K
= − sc
′ (K)
c (K)2Q
= −θF c
′ (K)
c (K)
> 0. (4.15)
4.2.3 Investments in irreversible abatement capital
For s < p < τ , while an increase in θ does not change the aggregate abatement
level, it increases aggregate compliance costs because c (K) θ increases. At the price
ceiling, p = τ , allowing purchases of additional permits and fixing the price at the
price ceiling (which is lower than it would be without the price ceiling) can reduce
firms’ compliance costs for high values of θ. However, compliance costs under the
price ceiling still increase as θ increases. Thus, there may still be incentives for
firms to invest in more abatement capital stock for high values of θ, although these
investments are less attractive than under pure permit trading where the permit price
would be higher without the price ceiling. With a price floor, p = s, firms may have
greater incentive to invest because the permit price is kept higher than under a pure
permit trading policy and because firms can sell unused permits to the government.
We assume that the industry’s aggregate capital stock is adjusted
instantaneously when firms are motivated to invest. However, irreversibility
prohibits firms from decreasing their abatement capital stock. Investment in
abatement capital is measured by increases in the aggregate capital stock ∆K with
unit costs equal to the constant w. Thus, total investment costs in a period are
w∆K. For simplicity we assume that the capital stock does not depreciate.
4.2.4 Optimal industry investment
Because competitive behavior under a hybrid scheme will minimize aggregate
compliance costs (Roberts and Spence (1976)), to specify the industry’s aggregate
investment strategy and optimal capital expansion path we follow Lucas and
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Prescott (1971), Baldursson and Karatzas (1996) and Zhao (2003) by appealing to a
fictitious social planner who minimizes expected industry costs over time. Under a
pure permit trading program, aggregate compliance costs are just equal to aggregate
abatement costs. However, under a hybrid price and quantity regulation, they can
be different depending on the realized value of a random shock, because purchases
of additional permits or sales of unused permits are allowed. At a point in time,
with given abatement capital K and realized value of θ, the planner determines the
aggregate abatement level (a) and potential purchases of additional permits from
the government at the price ceiling τ (denoted by Lc) or permit sales back to the
government at the price floor s (denoted by Lf ). That is, the planner solves:
S (K, θ; a¯, s, τ, Q) ≡ min
a,Lc,Lf
C (a,K, θ) + τLc − sLf
s.t. a¯ = a+ Lc − Lf
Lc ≥ 0, Lf ≥ 0
a ≤ Q. (4.16)
From (4.1) and (4.12), the aggregate compliance cost function S (·) can be expressed
as
S (K, θ; a¯, s, τ, Q) =

1
2
c (K) θQ2 − s (Q− a¯) for θ ≤ θF
−1
2
s2/ (c (K) θ) + sa¯ for θF ≤ θ ≤ θs
1
2
c (K) θa¯2 for θs ≤ θ ≤ θτ
−1
2
τ 2/ (c (K) θ) + τ a¯ for θτ ≤ θ.
(4.17)
Since S (·) already reflects optimal abatement at every moment in time, the only
intertemporal choices are capital investments. Then, the planner’s problem is to
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minimize the present value of the stream of the industry’s expected compliance costs
plus its capital investments. Formally, this problem is the following:
V (K, θ) ≡ max
K
−E
∫ ∞
0
S (K, θ; a¯, s, τ, Q) e−rtdt−
∑
h
w∆K (h) e−rh
s.t.
dθ (t)
θ (t)
= αdt+ σdz (t)
∆K (h) ≥ 0 ∀h ∈ H. (4.18)
In (4.18): h is the moment in time when investment in additional capital occurs;
H is a set of these moments in time; ∆K (h) is aggregate investment at h, and
w∆K (h) is the cost of this investment. The non-negativity constraint on ∆K (h)
captures the irreversibility of the capital stock. The objective function of (4.18)
consists of two parts. The first part is the expected present value of the stream
of compliance costs, and the second part is the present value of the costs of all
investments occurring at moments in time h ∈ H. The timing of an investment at h
is determined simultaneously with the optimal investment strategy.
Based on Bellman’s Principle of Optimality (Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Ch.11)),
we will decompose (4.18) into an instantaneous flow from the current state and the
expected maximized value over the remaining time horizon. Suppose that (K, θ)
is the current state. Consider an arbitrarily short interval of time dt. Since we
are considering decisions made continuously, we will take the limit as dt goes to zero.
Since (4.16) is current aggregate compliance costs, the flow of compliance costs during
the interval dt is S (K, θ; a¯, s, τ) dt. Suppose that an increase in the capital stock is
required at the end of this interval to K ′. Total investment costs which are incurred
at the end of dt are w (K ′ −K) = w∆K. While the random shock changes over the
interval from θ to θ + dθ, at current time t = 0 it is not known what dθ will be. All
that is known is the distribution of dθ from (4.2). Thus, the state at the end of dt
is (K ′, θ + dθ), and the value at this state should be calculated as the expected value
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conditional on the current information θ. Of course, aggregate investment costs and
the expected maximum value E [V (K ′, θ + dθ)] at the end of dt should be discounted
over this length of time. Then, we can obtain the following transformed problem of
the planner:
V (K, θ) = max
K′
−S (K, θ; a¯, s, τ, Q) dt+ e−rdt {E [V (K ′, θ + dθ)]− w (K ′ −K)}
s.t.
dθ (t)
θ (t)
= αdt+ σdz (t)
K ′ ≥ K (4.19)
The planner chooses K ′ to solve (4.19). For the maximum to exist, we require the
concavity of V (K, θ) in K. Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the concavity of
V (K, θ) is guaranteed if −S (K, θ; a¯, s, τ) is concave in K. For this purpose, we
assume that each function in (4.17) is strictly convex in K for any realized value of
θ, which requires
∂2
∂K2
(
1
c (K)
)
=
2c′ (K)2 − c (K) c′′ (K)
c (K)3
< 0, (4.20)
in addition to c′′ (K) > 0.
Given that V (K, θ) is strictly concave in K, the solution of (4.19) can be identified
by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
e−rdt{E[VK(K ′, θ+dθ)]−w}≤0, K ′ −K≥0, {E[VK(K ′, θ+dθ)]−w}(K ′−K)=0.
As mentioned above, the expectation operator is present in these conditions because
dθ is uncertain at time t. However, as dt goes to zero, e−rdt goes to 1 and dθ goes to
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zero with probability one. Therefore, E [VK (K
′, θ + dθ)]− w goes to VK (K ′, θ)− w.
Thus, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be expressed as
VK (K
′, θ)− w ≤ 0, K ′ −K ≥ 0, [VK (K ′, θ)− w] (K ′ −K) = 0. (4.21)
Given capital stock K and the realized value of the random shock, denoted by θ′,
investment occurs if VK (K, θ
′) > w and the new capital stock K ′ must satisfy
VK (K
′, θ′) = w. Given the current state (K, θ′), investment does not occur in the
period if VK (K, θ
′) ≤ w. As θ changes over time, investment prevents a state (K, θ)
such that VK (K, θ) > w. In this sense, VK (K, θ) = w can be considered as a barrier
to additional investment. In addition, this investment barrier implicitly defines the
boundaries of the investment and non-investment (or inaction) intervals of θ, given
K.
4.2.5 The expected marginal value function
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.21) tells us whether the industry will increase its
abatement capital stock in a period, given the realized value of θ. However, VK (K, θ)
has four different expressions depending on where θ falls. That is,
VK (K, θ) =

V FK (K, θ) for θ ≤ θF
V sK (K, θ) for θF ≤ θ ≤ θs
V mK (K, θ) for θs ≤ θ ≤ θτ
V τK (K, θ) for θτ ≤ θ.
In section C.1 of Appendix C, we derive the explicit forms of these expressions as
follows:
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V FK (K,θ)=−
β1 − 1
β1
c′ (K) θQ2
2 (r − α) ; (4.22)
V sK(K,θ)
=
1
β1
(
β1 + 1
r−σ2+α−
β1−1
r−α
)
c′ (K)Qs
2c (K)
(
θ
θF
)β2
−β1+1
β1
c′ (K) s2
2 (r−σ2+α) c (K)2 θ ; (4.23)
V mK (K,θ)
=
1
β1
(
β1 + 1
r−σ2+α−
β1−1
r−α
)[
c′ (K)Qs
2c (K)
(
θ
θF
)β2
− c
′ (K) a¯s
2c (K)
(
θ
θs
)β2]
− β1 − 1
β1
c′ (K) θa¯2
2 (r − α) ; (4.24)
V τK(K,θ)
=
1
β1
(
β1 + 1
r−σ2+α−
β1−1
r−α
)[
c′ (K)Qs
2c (K)
(
θ
θF
)β2
− c
′ (K) a¯s
2c (K)
(
θ
θs
)β2
+
c′ (K) a¯τ
2c (K)
(
θ
θτ
)β2]
− β1 + 1
β1
c′ (K) τ 2
2 (r − σ2 + α) c (K)2 θ . (4.25)
Given capital stock K, VK (K, θ) is connected at the cutoff values of θ. That is,
V FK (K, θF ) = V
s
K (K, θF ) , V
s
K (K, θs) = V
m
K (K, θs) and V
m
K (K, θτ ) = V
τ
K (K, θτ ).
Thus, (4.22) through (4.25) fully describes the continuous function VK (K, θ) over the
entire range of θ.
We can observe that each expression of VK (K, θ) consists of two terms except in
the case of full abatement (i.e, for (4.22)). V FK (K, θ) and the last terms in (4.23),
(4.24), and (4.25) are linked with the expected present value of the stream of marginal
benefits from investment, which are equal to the reductions in expected aggregate
abatement costs, assuming the current policy scheme is maintained. (4.22) and the
last term of (4.24) are increasing in θ while the last terms in (4.23) and (4.25) are
decreasing in θ. The fact that the effects of θ on these terms alternate implies that
the first terms in (4.23), (4.24), and (4.25) can be interpreted as possible gains and
loss from changes in policy schemes, which occur when θ goes beyond either of the
cutoff values. For example, assume that the realized value of θ is between θF and θs,
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so consider V sK (K, θ) . Note that the last term of V
s
K (K, θ) increases as θ decreases,
indicating that the present value of the stream of benefits from investment increases
as θ decreases in this interval. However, as θ decreases further and goes below θF , the
effect of θ on the benefits of investment changes; in particular, lower values of θ below
θF reduce the benefits of investment. Thus, from the perspective of the price floor,
arriving at and converting to zero-emissions implies a possible loss in the benefits
of investment. Interestingly, the cutoff value of θ at the price ceiling (θτ ) does not
appear in VK (K, θ) below the price ceiling. This result is consistent with the results
in Dixit (1991) and Roques and Savva (2009), who examine the effects of a price
ceiling on the irreversible investment in a competitive market and an oligopolistic
market, respectively. Both show that if the output price that triggers investment is
less than the price ceiling, this price is not affected by the ceiling.
The boundaries of investment and non-investment intervals of θ are determined
as solutions to VK (K, θ) = w. However, note that VK (K, θ) is non-linear in θ over its
entire range, which makes it very difficult to find explicit solutions of θ. Therefore,
to examine the boundaries of the investment and non-investment intervals of θ, we
need to investigate the structure of (4.22), (4.23), (4.24), and (4.25) in more detail.
4.3 Investment decision rules under a hybrid policy
Since the marginal value function at each interval includes the effects of the other
intervals, it has proven to be difficult to find explicit expressions of the boundary
of investment and non-investment intervals of θ. Instead, to specify intervals of θ
when investment occurs and how these intervals changes as K increases, we use how
VK (K, θ) changes with respect to θ. In this section, we present 1) the conditions
that determine the shape of VK (K, θ) and 2) how the investment and non-investment
intervals of θ change asK increases. Then, in section 4 we will compare the investment
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decision under a hybrid price and quantity regulation with the decision under a pure
permit trading program.
4.3.1 Shape of the marginal value function VK (K, θ)
The expected marginal value functon is a complicated function of θ, which has
important implications for whether new investments occur with realizations of θ. The
following lemma provides a qualitative summary of the potential forms of VK (K, θ).
It is proved in section C.2 in Appendix C.
Lemma 1: VK (K, θ) has at least one and at most two local maxima with respect to
θ. All maxima occur at the price controls. In addition,
lim
θ→0
VK (K, θ) = lim
θ→∞
VK (K, θ) = 0.
4.3.2 Investment decisions
The form of VK (K, θ) depends on the policy parameters (a¯, s, τ) and the
unregulated emissions level Q given r and (α, σ2). In this subsection we examine
how alternative shapes of VK (K, θ) as specified in Lemma 1 determine optimal
investment decisions, and how these decisions change as the abatement capital stock
increases.
4.3.2.1 VK (K, θ) has two local maxima
VK (K, θ) has two local maxima at the price floor and ceiling, respectively, if the
following conditions hold:
1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1
>
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
; (4.26)[
1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1](τ
s
)β2−1
<
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
. (4.27)
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Derivation of these conditions are in the proof of Lemma 1 in subsection C.2.2 in
Appendix C. When β2 < −1, the right side of (4.26) is strictly less than 1/2. Thus,
(4.26) is more likely to hold if the value of (Q/a¯)β2+1 is lower. Since β2 + 1 < 0, this
implies that the target abatement a¯ is set relatively low compared to unregulated
emissions Q. Thus, θF (K) = s/c (K)Q and θs (K) = s/c (K) a¯ are not too close for
the benefits from increasing abatement at the price floor to be reflected in VK (K, θ).
Given (4.26), for (4.27) to hold true at the same time, (τ/s)β2−1 must be small enough
to change the direction of the inequality in (4.27). Since β2−1 < 0, this requires that
τ/s is not close to 1, or rather the price controls are not close to each other. When
the interval between the price controls (s, τ), and thus the interval of (θs (K) , θτ (K))
are not short, neither the price ceiling or the floor binds easily. Consequently, the
effects of the market when neither price control binds is reflected in VK (K, θ).
To understand the shape of VK (K, θ) when the intervals of [θF , θs] and [θs, θτ ] have
sufficient lengths, we will examine how prices and abatement levels vary over θ. Figure
(4.1) shows prices, abatement levels, and the marginal value function under a hybrid
policy when it has two local maxima and the global maximum is at the price floor. In
θ ∈ (0, θF ], the permit price binds at the price floor σ and the abatement level is fixed
at the unregulated level of emissions Q. That is, all emissions are abated. In this
interval, VK (K, θ) is linearly increasing in θ. Higher levels of θ (i.e., higher marginal
abatement costs), given full abatement, increases the marginal value of investments
in reducing abatement costs.
In the interval θ ∈ [θF , θs], the price still binds at the price floor. Abatement is
decreasing in θ, but it is still greater than target abatement a¯. This is because when
realized values of θ are low (marginal abatement costs are low) firms can abate more
to sell unused permits back to the government. At the start of this interval, there
is short part where V (K, θ) is increasing in θ. This is due to the full-abatement
constraint. However, over most of the interval [θF , θs] , decreasing abatement as θ
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increases causes the marginal value from investment to decrease over most of the
interval.
In θ ∈ [θs, θτ ], neither of price controls binds and thus price is linearly increasing
in θ, but the abatement level is fixed at target abatement level a¯. Given the target
abatement level, increasing values of θ increase marginal abatement cost and the
permit price, and thus the marginal value from investment also increases over much
of [θs, θτ ]. However, for lower values of θ in [θs, θτ ], the chance of falling into the
interval [θF , θs] increases, which can cause the decreasing part of VK (K, θ) at the
beginning of [θs, θτ ].
Finally, in θ ∈ [θτ ,∞) the permit price binds at a price ceiling τ , and abatement
is decreasing in θ. Decreasing abatement causes the marginal value from investment
to decrease over most of the interval. However, at the beginning of this interval there
exists a short part where VK (K, θ) is increasing because of the potential benefits of
decreasing θ and falling into [θs, θτ ] dominates the effects of decreasing abatement.
The facts that VK (K, θ) is non-monotonic in θ and has at least one maxima
highlight the importance of the unit cost of capital w. If the global maximum of
VK (K, θ) is strictly less than w, then investment will not occur at any realized value
of θ. Suppose that the unit cost of capital stock is w′, which is greater than the global
maximum of VK (K, θ) at initial sate as shown in Figure (4.2a). Since VK (K, θ) < w
′
for any θ, investment can’t ever occur. We can’t exclude this situation as the initial
state regardless of the shape of VK (K, θ). However, to explain the dynamics of the
capital stock and the investment intervals, suppose that the unit cost of capital stock
is w, which is strictly less than the global maximum at the initial state as shown in
Figure (4.2a).
Global maximum at the price floor When VK (K, θ) has two local maxima,
the location of the global maximum determines its shape. Consider the case where
the global maximum of VK (K, θ) occurs at the price floor. Suppose at first that the
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Figure 4.1: Price, abatement, and marginal value function 1
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current capital stock is K1 such that V
m
K (K1, θ) > w for all θs (K1) < θ < θτ (K1).
Then, the investment interval given K1 is (θ
∗1 (K1) , θ∗2 (K1)) as shown in Figure
(4.2a). If the realized value of θ is between (θ∗1 (K1) , θ∗2 (K1)), then VK (K1, θ) > w
and thus investment occurs immediately to increase the capital stock. However, if the
realized value of θ is either below θ∗1 (K1) or above θ∗2 (K1), then investment does
not occur and the current capital stock K1 is maintained for that time period. Note
that with K1, additional investment can occur if the realized value of θ results in
full abatement (θ ≤ θF (K1)), the price floor binds (θ ≤ θs (K1)), when neither price
control binds (θ ∈ (θs (K1) , θτ (K1)), and when the price ceiling binds (θ ≥ θτ (K1)).
With this low level of capital stock, investment does not occur only when θ is very
low under full abatement or very high when the price ceiling binds.
Now suppose that investment occurs at K1 and thus the current capital stock
increases to K2. Since VKK (K, θ) < 0,
4 the reduction in VK(K, θ) due to this
investment can cause the investment interval to contract to two disjoint intervals,
(θ∗1 (K2) , θ∗2 (K2)) and (θ∗3 (K2) , θ∗4 (K2)) as shown in Figure (4.2b). In this case,
there are values of θ that do not motivate additional investment when neither price
control binds. However, if further investment occurs say to K3, then because the
global maximum of VK (K, θ) occurs at the price floor, VK (K3, θ) might be such
that investment beyond K3 only occurs for a small interval at the price floor as
shown in Figure (4.2c). Since VK (K, θ) has the global maximum at the price floor,
the investment interval around the local maximum at the price ceiling disappears
first. Since VK (K, θ) is strictly decreasing in K, eventually investment in abatement
capital will cease because the global maximum of VK (K, θ) becomes equal to w and
the values of VK (K, θ) fall strictly below w for all θ except at the global maximum.
4It can be shown that each expression in (4.22)-(4.25) satisfies VKK (K, θ) < 0. The
demonstrations are omitted because they are too long. The demonstrations are available upon
request.
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This is the case for capital stock K4 show in Figure (4.2d). That there is an upper
bound on abatement capital investment under the hybrid scheme is important in
comparing investment under a pure emissions market.
Global maximum at the price ceiling. Now consider the case where VK (K, θ)
has two local maxima, and the global maximum occurs at the price ceiling. The
shape of VK (K, θ) for this case is depicted in Figure (4.3). Consider first the capital
stock K1 in Figure (4.3a) which is very low so that the investment interval given K1
is (θ∗1 (K1) , θ∗2 (K1)). Unless the realized value of θ is either too low or too high,
investment occurs immediately to increase the abatement capital stock. Suppose
that additional investment occurs and the current capital stock increases to K2 as in
Figure (4.3b). Then, the investment interval contracts to two disjoint intervals,
(θ∗1 (K2) , θ∗2 (K2)) and (θ∗3 (K2) , θ∗4 (K2)). Each investment interval is formed
around the local maxima at the price floor and ceiling. If additional investment take
places to increase the capital stock, say to K3 such that the local maximum at the
price floor falls below w, then the investment interval appears only around the
global maximum at the price ceiling as shown in Figure (4.3c). In contrast, recall
from Figure (4.2) that when VK (K, θ) has two maxima and the global maximum
occurs at the price floor, higher levels of capital eliminates the investment intervals
of θ around the price ceiling first. In all cases, however, no further investment
occurs for higher levels of capital. This is depicted in Figure (4.3d).
4.3.2.2 VK (K, θ) has a single maximum at the price floor.
VK (K, θ) has a single maximum point at the price floor if the following conditions
holds true:
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1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1
>
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
; (4.28)[
1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1](τ
s
)β2−1
>
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
. (4.29)
From the discussion above, we know that (4.28) occurs if the target level of abatement
a¯ is not too close to unregulated emissions Q. Thus, the interval of (θF (K) , θs (K))
is of sufficient length for the positive effects of the price floor on investment to occur.
(4.29) depends on the stringency of the price controls. Given (4.28), for (4.29) to hold
true at the same time, (τ/s)β2−1 must be large enough to maintain the inequality in
(4.29). Since β2 − 1 < 0, this requires that τ/s is close to 1, or rather the price
controls are close to each other. When the interval between the price controls (s, τ),
and thus the interval of (θs (K) , θτ (K)) are short, either the price ceiling or the floor
binds easily. Consequently, the effects of the market when neither price control binds
is not reflected in VK (K, θ).
Figure (4.4) shows prices, abatement levels, and the marginal value function
under a hybrid policy when VK (K, θ) has a single maximum at the price floor. The
qualitative effects of θ on prices and abatement levels are the same as in Figure
(4.1). However, the shape of marginal value function VK (K, θ) is different.
Especially, we can see that the increasing part of VK (K, θ) in the interval of [θs, θτ ]
in Figure (4.1) does not appear in Figure (4.4).
Next, consider how the marginal value function VK (K, θ) and the investment
intervals change as the capital stockK increases when VK (K, θ) has a single maximum
at the price floor. As aggregate abatement capital increases, the investment interval
contracts as shown in Figure (4.5b). Finally, at a further higher level of capital stock,
the single maximum value at the price floor becomes equal to the unit capital costs
w and the investment interval vanishes as shown in Figure (4.5c).
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Figure 4.4: Price, abatement, and marginal value function 2
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4.3.2.3 VK (K, θ) has a single maximum at the price ceiling.
VK (K, θ) has a single maximum at the price ceiling if the following relationship
holds:
1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1
<
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
. (4.30)
When β2 < −1, the right side of this relationship is strictly less than 1/2. Thus, the
condition holds if (Q/a¯)β2+1 is sufficiently close to 1. Since β2 + 1 < 0, this implies
that the target level of abatement a¯ is set relatively high compared to unregulated
emissions Q. Thus, θF (K) = s/c (K)Q and θs (K) = s/c (K) a¯ are too close for the
benefits from increasing abatement at the price floor to be reflected in VK (K, θ).
As shown in Figure (4.6), the target abatement level a¯ is very high relative to the
unregulated emissions Q, which makes the interval [θF , θs] very short. As a result we
can see that although prices and abatement levels move as usual with θ, the marginal
value function VK (K, θ) is different from the previous cases in Figures (4.1) and (4.4).
VK (K, θ) has a single maximum at the price floor, which means that the decreasing
part of VK (K, θ) in the interval of [θF , θs] in Figures (4.1) and (4.4) does not appear
in Figure (4.6).
Next, consider how the marginal value function VK (K, θ) and investment intervals
change as the capital stock K increases when VK (K, θ) has a single maximum at
the price ceiling. As aggregate abatement capital increases, the investment interval
shrinks as shown in Figure (4.7b). In Figures (4.7a) and (4.7b), investment can only
occur when the price ceiling binds, but the price ceiling still works to limit investment
for high values of θ. In addition, it is possible that the lower bound of the investment
interval occurs when the price ceiling does not bind. As in all cases, there is no further
investment once the capital stock reaches higher levels like K3 in Figure (4.7c).
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Figure 4.6: Price, abatement, and marginal value function 3
109
(a
)
W
it
h
a
ca
p
it
a
l
st
o
ck
K
1
(b
)
W
it
h
a
ca
p
it
a
l
st
o
ck
K
2
(c
)
W
it
h
a
ca
p
it
a
l
st
o
ck
K
3
F
ig
u
re
4.
7:
In
ve
st
m
en
t
d
ec
is
io
n
s
w
h
en
V
K
(K
,θ
)
h
as
th
e
si
n
gl
e
m
ax
im
u
m
at
th
e
p
ri
ce
ce
il
in
g;
K
1
<
K
2
<
K
3
110
4.4 Investments in abatement capital under a hybrid policy
and a pure permit market
4.4.1 Derivation of investment decisions under a pure permit market
To further examine the effects of a hybrid price and quantity regulation on
investment in aggregate abatement capital, we will compare the investment intervals
under a hybrid policy with the investment intervals under a pure permit trading.
We begin by deriving the investment intervals under pure permit trading.
Aggregate compliance costs under the pure permit trading are just equal to the
aggregate abatement costs of achieving the target abatement a¯, because unlike a
hybrid price and quantity regulation, there are no additional purchases or sales of
permits. Thus, aggregate compliance costs under a pure permit market are
Spp (K, θ; a¯) =
1
2
c (K) θa¯2.
For the comparison between the hybrid policy and a pure permit market, we assume
that the random shock θ follows the same stochastic process under both regulations
and we impose the parameter restrictions of the random shock (4.3). Then, by the
same steps we used to derive VK (K, θ), which is shown in section C.3 in Appendix C,
the expected marginal value function under the pure market, denoted by V ppK (K, θ),
is
V ppK (K, θ) = −
β1 − 1
β1
c′ (K) θa¯2
2 (r − α) , (4.31)
where β1 > 1 is a positive solution to
1
2
σ2β (β − 1) + αβ − r = 0. (4.31) consists of
two parts: an option value coefficient (β1 − 1) /β1 < 1 and the present value of the
stream of marginal benefits from investment,−c′ (K) θa¯2/2 (r − α). Since (4.31) is
linearly increasing in θ, given K there is a single boundary for the non-investment
and investment intervals of θ, which is the solution to V ppK (K, θ) = w. Denote this
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boundary as θ∗ (K). Since (4.31) is monotonically increasing in θ, additional
investment occurs for realizations of θ above θ∗ (K).
4.4.2 Comparison of VK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ)
The following proposition shows the relationships between the expected marginal
values of further investment under the hybrid scheme and the pure market. It is
proved in section C.4 in Appendix C. In the next subsection, we will use this
proposition to help us compare how the investment and non-investment intervals of
θ differ under the two regulations.
Proposition 1: 1) Given aggregate abatement capital K, there is a single value of
θ > 0, call it θI (K), such that VK (K, θI (K)) = V
pp
K (K, θI (K)).
2) In addition, θI (K) > θτ (K) .
3) Moreover, the following relationships always hold:
VK (K, θ) > V
pp
K (K, θ) for 0 < θ < θI (K)
and
VK (K, θ) < V
pp
K (K, θ) for θ > θI (K) .
4.4.2.1 Comparison of the investment and non-investment intervals
Proposition 1 allows us to compare the investment and non-investment intervals
of θ under a hybrid policy and a pure permit trading. In addition, we look for how
these intervals respond to increases in the abatement capital stock. The overall results
from these comparisons are as follows:
Finding 1: Given K, if there exists an investment interval (or intervals) of θ under
the hybrid scheme, there is an upper bound of θ after which no additional investment
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occurs. This upper bound is due to the price ceiling. However, there is no such upper
bound of θ under a pure permit market. Thus, in a period, high realizations of the
random shock to abatement costs may trigger additional investment under the pure
emissions market, but not under the hybrid scheme.
Finding 2: Under the hybrid regulation there exists an upper bound of the abatement
capital stock such that no additional investment will occur. No such upper bound
exists for the pure emissions market.
Finding 3: Given K, investment intervals of θ under the hybrid policy may exist
for low realizations of θ that do not exist under the pure market regulation. Thus,
there may be investment opportunities for low realizations of abatement costs under
the hybrid scheme that are not available under the pure market.
To demonstrate these results, we’ll compare investment intervals under a hybrid
scheme and under a pure market using the case where VK (K, θ) has two local
maxima and the global maximum occurs at the price floor, which is depicted in
Figure (4.8). As following Proposition 1, in every panel the expected marginal value
function under a hybrid policy and under pure permit trading, which are marked by
VK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ), respectively, intersect only once after θτ (K) except when
θ = 0. Moreoever, for any level of capital stock, VK (K, θ) is higher than V
pp
K (K, θ)
before the intersection while VK (K, θ) falls below V
pp
K (K, θ) after the intersection.
These relationships hold regardless of the specific shape of VK (K, θ)
5.
Figure (4.8a) considers VK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) for an initial low level of capital
stock like K1, such that VK (K1, θ) > w for all θ ∈ [θs (K1) , θτ (K1)]. Investment
5In Figure (4.8), we can see that VK (K, θ) in the interval of [θs, θτ ] and V
pp
K (K, θ) have very
similar structures. However, according to Proposition 1, VK (K, θ) is higher than V
pp
K (K, θ) in this
interval. Under a hybrid policy, there is a chance that low values of θ fall into the interval of [θF , θs]
and thus firms can increase abatement. This potential benefit under a hybrid policy makes VK (K, θ)
higher than V ppK (K, θ). However, as θ increases, the probability that θ falls into [θF , θs] decreases,
which makes the gap between VK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) decrease.
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under a hybrid policy will occur except when the realized value of θ is either too
low or too high. While investment is triggered only by higher values of θ under pure
permit trading, investment under a hybrid policy can occur for lower values of θ
(Finding 3). However, investment does not occur under a hybrid policy for higher
values of θ because of the price ceiling, but would occur under pure permit trading
(Finding 1). Suppose that investment occurs at K1 and capital stock increases to
K2. Then, as shown in Figure (4.8b), a hybrid policy have two disjoint investment
intervals. The left one for smaller values of θ lies in the non-investment interval under
a pure permit trading (Finding 3). The right investment interval under a hybrid policy
starts from slightly lower values of θ (which is indicated by the red lines) than the
investment interval under pure permit trading (which is indicated by black lines).
This does not always occur; that is, it is also possible that the lower boundary of
the upper investment interval is equal to or greater than the lower boundary of the
investment interval under pure permit trading. However, the investment interval
under the hybrid policy still has an upper bound but there is no upper bound under
pure permit trading (Finding 1).
Suppose again that investment occurs at K2 and capital stock increases to K3
such that the local maximum at the price ceiling under the hybrid policy falls below
w, but the global maximum at the price floor is still higher than w. Then, the
left investment interval in Figure (4.8c) still remains but is smaller, while the right
interval disappears. Finally, as in all cases, for high level of capital stock like K4 in
Figure (4.8d), the global maximum also falls below w and thus there is no further
investment under the hybrid policy. However, under the pure permit trading there are
still possible realizations of θ for which investment occurs under pure permit trading
(Finding 2).
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4.4.2.2 Comparison the levels of investment
As shown in Figure (4.8), the investment interval(s) under each policy can have
some overlapping intervals even when a hybrid policy has two disjoint investment
intervals. Thus, given the abatement capital stock, investments can occur under both
policies for some values of a random shock. From Proposition 1, we can compare
increases in the capital stock under each policy when the realized value of θ falls into
the overlapping investment interval and thus investments occur under both policies.
Corollary 1: Given a capital stock K and the realized value of a random shock θ′
that satisfy both VK (K, θ
′) > w and V ppK (K, θ
′) > w, investments occur to increase
the capital stock such that VK (K
′, θ′) = w under a hybrid policy and V ppK (K
′′, θ′) = w
under a pure permit market, respectively. Then,
1) If θ′ > θI (K), then K ′ − K < K ′′ − K. That is, if the realized value
of the random shock θ′ is greater than the intersection of VK (K, θ) and
V ppK (K, θ), then investment under pure permit trading is greater than
under a hybrid policy.
2) If θ′ < θI (K), then K ′ − K > K ′′ − K. If the realized value of the
random shock θ′ is less than the intersection of VK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ),
then investment under a hybrid policy is greater than under pure permit
trading.
Proof. We’ll prove only the part (1) of Corollary 1. Part (2) can be derived using
the same steps. Suppose that θ′ > θI (K). From Proposition 1, we know that
VK (K, θ
′) < V ppK (K, θ
′). Let the increased capital stock under a hybrid policy be K ′
such that VK (K
′, θ′) = w. Then,
w = VK (K
′, θ′) < V ppK (K
′, θ′) .
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K ′ under pure permit trading implies over-investment because the capital stock
increases more than the level that is required to restore the equality. Therefore, K ′′
such that V ppK (K
′′, θ′) = w must be less than K ′. 2
Proposition 1 shows that given K, VK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) intersects only at the
price ceiling. Thus, if investment occurs at the price ceiling, it is likely that the
realized value of θ is greater than the intersection of VK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ). In
turn, from Corollary 1, investments at the price ceiling are likely to be less than
investments under pure permit trading.
4.5 Comparative statics and numerical examples
The parameters in our model can be separated into groups: 1) the policy variables
(a¯, s, τ) and 2) the parameters of the distribution of θ, (α, σ2). In the following
two subsections, we will show the effects of changing each of these parameters on
the investment decision. To do this, we have to find how VK (K, θ) is affected by
changes in each parameter. However, since the marginal value function VK (K, θ)
has complicated expressions depending on θ, sometimes it is not possible to obtain
analytical expressions for changes in VK (K, θ). For these cases, we will add numerical
examples. For numerical examples we need to assume the functional form of c (K).
Following Zhao (2003) and Park (2012), we assume that
c (K) = c0K
−γ.
For our base case we assume that Q = 200, a¯ = 60, s = 25, τ = 75, r = 0.075, α = 0,
σ = 0.1, K0 = 100, γ = 0.04, and c0 = 1. For the initial value of a random shock,
we assume that θ (0) = 1. Then, with these parameters, the expected permit price at
the initial period is p (0) = c (K0) θ (0) a¯ ≈ 50. Note that we assume that the price
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floor and ceiling are symmetric around the initial expected price of permits. Finally,
we assume that w = 8 is the unit cost of capital.
4.5.1 Comparative statics with respect to policy parameters
4.5.1.1 Changes in a¯
In our model, the target abatement level a¯ affects: 1) the two cutoff values θs (K)
and θτ (K) and 2) V
m
K (K, θ) and V
τ
K (K, θ). From (4.7), (4.8), (4.24), and (4.25), we
can find:
∂θτ
∂a¯
= − τ
c (K) a¯2
< − s
c (K) a¯2
=
∂θs
∂a¯
< 0,
∂V mK (K, θ)
∂a¯
=
β1 − 1
β1
1
r − α
c′ (K) s
c (K)
[(
θ
θs
)β2
−
(
θ
θs
)]
> 0,
∂V τK (K, θ)
∂a¯
=
β1 − 1
β1
1
r − α
c′ (K) τ
c (K)
(
θ
θτ
)β2 [(τ
s
)β2−1 − 1] > 0.
Thus, increases in the target abatement level a¯ decrease both θs and θτ . Since θτ
is reduced more than θs, in addition, the interval (θs, θτ ) where neither of the price
controls binds also decreases. Since V mK (K, θ) and V
τ
K (K, θ) increase, we can expect
that the investment intervals also increase as a¯ increases. For instance, Figure (4.9)
displays how the marginal value function VK (K, θ) and thus the investment intervals
change for different values of a¯. Both graphs are drawn with the parameters of the
base case which are explained above and w = 8. Holding the other parameters
constant, only the values of the target abatement level a¯ are changed. For the upper
panel of Figure (4.9), we use a¯1 = 40, a¯2 = 60, and a¯3 = 80. For a¯1 = 40, there
exists the investment interval only around the global maximum at the price floor
because the local maximum at the price ceiling is strictly below w = 8. However, as
a¯ increases to a¯2 = 60 and then to a¯3 = 80, V
m
K (K, θ) and V
τ
K (K, θ) both increase
and thus the local maximum at the price ceiling can rise above w. This causes a
disjoint investment interval to appear around the local maximum at the price ceiling.
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The investment interval around the local maximum at the price floor is unlikely to
increase because V FK (K, θ) and V
s
K (K, θ) are not affected by changes in a¯.
In the bottom panel of Figure (4.9), we illustrate the investment intervals as the
target abatement level a¯ is changed from 20 to 120. Given Q = 200, the rates of
the target abatement vary from 10% to 60%. Lower boundaries of the investment
intervals are denoted by θ1 and θ3 with θ1 < θ3 and upper boundaries of the investment
intervals are marked by θ2 and θ4 with θ2 < θ4. In addition, dashed line marked by θpp
represents the lower boundary of the investment interval under a pure permit trading.
(There is no upper boundary of this interval). Given a target abatement level a¯, the
investment intervals of lower and higher values of θ are denoted by IIL (a¯) and IIH (a¯),
respectively. For lower values of a¯, investment occurs only for small values of θ, in
IIL (a¯). For a¯1 = 40, there is only one investment interval. However, as a¯ becomes
greater than about 50, the local maximum at the price ceiling rises above w = 8 and
thus the disjoint investment intervals consisting of higher values of θ appear such as
IIH (a¯2) and IIH (a¯3). As a¯ increases, θ3 decreases while θ4 keeps increasing. Thus,
as a¯ gets larger and larger the investment intervals, especially (θ3, θ4), expand. If the
target abatement level a¯ is greater than about 100, then the local minimum value
of V mK (K, θ) goes beyond w, which implies that θ2 and θ3 become equal and thus
disjoint investment intervals are connected. So (θ1, θ4) becomes the sole investment
interval. Increases in the target abatement level increase the marginal value of the
capital stock and so the investment intervals expand.
4.5.1.2 Changes in s
When the price floor s changes, the following things are affected: 1) θF (K) and
θs (K), and 2) V
s
K (K, θ), V
m
K (K, θ), and V
τ
K (K, θ). From (4.8), (4.11), (4.23), and
(4.24), we can find:
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Figure 4.9: Changes in the target abatement level: a¯1 < a¯2 < a¯3
120
∂θs
∂s
=
1
c (K) a¯
>
1
c (K)Q
=
∂θF
∂s
> 0;
∂V sK(K, θ)
∂s
=
β1 + 1
β1
1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K)Q
c (K)
[(
θ
θF
)β2
−
(
θ
θF
)−1]
> 0;
∂V mK (K, θ)
∂s
=
∂V τK(K, θ)
∂s
=
β1+1
β1
1
r − σ2 + α
c′(K)
c(K)
(
c(K) θ
s
)β2(
Qβ2+1 − a¯β2+1)> 0.
Thus, increases in the price floor s increase both θF and θs . Since θs increases more
than θF , the interval (θF , θs) also increases, which makes it more likely that the price
floor binds. Since V sK (K, θ), V
m
K (K, θ) and V
τ
K (K, θ) move upward, we can expect
that the investment intervals also increase as s increases.
For instance, the top panel of Figure (4.10) shows how the marginal value function
VK (K, θ) moves for different price floors s and the bottom panel describes how the
investment intervals change with s. Both graphs are drawn with the parameters of
the base case and w = 8. With the other parameters fixed, only the level of the price
floor s is changed. For the upper graph, we choose s1 = 15, s2 = 25, and s3 = 35 and
for the lower one we vary the level of the price floor from 5 to 50. As depicted in the
top panel of Figure (4.10), for s1 = 15, there is one investment interval around the
global maximum at the price ceiling. However, as s increases to s2 = 25 and s3 = 35,
VK (K, θ), and especially V
F
K (K, θ) and V
s
K (K, θ), increase which can cause the local
maximum at the price floor to rise above w . This creates a new disjoint investment
interval appear around the local maximum at the price floor. Note that unlike the
previous case of the target abatement level a¯ , V sK (K, θ) and V
m
K (K, θ) increase at
the same time, which increases the investment interval around the local maximum at
the price floor.
Like the previous case, both θ1 and θ3(θ1 < θ3) are lower boundaries of the
investment intervals and both θ2 and θ4 (θ2 < θ4) are upper boundaries of the
investment intervals. The dashed line marked by θpp is the lower boundary of the
investment interval under a pure permit trading. Finally, given a price floor s, the
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investment intervals of lower and higher values of θ are denoted by IIL (s) and
IIH (s), respectively. For lower values of s, there exists the investment interval with
higher values of θ such as IIH (s1). However, around s = 18, the investment interval
with lower values of θ appears, IIL (s). Note that IIL (s) expands as s increases. In
addition, as s increases θ3 decreases while θ4 increases and thus the investment
interval of higher values of θ, IIH (s), also increases. Therefore, as s is increased, the
investment intervals tend to expand. For s ≥ 40, the local minimum value of
V mK (K, θ) is greater than w = 8, which makes θ2 and θ3 equal and thus the two
investment intervals are connected to become (θ1, θ4).
4.5.1.3 Changes in τ
When the price ceiling τ changes, the following are affected: 1) θτ , and 2)
V τK (K, θ). From (4.7) and (4.25), we can find:
∂θτ
∂τ
=
1
c (K) a¯
> 0;
∂V τK (K, θ)
∂τ
=
β1 + 1
β1
1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) a¯
c (K)
[(
θ
θτ
)β2
−
(
θ
θτ
)−1]
> 0.
As the price ceiling τ increases, only θτ increases and thus the interval (θs, θτ ) where
neither of the price controls binds also increases. Changes in τ affect only V τK (K, θ).
As depicted in Figure (4.11), since ∂V τK (K, θ) /∂τ > 0, we can expect that the
investment interval will increase for higher levels of τ . However, this only occurs for
the investment interval around the local maximum at the price ceiling. Because
V FK (K, θ), V
s
K (K, θ), and V
m
K (K, θ) are not affected by the level of the price ceiling
τ , the lower investment interval around the local maximum at the price floor is not
affected at all. Given the base case parameters, we change the values of the price
ceiling τ from 50 to 90 in the bottom panel of Figure (4.11). For lower values of τ
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Figure 4.10: Changes in a price floor: s1 < s2 < s3
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less than 59.4, the local maximum at the price ceiling is below w and thus the only
investment interval exists for low values of θ, or IIL (τ). However, as θ increases, the
investment interval of high values of θ, IIH (τ), appears and expands.
4.5.1.4 Symmetric changes in (s, τ)
So far we have examined how changes in only one of the two price controls affect
the investment intervals. We found that increases in the price floor s make investment
at lower values of θ more likely while increases in the price ceiling τ cause investment
to occur at higher values of θ. However, since in our base case we assume that the price
floor and ceiling are symmetric around the initial expected price, we now change the
price floor and ceiling at the same time keeping them symmetric around p (0) ≈ 50.
The symmetric price floor and ceiling can be expressed by
s = (1− δ) p (0) ; τ = (1 + δ) p (0) .
We will now change δ and the effects on the marginal value function VK (K, θ)
and the investment intervals will be examined using numerical examples. Given the
base case parameters, we change δ from 10% to 80%, that is, s decreases from 45 to
10 while τ increases from 55 to 90. The top panel of Figure (4.12) shows the marginal
value functions for δ1 = 15%, δ2 = 50%, and δ3 = 80%. For low values of δ, s is
relatively high while τ is relatively low. Thus, the global maximum occurs at the
price floor. However, as δ increases, V sK (K, θ) and V
m
K (K, θ) move downward while
V τK (K, θ) moves upward. As a result, for higher value of δ, the location of the global
maximum moves from the price floor to the price ceiling. We can expect that the
investment interval with lower values of θ, marked as IIL (δ) in the bottom panel of
Figure (4.12), will shrink and finally disappear. However, the investment interval with
higher values of θ, marked as IIH (δ) in the bottom panel, will expand as δ increases.
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Figure 4.11: Changes in a price ceiling: τ1 < τ2 < τ3
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For δ ≤ 0.2, the investment interval (θ1, θ4) has relatively low values of θ compared
to the investment interval (θpp,∞) under pure permit trading. For 0.2 < δ ≤ 0.64,
the investment interval of low values of θ, IIL (δ), keeps falling while the investment
interval of high values of θ, IIH (δ), keep increasing. Finally, for δ > 0.64 , the
investment interval of low values of θ disappears and thus investment will occur only
at high values of θ.
4.5.2 Comparative statics with respect to (α, σ)
4.5.2.1 Changes in σ
Since the marginal value function under pure permit trading, V PPK (K, θ), is
monotonically decreasing in σ, the lower bound of the investment interval under a
pure permit trading is strictly increasing in σ. This implies that higher values of θ
are required to stimulate investment under greater uncertainty. However, changes in
VK (K, θ) under a permit market with price controls are not monotonic in σ.
Moreover, depending on the values of θ, it is possible that VK (K, θ) can increase as
σ increases. Given r and α, the values of σ must be σ2 < r + α from the second
condition of (4.3). With the base case parameters of r = 0.075 and α = 0, we
examine values of σ from 0.01 to 0.25. The results of this numerical exercise are
shown in Figures (4.13) and (4.14).
At first, from Figure (4.13), we see the two distinguishing movements of VK (K, θ)
as σ increases: the two local maximum values shift down while the local minimum
value increases, causing VK (K, θ) to become flatter. Decreases in VK (K, θ) are likely
to reduce the investment interval. However, increases in the local minimum value of
V mK (K, θ) may cause the investment intervals to expand..
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Figure 4.12: Symmetric changes in the interval of (s, τ); δ1 < δ2 < δ3
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Figure 4.13: Changes in VK (K, θ;σ) for σ1 < σ2 < σ3
The effects of changes in σ on the investment intervals can differ depending on the
relative size of unit cost w and capital stock K. Given the base case parameters with
w = 8, changes in the investment intervals over σ are shown in Figure (4.14a). The
lower boundaries of the investment intervals θ1 and θ3 keep increasing as σ increases.
However, the upper boundaries θ2 and θ4 increase for σ ≤ 0.19 and then decrease
for σ > 0.19. Thus, the investment intervals start to expand for lower values of σ.
However, after around σ = 0.19, they shrink. As a benchmark, the lower bound of
the investment interval under pure permit trading keeps increasing as σ increases,
which implies that higher values of θ are required to stimulate investments. Under
a hybrid policy, θ3 plays a similar role. As σ increases, both θ3 and θpp become
larger. However, increases in θ3 are less than increases in θpp. This implies that under
a hybrid policy it is a little easier for investment to occur than under pure permit
trading. However, a hybrid policy still has a upper bound of the investment interval,
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θ4. Moreover, this upper boundary becomes smaller which reduces the investment
intervals of high values of θ as σ increases.
For low unit cost w = 7, as depicted in Figure (4.14b), expansion of the investment
intervals is enhanced compared to the case of w = 8. Given the range of σ, the
investment intervals under a hybrid policy never shrink. However, for the case of
w = 9, as shown in Figure (4.14c) another interesting thing happens. Because of
the downward movement of VK (K, θ) over σ, all of VK (K, θ) falls below w around
σ = 0.215 and thus the investment intervals disappear. Similar effects occur for the
case of w = 8 and a higher initial capital stock K0 = 107.5 (Figure (4.14d)). In
this example, the marginal rate of return to investment is reduced. As a result, after
σ = 0.24, VK (K, θ) falls below w and the investment intervals vanish.
4.5.2.2 Changes in α
Like the case of changes in σ, the marginal value function under pure permit
trading, V PPK (K, θ), is monotonically increasing in α. Therefore, the lower bound of
the investment interval under pure permit trading strictly decreasing in α. However,
the marginal value function under a permit market with price controls, VK (K, θ),
is not monotonic in α. Moreover, depending on the values of θ, it is possible that
VK (K, θ) can decrease as α increases. Given r, the values of α must be r > α and
α > σ2 − r from (4.3). With the base case parameters of r = 0.075 and σ = 0.1,
we vary α from -0.03 to 0.05 in Figure (4.15). From the upper panel of Figure
(4.15), we can see that the maximum values of VK (K, θ) tend to move upward as
α increases while the interior minimum of VK (K, θ) tends to shift down. Changes
in the investment intervals as α changes are illustrated in the lower panel of Figure
(4.15). Note that it is not clear how the lenghts of the investment intervals change
with α.
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Figure 4.15: Changes in α: α1 < α2 < α3
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4.5.3 Capital expansions under a hybrid policy and a pure permit trading
Although we derived the investment decision rule under a hybrid policy and
compared it with the investment decision rule under pure permit trading, we did
not show which policy induces greater investments in abatement capital. In this
subsection, we demonstrate expansion paths of the capital stock based on the
investment decision rules under both policies and compare them. To execute this
numerical example, first we generate 10,000 sample paths of a random shock for 30
years. Then, we apply the two investment decision rules to each sample path. In
each period of a sample path, the realized value of a random shock θ′ is observed.
Then given capital stock K we can determine whether investment is required or not.
If it is required, then we can calculate the increase in the capital stock that will
satsify VK (K
′, θ′) = w under the hybrid policy, and V ppK (K
′, θ′) = w under pure
permit trading, where K ′ = K + ∆K. Note that K ′ will likely differ under the two
policies.
Except for the parameters of the distribution of θ (α, σ2), the other parameters
of the model are the same as explained above: Q = 200, a¯ = 60, s = 25, τ = 75,
r = 0.075, K0 = 100, γ = 0.04, c0 = 1 and w = 8. We take the value of α
from {−0.03,−0.02,−0.01, 0, 0.01, 0.02} so that r > α because of (4.3). Then, the
permissible values of σ are taken from {0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25} given r and α so
that the second assumption of (4.3), r + α > σ2, is satisfied. After applying the
decision rules to all sample paths, we calculate the average level of capital stock at
each period over all sample paths. The results are shown in Figures (4.16) and (4.17).
For α = −0.03, the capital stock is eventually greater under the hybrid policy than
under pure permit trading, regardless of the level of volatility σ (as shown in the top-
left panel of Figure (4.16)). For α = −0.02 and low levels of σ such as 0.10 and 0.15,
the hybrid policy motivates greater investment than pure permit trading. However,
for a high level of volatility (σ = 0.20), the average level of capital stock under pure
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permit trading at the end period is greater than under a hybrid policy (as depicted
in the top-right panel of Figure 134). When the expected growth rate of a random
shock is greater than or equal to −0.01 (α ≥ −0.01), for any level of volatility σ, a
hybrid policy results in lower investment than pure permit trading, except the case
of α = −0.01 and σ = 0.1 where both show almost the same average levels of the
capital stock (as shown in the bottom panels of Figure (4.16) and all panels of Figure
(4.17)).
Another interesting phenomenon is evident in the cases of the positive expected
growth rate α ≥ 0.01. Under a pure permit trading, as σ increases, the average level
of the capital stock also increases. However, under a hybrid policy, as σ increases
total investment in the capital stock decreases. That is, as shown in Figure (4.17),
the average level of the capital stock at the end period under a hybrid policy decreases
as σ increases from 0.05 to 0.15 and then to 0.25. In the previous subsection, we found
that as σ increases, VK (K, θ) can fall below the unit cost w and thus the investment
intervals may disappear depending on the relative amount of capital K and unit cost
w. When σ is high, it’s more likely for VK (K, θ) to fall below the unit cost w for
small increases in the capital stock K. For instance, when the expected growth rate is
α = 0.01, the maximum capital stock level for σ = 0.05 is 157.63 while the maximum
capital stock for σ = 0.25 is 109.24. Thus, for σ = 0.05, small increases in the capital
stock K still allow additional investment. On the other hand, for σ = 0.25, small
increases in the capital stock K makes most of the marginal value function VK (K, θ)
falls below w, and thus there is not much additional investment after that.
4.6 Conclusions
As a cost containment measure, a hybrid policy imposes a price ceiling and a
price floor directly on a permit market. It has been already shown that a hybrid
policy can outperform a pure permit market in a static setting. Another criterion to
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evaluate environmental regulation is how much a regulation can induce
technological innovations. Considering investment in new abatement capital which
reduces total and marginal abatement costs as one aspect of technological
innovations, we have investigated the effects of a hybrid price and quantity
regulation on irreversible and incremental investment in abatement capital under
uncertainty about abatement costs.
We have derived the explicit investment decision rule under a hybrid policy.
Investments are determined by an expected marginal value function and unit costs
of new investment. We found that the marginal value function under a hybrid
policy is not monotonic in shocks to abatement costs. Moreover, the marginal value
function has a global maximum over abatement cost shocks and goes to zero as the
shocks get large. This implies that there is an upper bound on total investment in
the abatement capital stock under the hybrid policy. No such upper bound exists
under pure permit trading: there always exists the possibility of further investment
under this policy. This is our most important, policy-relevant result.
In addition, we found that the expected marginal value function under a hybrid
policy can take four different shapes depending on the levels of the policy
instruments, that is, the target abatement level, the price ceiling and the price floor.
The investment intervals usually locate around the local maxima and they shrink as
investments occur and the capital stock increases. Then, the investment interval
around the global maximum can persist longer than the investment interval around
the other local maximum as the capital stock increases. If the target abatement
level is set high relative to unregulated emissions, then the interval where the price
floor binds without achieving full abatement becomes too short for the benefits from
increasing abatement at the price floor. Therefore, the marginal value function has
the single maximum at the price ceiling. Provided that the target abatement level is
not too close to unregulated emissions, the marginal value function has a single
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maximum at the price floor if the price ceiling and floor are close to each other. The
interval where neither the price ceiling or the price floor bind is so short that either
of the price controls can bind easily. Provided that the target abatement level is not
too close to the unregulated level of emissions and that the price ceiling and the
price floor are not too close, the marginal value function has two local maxima.
By comparing the marginal value functions under a hybrid policy and under pure
permit trading, we found that they intersect only one time at the price ceiling. In
addition, before they intersect, the marginal value function under a hybrid policy
is greater than the marginal value function under pure permit trading. However,
after the intersection, the relationship is reversed. As a cost containment measure,
the goal of a hybrid policy is to restrict variation in abatement costs. This implies
that a hybrid policy keeps abatement costs high when they could be lower without
the price floor, and the policy keeps abatement costs low when they could be higher
without the price ceiling. These properties flatten the marginal value function under a
hybrid policy compared to the marginal value function under a pure emissions permit
trading.
If there exists an investment interval (or intervals) of abatement costs shocks
under the hybrid policy, there is an upper bound of this shock after which no
additional investment occurs. This upper bound is due to the price ceiling.
However, there is no such upper bound under a pure permit trading. Thus, a high
realization of a random shock to abatement costs may trigger additional investment
under a pure emissions permit trading, but not under a hybrid policy. On the other
hand, investment intervals of abatement cost shocks under a hybrid policy may exist
for low realizations of θ that do not exist under a pure market regulation. Thus,
there may be investment opportunities for low realizations of abatement costs under
the hybrid scheme that are not available under the pure market.
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From the comparative statics with respect to the volatility of the abatement cost
shocks, we found that increases in uncertainty can have opposite effects on the
investment intervals. First, as volatility increases, the investment intervals can
increase especially when either the current level of the capital stock or the unit costs
of capital stock are low. However, when either the current level of the capital stock
or the unit cost of investment are high, the investment intervals can decrease and
can even disappear for higher volatility. Numerical examples that demonstrate the
expansion paths of the capital stock shows the significant effects of the latter case.
In this paper, by deriving the explicit investment decision rule under a hybrid
price and quantity regulation, we were able to compare that with investment
decisions under a pure emissions permit trading. However, to show which policy is
superior to the other policy in inducing investment in abatement capital is not the
goal of this paper. In addition, without calculating a probability that investment
occurs given the current state, we cannot argue which one is better than the other
one. While we examined the effects of a hybrid policy on irreversible and
incremental investment in abatement capital, there are some limits in our model.
First, we considered only the case where a random shock follows a geometric
Brownian motion to derive explicit solutions of the model. However, it would be
useful to consider other cases. Next, we assumed irreversible and incremental
investment in abatement capital. However, some types of investment can be
exercised only once. This type of investment may characterize the adoption of a
better technology which can reduce abatement costs. It would be useful to examine
whether a hybrid policy has similar effects in this situation. Finally, we did not
consider changes in the levels of policy variables over time. For example, most
implemented and proposed carbon policies increase the target abatement level over
time. This implies that to keep the price controls symmetric, the levels of price
controls also increase at the same rate with which the target abatement increases.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The first task in the proof of the proposition is to characterize the optimal
emissions market with price controls, given pollutant 2 is controlled with L2
tradable permits and that the constraints in (2.13) do not bind. We then develop
the policy choice rules in the proposition by determining when the constraints will
bind.
A.1.1 Characterization of a pollutant 1 market with price controls, given
L2.
We begin by using the definitions of the cut-off values uτ1 and uσ1 in (2.9) to
specify the following relationships:
Q1
(
τ1, L2, u
τ1
)
= Q1
(
σ1, L2, u
σ1
)
= λ1; (A.1)
− C1
(
Q1
(
z, L2, u
)
, L2, u
)
= z, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}. (A.2)
(A.1) states that at uτ1 the price ceiling τ1 and the permit supply λ1 bind together,
and at uσ1 the price floor σ1 and the permit supply bind together. (A.2) states that at
the price controls, pollutant 1 emissions are such that aggregate marginal abatement
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costs given L2 are equal to the price controls. With these results, the first order
conditions for the unconstrained version of (2.13) can be written as:
∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, L2
)
∂λ1
=
∫ uτ1
uσ1
[
C1
(
λ1, L2, u
)
+D11(λ1)
]
f(u) du = 0;
∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, L2
)
∂τ1
=
∫ u
uτ1
[−τ1 +D11(Q1(τ1, L2, u))] ∂Q1(τ1, L2, u)∂τ1 f(u) du = 0;
∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, L2
)
∂σ1
=
∫ uσ1
u
[−σ1 +D11(Q1(σ1, L2, u))] ∂Q1(σ1, L2, u)∂σ1 f(u) du = 0.
(A.3)
To write these conditions in terms of the functional forms for abatement costs
and the damage functions, we need to specify the emissions response of pollutant 1
to its own price and the quantity of emissions of pollutant 2. Using the aggregate
abatement cost function (2.2), note that the explicit form of p1 = −C1
(
Q1, L2, u
)
is
p1 = a1 + u− a2Q1 + wL2, (A.4)
which gives us the pollutant 1 emissions response at the price ceiling and price floor:
Q1
(
z, L2, u
)
=
a1 + u− z + wL2
a2
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}, (A.5)
with
∂Q1
(
z, L2, u
)
∂z
= − 1
a2
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}. (A.6)
Given (A.5) and the marginal damage functions, we also have
D11
(
Q1
(
z, L2, u
))
= d11 + d12
a1 + u− z + wL2
a2
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}. (A.7)
Moreover,
D11 (λ1) = d11 + d12λ1, (A.8)
and
C1
(
λ1, L2, u
)
= − (a1 + u) + a2λ1 − wL2. (A.9)
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Substitute (A.5) through (A.9) into (A.3) to obtain:
∂W
(
λ1,τ1,σ1,L2
)
∂λ1
=
∫ uτ1
uσ1
[−a1+d11+(a2+d12)λ1−wL2−u]f(u)du=0;
∂W
(
λ1,τ1,σ1,L2
)
∂τ1
=
∫ u
uτ1
(
−a1d12+a2d11
a22
+
a2+d12
a22
τ1−wd12
a22
L2− d12
a22
u
)
f(u)du=0;
∂W
(
λ1,τ1,σ1,L2
)
∂σ1
=
∫ uσ1
u
(
−a1d12+a2d11
a22
+
a2+d12
a22
σ1−wd12
a22
L2− d12
a22
u
)
f(u)du=0,
which can be rearranged to obtain:
λ∗1
(
L2
)
=
a1 − d11 + wL2 + E
[
u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ]
a2 + d12
; (A.10)
τ ∗1
(
L2
)
=
a1d12 + a2d11 + wd12L2 + d12E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u]
a2 + d12
; (A.11)
σ∗1
(
L2
)
=
a1d12 + a2d11 + wd12L2 + d12E
[
u|u ≤ u ≤ uσ∗1]
a2 + d12
. (A.12)
In (A.10) through (A.12), E
[
u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ], E[u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u], and E[u|u ≤ u ≤
uσ
∗
1 ] are conditional expectations of u. Note how the regulation of pollutant 2 and
the abatement interaction between the two pollutants affects the choices of the policy
variables. Also note that (A.10) through (A.12) are not the solutions for λ∗1
(
L2
)
,
τ ∗1
(
L2
)
and σ∗1
(
L2
)
, because these variables also appear on the right sides of (A.10)
through (A.12).
It is straightforward to calculate the optimal pure tax t∗1
(
L2
)
and the optimal
number of permits under a pure market L∗1
(
L2
)
from (A.10) through (A.12). We do
not do so here, because their specific values are not required for the proofs of this
paper. The derivations of t∗1
(
L2
)
and L∗1
(
L2
)
are available upon request.
We are now ready to examine the optimal choices from among the alternative
pollutant 1 policies.
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A.1.2 When is the tax the preferred policy?
Recall that the optimal policy is the tax t∗1
(
L2
)
if and only if the solution to
(2.13) yields τ ∗1
(
L2
) ≤ σ∗1 (L2). To determine the conditions under which this is true
subtract (A.12) from (A.11) to obtain
τ ∗1
(
L2
)− σ∗1 (L2) = d12a2 + d12 {E [u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u]− E [u|u ≤ u ≤ uσ∗1]} (A.13)
The denominator of (A.13) is strictly positive. Moreoever, E(u) = 0 implies that
E
[
u|u ≤ u ≤ uσ∗1] ≤ 0 and E [u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u] ≥ 0, but both cannot be zero
simultaneously. Therefore, E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u] − E [u|u ≤ u ≤ uσ∗1] > 0.
Consequently, τ ∗1
(
L2
) ≤ σ∗1 (L2) ⇐⇒ d12 ≤ 0. However, since d12 ≥ 0,
τ ∗1
(
L2
) ≤ σ∗1 (L2) ⇐⇒ d12 = 0, which reveals that the t∗1 (L2) is the optimal policy
if and only if d12 = 0, which is the desired result.
A.1.3 The pure emissions market is never the optimal choice.
Recall from the discussion following (2.13) that a simple emissions market is
optimal if and only if
uτ
∗
1 =uτ1
(
λ∗1
(
L2
)
,τ ∗1
(
L2
)
,L2
)≥u and uσ∗1 =uσ1(λ∗1(L2),σ∗1(L2),L2)≤u. (A.14)
Toward specifying uτ
∗
1 and uσ
∗
1 , recall from (2.9) that the cut-off values of u are
implicitly defined by z = −C1
(
λ1, L2, u
z
)
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}. Explicitly,
uz = z − a1 + a2λ1 − wL2, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}. (A.15)
At the unconstrained solution to (2.13):
uτ1
(
λ∗1
(
L2
)
, τ ∗1
(
L2
)
, L2
)
= τ ∗1
(
L2
)− a1 + a2λ∗1 (L2)− wL2; (A.16)
uσ1
(
λ∗1
(
L2
)
, τ ∗1
(
L2
)
, L2
)
= σ∗1
(
L2
)− a1 + a2λ∗1 (L2)− wL2. (A.17)
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To demonstrate that pure emissions trading cannot be the optimal policy choice,
we show that (A.14) cannot hold. After substituting (A.10) and (A.11) into (A.16),
it is possible to write uτ1
(
λ∗1
(
L2
)
, τ ∗1
(
L2
)
, L2
)
as
uτ1
(
λ∗1
(
L2
)
,τ ∗1
(
L2
)
,L2
)
=
d12
a2+d12
E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤u≤u]+ a2
a2+d12
E
[
u|uσ∗1≤u≤uτ∗1 ] .
(A.18)
Now evaluate the conditional expectations in (A.18) under the assumption that a pure
market is optimal; that is, uτ
∗
1 ≥ u and uσ∗1 ≤ u. Since E(u) = 0 and the support
of u is [u, u], uτ
∗
1 ≥ u and uσ∗1 ≤ u imply E [u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ] = 0. Therefore, the
second term on the right side of (A.18) is equal to zero. To evaluate the first term,
note that we cannot directly evaluate the conditional expectation
E[u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u] =
∫ u
uτ
∗
1
uf (u) du∫ u
uτ
∗
1
f (u) du
,
given uτ
∗
1 ≥ u, but we can use l’Hopital’s rule to determine
lim
uτ
∗
1→u E[u|uτ
∗
1 ≤ u ≤ u] = u.
This implies
uτ
∗
1 = uτ1
(
λ∗1
(
L2
)
, τ ∗1
(
L2
)
, L2
)
=
d12u
a2 + d12
< u. (A.19)
The inequality follows because d12/(a2 + d12) < 1. (A.19) implies that (A.14) cannot
hold, and therefore, a pure trading scheme for pollutant 1 cannot be the optimal
policy. (We could have proved the same by showing that uσ1
(
λ∗1
(
L2
)
, σ∗1
(
L2
)
, L2
) ≤
u is also not possible).
A.1.4 When is the hybrid preferred to the tax?
Since the tax is optimal if and only if d12 = 0 and a pure trading scheme is never
optimal, it must be true that the hybrid policy is optimal if and only if d12 > 0.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 proceeds in the same way as the proof of Proposition 1.
We first characterize the optimal emissions market with price controls when pollutant
2 is controlled with an emissions tax t2, given that the constraints in (2.18) do not
bind. We then determine when these constraints do bind to derive the instrument
choice rules of the proposition.
A.2.1 Characterization of a pollutant 1 market with price controls, given
t2.
We begin by using the definitions of the cut-off values uτ1 and uσ1 in (2.14) to
specify the following relationships:
Q1
(
τ1, t2, u
τ1
)
= Q1
(
σ1, t2, u
σ1
)
= λ1; (A.20)
Q2
(
τ1, t2, u
τ1
)
= Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
τ1
)
; (A.21)
Q2
(
σ1, t2, u
σ1
)
= Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
σ1
)
. (A.22)
We also have:
−C1
(
Q1
(
z, t2, u
)
, Q2
(
z, t2, u
)
, u
)
= z, (A.23)
−C2
(
Q1
(
z, t2, u
)
, Q2
(
z, t2, u
)
, u
)
= t2 for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}. (A.24)
With (A.20) through (A.24), the first order conditions for the unconstrained version
of (2.18) are:
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∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, t2
)
∂λ1
=
∫ uτ1
uσ1
{
C1
(
λ1, Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
)
, u
)
+D11 (λ1) +
+
[−t2 +D22 (Q2 (λ1, t2, u))] ∂Q2 (λ1, t2, u)∂λ1
}
f (u) du = 0;
∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, t2
)
∂τ1
=
∫ u
uτ1
{[−τ1 +D11 (Q1 (τ1, t2, u))] ∂Q1 (τ1, t2, u)∂τ1
+
[−t2 +D22 (Q2 (τ1, t2, u))] ∂Q2 (τ1, t2, u)∂τ1
}
f (u) du = 0;
∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, t2
)
∂σ1
=
∫ uσ1
u
{[−σ1 +D11 (Q1 (σ1, t2, u))] ∂Q1 (σ1, t2, u)∂σ1
+
[−t2 +D22 (Q2 (σ1, t2, u))] ∂Q2 (σ1, t2, u)∂σ1
}
f (u) du = 0.
(A.25)
To write these conditions in terms of the functional forms for abatement costs
and damages, we require the emissions responses of both pollutants when they are
controlled by prices. In this case the explicit forms of pj = −Cj (Q1, Q2, u) , for j ∈
{1, 2}, are
pj = a1 + u− a2Qj + wQk, for j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= k.
Solving these equations for Q1 and Q2 produces the explicit forms of the emissions
responses of both pollutants when they are controlled by prices:
Qj (pj, pk, u) =
(a1 + u)(a2 + w)− a2pj − wpk
a22 − w2
, for j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= k. (A.26)
At the price ceiling and price floor we have:
Q1
(
z, t2, u
)
=
(a1 + u) (a2 + w)− a2z − wt2
a22 − w2
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}; (A.27)
Q2
(
z, t2, u
)
=
(a1 + u) (a2 + w)− a2t2 − wz
a22 − w2
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}. (A.28)
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We also need to specify the pollutant 2 emissions response to its tax when the quantity
of pollutant 1 is fixed at its supply of permits; that is, Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
)
. The explicit
form of the condition t2 = −C2(λ1, Q2, u) is t2 = a1 + u− a2Q2 + wλ1, with solution
Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
)
=
(a1 + u)− t2 + wλ1
a2
. (A.29)
Note that:
∂Q1
(
z, t2, u
)
∂z
= − a2
a22 − w2
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}; (A.30)
∂Q2
(
z, t2, u
)
∂z
= − w
a22 − w2
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}; (A.31)
∂Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
)
∂λ1
=
w
a2
. (A.32)
With (A.27), (A.28), and (A.29) and the functional forms of the marginal damage
and marginal abatement cost functions we have:
C1
(
λ1, Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
)
, u
)
= − (a1 + u) + a2λ1 − w (a1 + u)− t2 + wλ1
a2
; (A.33)
D11 (λ1) = d11 + d12λ1; (A.34)
D22
(
Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
))
= d21 + d22
a1 + u− t2 + wλ1
a2
; (A.35)
D11
(
Q1
(
z, t2, u
))
= d11 + d12
(a1 + u) (a2 + w)− a2z − wt2
a22 − w2
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}; (A.36)
D22
(
Q2
(
z, t2, u
))
= d21 + d22
(a1 + u) (a2 + w)− a2t2 − wz
a22 − w2
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}. (A.37)
Substitute (A.30) through (A.37) into (A.25) to rewrite the first order conditions for
the unconstrained version of (2.18) as:
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∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, t2
)
∂λ1
=
∫ uτ1
uσ1
[
− (a1 + u) + a2λ1 − w (a1 + u)− t2 + wλ1
a2
+ d11 + d12λ1
+
(
−t2 + d21 + d22 (a1 + u)− t2 + wλ1
a2
)(
w
a2
)]
f (u) du = 0;
∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, t2
)
∂τ1
=
∫ u
uτ1
{[
−τ1 + d11 + d12 (a1 + u) (a2 + w)− a2τ1 − wt2
a22 − w2
]( −a2
a22 − w2
)
+
[
−t2 + d21 + d22 (a1 + u) (a2 + w)− a2t2 − wτ1
a22 − w2
]( −w
a22 − w2
)}
f (u) du = 0;
∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, t2
)
∂σ1
=
∫ uσ1
u
{[
−σ1 + d11 + d12 (a1 + u) (a2 + w)− a2σ1 − wt2
a22 − w2
]( −a2
a22 − w2
)
+
[
−t2 + d21 + d22 (a1 + u) (a2 + w)− a2t2 − wσ1
a22 − w2
]( −w
a22 − w2
)}
f (u) du = 0.
Collecting common terms for u, λ1, τ1, σ1 and t2 and rearranging them allows us to
characterize the optimal hybrid policy for pollutant 1 as follows:
λ∗1
(
t2
)
=
a22 (a1−d11)+w
(
a2(a1−d21)−d22
(
a1−t2
))
+(a2(a2+w)−wd22)E
[
u|uσ∗1≤u≤uτ∗1 ]
A
(A.38)
τ ∗1
(
t2
)
=
B−(a22−w2+a2(d12+d22))wt2+(a2+w)(a2d12+d22w)E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤u≤u]
A
(A.39)
σ∗1
(
t2
)
=
B−(a22−w2+a2(d12+d22))wt2+(a2+w)(a2d12+d22w)E
[
u|u≤u≤uσ∗1]
A
(A.40)
where
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A = a2
(
a22 − w2
)
+ a22d12 + d22w
2; (A.41)
B = a1 (a2 + w) (a2d12 + d22w) +
(
a22 − w2
)
(a2d11 + d21w) , (A.42)
and E
[
u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ], E[u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u], and E[u|u ≤ u ≤ uσ∗1 ] are conditional
expectations of u.
Again, it is straightforward to calculate the optimal pure tax t∗1
(
t2
)
and the
optimal number of permits under a pure market L∗1
(
t2
)
from (A.38) through (A.40).
These calculations are available upon request.
A.2.2 When is the tax the preferred policy?
The optimal policy is the tax t∗1
(
t2
)
if and only if the solution to (2.18) yields
τ ∗1
(
t2
) ≤ σ∗1 (t2). To determine the conditions under which this holds, subtract (A.40)
from (A.39) to obtain
τ ∗1
(
t2
)− σ∗1 (t2)
=
(a2 + w) (a2d12 + wd22)
a2 (a22 − w2) + a22d12 + w2d22
{
E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u]− E [u|u ≤ u ≤ uσ∗1]} . (A.43)
The denominator of (A.43) and a2 + w are strictly positive. Moreover, since
E(u) = 0, E
[
u|u ≤ u ≤ uσ∗1] ≤ 0 and E [u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u] ≥ 0, but they both cannot
be zero simultaneously. Therefore, E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u] − E [u|u ≤ u ≤ uσ∗1] > 0.
Consequently, τ ∗1
(
t2
) ≤ σ∗1 (t2) if and only if a2d12 +wd22 ≤ 0 which reveals that the
tax t∗1
(
t2
)
is the optimal policy if and only if d22w/a2 ≤ −d12, which is the desired
result.
A.2.3 When is the pure emissions market the preferred policy?
A simple emissions market is optimal if and only if:
uτ
∗
1 = uτ1
(
λ∗1
(
t2
)
, τ ∗1
(
t2
)
, t2
) ≥ u and uσ∗1 = uσ1 (λ∗1 (t2) , σ∗1 (t2) , t2) ≤ u.
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Toward specifying uτ
∗
1 and uσ
∗
1 , recall from (2.14) that the cut-off values of u are
implicitly defined by
z = −C1
(
λ1, Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
z
)
, uz
)
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}.
Explicitly,
uz = z − a1 + a2λ1 − wQ2, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}. (A.44)
Given that pollutant 2 is controlled with the tax t2, emissions of the co-pollutant at
the price controls satisfy t2 = −C2 (λ1, Q2, uz) = a1+uz−a2Q2+wλ1, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1};
that is,
Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
z
)
=
a1 + u
z − t2 + wλ1
a2
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}.
Substitute Q2
(
λ1, t2, u
z
)
in for Q2 in (A.44) to obtain
uz
(
λ1, z, t2
)
= −a1 + (a2 − w)λ1 + a2z
a2 + w
+
wt2
a2 + w
, for z ∈ {τ1, σ1}. (A.45)
At the unconstrained solution to (2.18):
uτ1
(
λ∗1
(
t2
)
, τ ∗1
(
t2
)
, t2
)
= −a1 + (a2 − w)λ∗1
(
t2
)
+
a2τ
∗
1
(
t2
)
a2 + w
+
wt2
a2 + w
; (A.46)
uσ1
(
λ∗1
(
t2
)
, σ∗1
(
t2
)
, t2
)
= −a1 + (a2 − w)λ∗1
(
t2
)
+
a2σ
∗
1
(
t2
)
a2 + w
+
wt2
a2 + w
. (A.47)
After substituting (A.38) through (A.40) into (A.46) and (A.47), it is possible to
show:
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uτ1
(
λ∗1
(
t2
)
, τ ∗1
(
t2
)
, t2
)
=
(a2 − w) (a22 + a2w − wd22)
a2 (a22 − w2) + a22d12 + d22w2
E
[
u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ]
+
a2 (a2d12 + d22w)
a2 (a22 − w2) + a22d12 + d22w2
E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u] ; (A.48)
uσ1
(
λ∗1
(
t2
)
, σ∗1
(
t2
)
, t2
)
=
(a2 − w) (a22 + a2w − wd22)
a2 (a22 − w2) + a22d12 + d22w2
E
[
u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ]
+
a2 (a2d12 + d22w)
a2 (a22 − w2) + a22d12 + d22w2
E [u|u ≤ u ≤ uσ1∗] (A.49)
The necessary condition (or conditions) for a pure market to be the optimal policy
is found by evaluating the conditions under which uτ
∗
1 = uτ1
(
λ∗1
(
t2
)
, τ ∗1
(
t2
)
, t2
) ≥ u
and uσ
∗
1 = uσ1
(
λ∗1
(
t2
)
, σ∗1
(
t2
)
, t2
) ≤ u. To do so, we must evaluate the conditional
expectations in (A.48) and (A.49) under these conditions. First, since E(u) = 0 and
the support of u is [u, u], uτ
∗
1 ≥ u and uσ∗1 ≤ u imply E [u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ] = 0. Next,
we cannot directly evaluate
E[u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u] =
∫ u
uτ
∗
1
uf (u) du∫ u
uτ
∗
1
f (u) du
,
given uτ
∗
1 ≥ u, but we can use l’Hopital’s rule to determine
lim
uτ
∗
1→u E[u|uτ
∗
1 ≤ u ≤ u] = u.
Similarly,
lim
uσ
∗
1→u E[u|u ≤ u ≤ uσ1∗] = u.
Substitute these limiting values and E
[
u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ] = 0 into (A.48) and (A.49)
to obtain:
uτ
∗
1 = uτ1
(
λ∗1
(
t2
)
, τ ∗1
(
t2
)
, t2
) ≥ u =⇒ a2 (a2d12 + d22w)u
a2 (a22 − w2) + a22d12 + d22w2
≥ u;
uσ
∗
1 = uσ1
(
λ∗1
(
t2
)
, σ∗1
(
t2
)
, t2
) ≤ u =⇒ a2 (a2d12 + d22w)u
a2 (a22 − w2) + a22d12 + d22w2
≤ u.
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Since a2 (a
2
2 − w2) + a22d12 + d22w2 and a2 are strictly positive, these inequalities hold
if and only if
a2 (a2d12 + wd22)
a2 (a22 − w2) + a22d12 + w2d22
≥ 1,
which simplifies to wd22/a2 ≥ a2 + w: therefore, this is a necessary condition for a
simple emission market to be the optimal policy.
To prove that d22w/a2 ≥ a2 + w is also sufficient for emissions trading to be
the optimal policy, suppose toward a contradiction that d22w/a2 ≥ a2 + w, but that
pure trading is not optimal; that is, uτ
∗
1 = uτ1
(
λ∗1
(
t2
)
, τ ∗1
(
t2
)
, t2
)
< u or uσ
∗
1 =
uσ1
(
λ∗1
(
t2
)
, σ∗1
(
t2
)
, t2
)
> u. Note first that since uτ
∗
1 < u,
E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u] > uτ1 (λ∗1 (t2) , τ ∗1 (t2) , t2) .
Using (A.48),
E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u] > (a2 − w) (a22 + a2w − wd22)
a2 (a22 − w2) + a22d12 + d22w2
E
[
u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ]
+
a2 (a2d12 + d22w)
a2 (a22 − w2) + a22d12 + d22w2
E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u] ,
which implies,
(a2 − w) (a2(a2 + w)− wd22)
a2 (a22 − w2) + a22d12 + w2d22
{
E
[
u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ]− E [u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u]} < 0.
(A.50)
The first term of the left side of (A.50) is less than or equal to zero because
a2 (a
2
2 − w2) + a22d12 + w2d22 > 0, a2 − w > 0, and a2(a2 + w) − wd22 ≤ 0 by
assumption. The second term involving the conditional expectations is strictly
negative because
E
[
u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ] ≤ uτ∗1 < E [u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u] .
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Since the first term of (A.50) is weakly negative and the second is strictly negative,
the inequality cannot hold and we have obtained our contradiction. Thus, d22w/a2 ≥
a2 + w is also a sufficient condition for the optimal policy to be a pure emissions
market. As an aside, we could have obtained a similar contradiction by showing that
uσ
∗
1 = uσ1
(
λ∗1
(
t2
)
, σ∗1
(
t2
)
, t2
)
> u cannot hold if d22w/a2 ≥ a2 + w.
A.2.4 When is the hybrid regulation the preferred policy?
Since the tax is the optimal policy pollutant 1 if and only if d22w/a2 ≤ −d12 and the
pure trading program is optimal if and only if d22w/a2 ≥ a2 +w, then it must be the
case that the hybrid policy is optimal if and only if d22w/a2 ∈ (−d12, a2 + w).
A.3 The impact of variation in pollutant 1 emissions on
expected pollutant 2 damage
Given t2 and emissions of pollutant 1, emissions of pollutant 2 can be written as
Q2
(
Q1, t2, u
)
=
a1 + u− t2 + wQ1
a2
. (A.51)
From this we can write pollutant 2 emissions as Q2
(
Q1, t2, u
)
= E(Q2) + u/a2,
where u/a2 is random variation of Q2 around its expected value. If pollutant 1 is
also controlled with a tax, we can write its emissions in the same fashion, that is,
Q1(t1, Q2, u) = E(Q1) + u/a2. Now let us introduce a new variable γ ∈ [0, 1] so that
Q1(· ) = E(Q1) + uγ/a2. The introduction of γ allows us to modify the variation of
pollutant 1 emissions around its expected value. For alternative policies that
produce the same expected pollutant 1 emissions, γ = 1 when the pollutant is
controlled with a tax, γ ∈ (0, 1) when the pollutant is controlled with a hybrid and
γ = 0 when the pollutant is controlled with a pure emissions market. Given the
specification of pollutant 1 emissions, calculate its variance as
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V ar(Q1) = E(u
2)γ2/a22. Clearly, the variance of pollutant 1 emissions is declining as
γ is reduced.
To show how variation in pollutant 1 emissions affects the variation in pollutant 2
emissions when the latter is controlled with a tax, substitute Q1(· ) = E(Q1) + uγ/a2
into (A.51) to obtain
Q2
(
Q1, t2, u
)
=
a1 + u− t2 + w(E(Q1) + uγ/a2)
a2
. (A.52)
This substitution does not affect the expected value of pollutant 2 emissions, but its
variance is
V ar(Q2) =
E(u2)(1 + wγ/a2)
2
a22
.
The effect of a reduction in the variation of pollutant 1 emissions on the variance of
pollutant 2 emissions is
∂V ar(Q2)
∂γ
=
[
w
a2
] [
E(u2)(1 + wγ/a2)
a22
]
. (A.53)
Since a2 + w > 0 and γ ∈ [0, 1], 1 + wγ/a2 > 0, which implies that the second
term of (A.53) in hard brackets is strictly positive. Thus, the qualitative effect of the
variance of pollutant 1 emissions on the variance of pollutant 2 emissions depends on
whether the pollutants are substitutes or complements. In particular, a decrease in the
variance of pollutant 1 emissions also reduces the variance of pollutant 2 emissions
if the pollutants are complements in abatement, while the variance of pollutant 2
emissions increases if the pollutants are substitutes.
To show how the variation of pollutant 1 emissions affects the expected damage
of pollutant 2 emissions substitute (A.52) into (2.4) and collect terms to obtain
D2(Q2) = d21
(
E(Q2) +
u(1 + wγ/a2)
a2
)
+
d22
2
(
E(Q2) +
u(1 + wγ/a2)
a2
)2
.
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Take the expectation to obtain
E(D2(Q2)) = d21E(Q2) +
d22
2
[E(Q2)]
2 +
d22
2
[
E(u2)(1 + wγ/a2)
2
a22
]
,
and differentiate with respect to γ to obtain
∂E(D2(Q2))
∂γ
=
(
d22w
a2
)[
E(u2)(1 + wγ/a2)
a22
]
= d22
∂V ar(Q2)
∂γ
.
Of course, if pollutant 2 damage is a linear function (so that d22 = 0) then changes in
the variance of pollutant 2 emissions induced by changes in the variance of pollutant 1
emissions have no impact on expected co-pollutant damage. However, if the pollutant
2 damage function is strictly convex, then, when the pollutants are complements in
abatement, a decrease in the variance of pollutant 1 emissions reduces expected co-
pollutant damage through a reduction in the variance of pollutant 2 emissions. If the
pollutants are substitutes, a decrease in the variance of pollutant 1 emissions increases
expected co-pollutant damage by causing an increase in the variation of pollutant 2
emissions.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Optimal hybrid policy for pollutant 1 given tradable
permits L¯2
In this section, we will characterize the optimal hybrid policy for pollutant 1
given tradable permits for pollutant 2, which are presented by equations (3.22)
through (3.24) in subsection 3.3.1. Given expected social costs (3.20), the optimal
hybrid policy for pollutant 1 is the solution to (3.21). Since we focus at first on the
characterization of the optimal hybrid policy, we assume that each of the constraints
in (3.21) do not bind.
Given the definitions of uτ1 and uσ1 , we have the following:
Q1
(
z, L¯2, u
z
)
= λ1, z ∈ {τ1, σ1} .
With this result the first order conditions for the unconstrained version of (3.21) can
be written as
∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, L¯2
)
∂λ1
=
∫ uτ1
uσ1
[
C1
(
λ1, L¯2, u
)
+D1
(
λ1, L¯2
)]
f (u) du = 0; (B.1)
∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, L¯2
)
∂τ1
=
∫ u
uτ1
[
C1
(
Q1
(
τ1,L¯2,u
)
,L¯2,u
)
+D1
(
Q1
(
τ1,L¯2,u
)
,L¯2
)]∂Q1(τ1,L¯2,u)
∂τ1
f(u)du=0; (B.2)
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∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, L¯2
)
∂σ1
=
∫ uσ1
u
[
C1
(
Q1
(
σ1,L¯2,u
)
,L¯2,u
)
+D1
(
Q1
(
σ1,L¯2,u
)
,L¯2
)]∂Q1(σ1,L¯2,u)
∂σ1
f(u)du=0.
(B.3)
The following always holds true:
−C1
(
Q1
(
z, L¯2, u
)
, L¯2, u
)
= z, z ∈ {τ1, σ1} , (B.4)
and from (3.17) we have
∂Q1
(
z, L2, u
)
∂z
= − 1
a2
, z ∈ {τ1, σ1} . (B.5)
With (3.17), (B.4), and (B.5), applying the functional forms of the marginal
abatement cost and marginal damage functions and collecting common terms for u
allows us to write (B.1) through (B.3) as:
∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, L¯2
)
∂λ1
= − [(a1 − d11)− (a2 + d12)λ1 + (w − v) L¯2] ∫ uτ1
uσ1
f (u) du−
∫ uτ1
uσ1
uf (u) du = 0;
∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, L¯2
)
∂τ1
=
[
a1d12+a2d11−(a2 + d12)τ1+(a2v + wd12)L¯2
a2
]∫ u
uτ1
f(u)du+
d12
a2
∫ u
uτ1
uf(u)du=0;
∂W
(
λ1, τ1, σ1, L¯2
)
∂σ1
=
[
a1d12+a2d11−(a2 + d12)σ1+(a2v + wd12)L¯2
a2
]∫ uσ1
u
f(u)du+
d12
a2
∫ uσ1
u
uf(u)du=0,
which can be rearranged to obtain the following
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λ∗1
(
L¯2
)
=
a1 − d11 + (w − v) L¯2 + E
[
u|uσ∗1 ≤ u ≤ uτ∗1 ]
a2 + d12
;
τ ∗1
(
L¯2
)
=
a1d12 + a2d11 + (a2v + wd12) L¯2 + d12E
[
u|uτ∗1 ≤ u ≤ u¯]
a2 + d12
;
σ∗1
(
L¯2
)
=
a1d12 + a2d11 + (a2v + wd12) L¯2 + d12E
[
u|u ≤ u ≤ uσ∗1]
a2 + d12
. (B.6)
Using (3.6), (3.7), and (3.14), we have
a1 − d11 + (w − v) L¯2
a2 + d12
= Q̂1 − v − w
a2 + d12
(
L¯2 − Q̂2
)
;
a1d12 + a2d11 + (a2v + wd12) L¯2
a2 + d12
= P̂1 +
a2v + d22w
a2 + d12
(
L¯2 − Q̂2
)
.
With these results, (B.6) can be simplified further to obtain equations (3.22) through
(3.24).
B.2 Optimal hybrid policy for pollutant 1 given emissions
tax t¯2
In this section we derive the characterizations of the optimal hybrid policy for
pollutant 1 when pollutant 2 is regulated by an emissions tax, which are presented
by equations (3.32) through (3.34) in subsection 3.3.2. We apply the same approach
that we took to derive the optimal hybrid policy given tradable permits for pollutant
2. Given expected social costs (3.30), the optimal hybrid policy for pollutant 1 given
emissions tax t¯2 is the solution to (3.31).
From the definitions of uτ1 and uσ1 , we have the following:
Q1 (z, t¯2, u
z) = λ1, z ∈ {τ1, σ1} ;
Q2 (z, t¯2, u
z) = Q2 (λ1, t¯2, u
z) , z ∈ {τ1, σ1} .
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In addition, the following always holds:
−C1 (Q1 (z, t¯2, u) , Q2 (z, t¯2, u) , u) = z, z ∈ {τ1, σ1} ;
−C2 (Q1 (z, t¯2, u) , Q2 (z, t¯2, u) , u) = t¯2, z ∈ {τ1, σ1} ;
−C2 (λ1, Q2 (λ1, t¯2, u) , u) = t¯2.
With these results the first order conditions of the unconstrained version of (3.31)
are:
∂W (λ1, τ1, σ1, t¯2)
∂λ1
=
∫ uτ1
uσ1
{[C1 (λ1, Q2 (λ1, t¯2, u) , u) +D1 (λ1, Q2 (λ1, t¯2, u))]
+ [−t¯2 +D2 (λ1, Q2 (λ1, t¯2, u))] ∂Q2 (λ1, t¯2, u)
∂λ1
}
f (u) du = 0;
∂W (λ1, τ1, σ1, t¯2)
∂τ1
=
∫ u
uτ1
{
[−τ1 +D1 (Q1 (τ1, t¯2, u) , Q2 (τ1, t¯2, u))] ∂Q1 (τ1, t¯2, u)
∂τ1
+ [−t¯2 +D1 (Q1 (τ1, t¯2, u) , Q2 (τ1, t¯2, u))] ∂Q2 (τ1, t¯2, u)
∂τ1
}
f (u) du = 0;
∂W (λ1, τ1, σ1, t¯2)
∂σ1
=
∫ uσ1
u
{
[−σ1 +D1 (Q1 (σ1, t¯2, u) , Q2 (σ1, t¯2, u))] ∂Q1 (σ1, t¯2, u)
∂σ1
+ [−t¯2 +D2 (Q1 (σ1, t¯2, u) , Q2 (σ1, t¯2, u))] ∂Q2 (σ1, t¯2, u)
∂σ1
}
f (u) du = 0.
From (3.17) we have
∂Q2 (λ1, t¯2, u)
∂λ1
=
w
a2
, (B.7)
and from (3.12), we have
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∂Q1 (z, t¯2, u)
∂z
= − a2
a22 − w2
, z ∈ {τ1, σ1} ;
∂Q2 (z, t¯2, u)
∂z
= − w
a22 − w2
, z ∈ {τ1, σ1} . (B.8)
Applying (3.12), (3.17), (B.7), (B.8) and the functional forms of the marginal
abatement cost and marginal damage functions and collecting common terms for u,
λ1, τ1, σ1, and t¯2 allow us to write the first order conditions as:
∂W (λ1,τ1,σ1,t¯2)
∂λ1
=
{
−(a2v + d22w) t¯2
a22
+
{a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)−w(w − 2v)]+d22w2}λ1
a22
+
a2 [a2d11−a1 (a2 + w − v)+d21w]+a1d22w
a22
}∫ uτ1
uσ1
f(u) du
− (a2 (a2 + w − v)−d22w)
a22
∫ uτ1
uσ1
uf(u) du = 0;
∂W (λ1,τ1,σ1,t¯2)
∂τ1
=
{
[a2 (d12 + d22)w + a
2
2(v + w) + w
2(v − w)] t¯2
(a22 − w2) 2
+
{a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2} τ1
(a22 − w2) 2
−(a2−w)(a2d11+d21w)+a1(a2(d12+v)+w (d22+v))
(w − a2) 2 (a2 + w)
}∫ u
uτ1
f(u)du
− a2 (d12 + v) + w (d22 + v)
(a2 − w) 2 (a2 + w)
∫ u
uτ1
uf (u) du = 0;
∂W (λ1,τ1,σ1,t¯2)
∂σ1
=
{
[a2 (d12 + d22)w + a
2
2(v + w) + w
2(v − w)] t¯2
(w2 − a22) 2
+
{a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2}σ1
(w2 − a22) 2
−(a2−w)(a2d11+d21w)+a1(a2(d12+v)+w (d22+v))
(w − a2) 2 (a2 + w)
}∫ uσ1
u
f(u)du
− (a2 (d12 + v) + w (d22 + v))
(a2 − w) 2 (a2 + w)
∫ uσ1
u
uf (u) du = 0.
These equations can be rearranged for λ1, τ1, and σ1 to obtain the following:
λ∗1 (t¯2) =
a2 [a1 (a2 + w − v)− a2d11 − d21w]− a1d22w + (a2v + d22w) t¯2
a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2
+
[a2 (a2 + w − v)− d22w]E [u|uσ ≤ u ≤ uτ ]
a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2 ; (B.9)
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τ ∗1 (t¯2) =
(a2 + w) [(a2 − w) (a2d11 + d21w) + a1 (a2 (d12 + v) + w (d22 + v))]
a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2
− [a2 (d12 + d22)w + a
2
2(v + w) + w
2(v − w)] t¯2
a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2
+
(a2 + w) [a2 (d12 + v) + w (d22 + v)]E [u|uτ ≤ u ≤ u¯]
a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2 ; (B.10)
σ∗1 (t¯2) =
(a2 + w) [(a2 − w) (a2d11 + d21w) + a1 (a2 (d12 + v) + w (d22 + v))]
a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2
− [a2 (d12 + d22)w + a
2
2(v + w) + w
2(v − w)] t¯2
a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2
+
(a2 + w) [a2 (d12 + v) + w (d22 + v)]E
[
u|u ≤ u ≤ uuσ]
a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2 (B.11)
Using (3.6), (3.14), and (3.15), the first term of λ∗1 (t¯2) in (B.9) and the first two terms
of τ ∗1 (t¯2) and σ
∗
1 (t¯2) in (B.10) and (B.11) can be rearranged as:
a2 [a1 (a2 + w − v)− a2d11 − d21w]− a1d22w + (a2v + d22w) t¯2
a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2
= Q̂1 +
(a2v + d22w)
(
t¯2 − Pˆ2
)
a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2 ;
(a2 + w) [(a2 − w) (a2d11 + d21w) + a1 (a2 (d12 + v) + w (d22 + v))]
a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2
− [a2 (d12 + d22)w + a
2
2(v + w) + w
2(v − w)] t¯2
a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2
= P̂1 −
[a2 (d12 + d22)w + a
2
2(v + w) + w
2(v − w)]
(
t¯2 − Pˆ2
)
a2 [a2 (a2 + d12)− w(w − 2v)] + d22w2 ,
which results in equations (3.32) through (3.34).
B.3 Expected emissions of pollutant 1
Finding 1 in section 3.4 reveals that all the optimal price-based regulations for
pollutant 1 produce the same expected emissions. In this subsection we demonstrate
this result, first when pollutant 2 is regulated with tradable permits and then when
the pollutant is regulated with an emissions tax.
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B.3.1 Given tradable permits L¯2
Here we will calculate the expected emissions of pollutant 1 under the optimal
hybrid policy given tradable permits for pollutant 2. We then show that this value
is equal to the optimal number of tradable permits for pollutant 1, L∗1
(
L¯2
)
, and the
expected emissions of pollutant 1 under the optimal emissions tax, t∗1
(
L¯2
)
.
Under the optimal hybrid policy h∗1
(
L¯2
)
=
(
λ∗1
(
L¯2
)
, τ ∗1
(
L¯2
)
, σ∗1
(
L¯2
))
, the
expected emissions of pollutant 1 can be expressed as
E
[
Q1
(
h∗1
(
L¯2
)
, L¯2, u
)]
=
∫ u
uτ
∗
1
Q1
(
τ ∗1
(
L¯2
)
, L¯2, u
)
f (u) du+
∫ uτ∗1
uσ
∗
1
λ∗1
(
L¯2
)
f (u) du
+
∫ uσ∗1
u
Q1
(
σ∗1
(
L¯2
)
, L¯2, u
)
f (u) du. (B.12)
Applying (3.17) to (B.12) yields
E
[
Q1
(
h∗1
(
L¯2
)
, L¯2, u
)]
=
∫ u
uτ
∗
1
(
a1 + u− τ ∗1
(
L¯2
)
+ wL¯2
a2
)
f(u) du+
∫ uτ∗1
uσ
∗
1
λ∗1f(u) du
+
∫ uσ∗1
u
(
a1 + u− σ∗1
(
L¯2
)
+ wL¯2
a2
)
f(u) du.
Substituting the optimal hybrid policy variables (3.22), (3.23), and (3.24) into this
result and manipulating terms produces
E
[
Q1
(
h∗1
(
L¯2
)
, L¯2, u
)]
= Q̂1 − v − w
a2 + d12
(
L¯2 − Q̂2
)
+
G
a2 + d12
,
where
G =
∫ u¯
uτ
∗
1
uf (u) du+
∫ uτ∗1
uσ
∗
1
uf (u) du+
∫ uσ∗1
u
uf (u) du.
Clearly, G = 0 under the optimal hybrid policy h∗1
(
L¯2
)
=
(
λ∗1
(
L¯2
)
, τ ∗1
(
L¯2
)
, σ∗1
(
L¯2
))
,
because E (u) = 0. Moreover, it is zero under the optimal tax t∗1
(
L¯2
)
because uσ
∗
1 =
uτ
∗
1 ≤ u. It is also zero under the optimal trading program L∗1
(
L¯2
)
because uσ
∗
1 ≤ u
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and uτ
∗
1 ≥ u. Therefore, the expected emissions of pollutant 1 are the same under
optimal price-based policies when pollutant 2 is regulated with a fixed number of
tradable permits.
B.3.2 Expected emissions of pollutant 1 given emissions tax t¯2
Now we demonstrate that the optimal price-based regulations for pollutant 1
produces the same expected emissions, given an emissions tax for pollutant 2. We
will take the same steps that we took in subsection B.3.1. We first derive the
expected emissions of pollutant 1 under the optimal hybrid policy
h∗1 (t¯2) = (λ
∗
1 (t¯2) , τ
∗
1 (t¯2) , σ
∗
1 (t¯2)) and then we show that this value is the same under
the optimal emissions tax t∗1 (t¯2) and under optimal pure permit trading with L
∗
1 (t¯2)
permits.
Under the optimal hybrid policy h∗1 (t¯2) = (λ
∗
1 (t¯2) , τ
∗
1 (t¯2) , σ
∗
1 (t¯2)), the expected
emissions of pollutant 1 can be written as
E [Q1 (h
∗
1 (t¯2) , t¯2, u)] =
∫ u
uτ
∗
1
Q1 (τ
∗
1 (t¯2) , t¯2, u) f (u) du+
∫ uτ∗1
uσ
∗
1
λ∗1 (t¯2) f (u) du
+
∫ uσ∗1
u
Q1 (σ
∗
1 (t¯2) , t¯2, u) f (u) du. (B.13)
Applying (3.12) to (B.13) produces
E [Q1 (h
∗
1 (t¯2) , t¯2, u)] =
∫ u¯
uτ
∗
1
(
(a1 + u) (a2 + w)− a2τ ∗1 (t¯2)− wt¯2
a22 − w2
)
f (u) du
+
∫ uτ∗1
uσ
∗
1
λ1 (t¯2) f (u) du
+
∫ uσ∗1
u
(
(a1 + u) (a2 + w)− a2σ∗1 (t¯2)− wt¯2
a22 − w2
)
f (u) du.
Substituting (3.32), (3.33), and (3.34) into this result and manipulating terms yields
E [Q1 (h
∗
1 (t¯2) , t¯2, u)] = Q̂1 +
Y
a2X + wY
(
t¯2 − P̂2
)
+
[a2 (a2 + w)− Y ]
a2X + wY
H (B.14)
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where X = a2 (a2 + d12) + w (v − w), Y = a2v + d22w, and
H =
∫ u¯
uτ
∗
1
uf (u) du+
∫ uτ∗1
uσ
∗
1
uf (u) du+
∫ uσ∗1
u
uf (u) du.
By the same logic given above, H = 0 under h∗1
(
L2
)
, t∗1
(
L2
)
and L∗1
(
L2
)
. Therefore,
the expected emissions of pollutant 1 are the same among the optimal price-based
regulations for pollutant 1 when pollutant 2 is regulated by an emissions tax.
B.4 Expected emissions of pollutant 2
In this section, we demonstrate the last part of Finding 1: the optimal price-based
regulations for pollutant 1 also produce the same expected emissions for pollutant 2,
given the emissions tax for pollutant 2.
When pollutant 2 is regulated by a tax t¯2 and pollutant 1 is regulated by the
optimal hybrid policy h∗1 (t¯2) = (λ
∗
1 (t¯2) , τ
∗
1 (t¯2) , σ
∗
1 (t¯2)), the expected emissions of
pollutant 2 can be expressed as
E [Q2 (h
∗
1 (t¯2) , t¯2, u)] =
∫ u¯
uτ
∗
1
Q2(τ
∗
1 (t¯2), t¯2, u)f(u) du+
∫ uτ∗1
uσ
∗
1
Q2(λ
∗
1 (t¯2), t¯2, u)f(u) du
+
∫ uσ∗1
u
Q2(σ
∗
1 (t¯2), t¯2, u)f(u) du. (B.15)
Applying (3.12) to (B.15) produces
E [Q2 (h
∗
1 (t¯2) , t¯2, u)]
=
∫ u¯
uτ
∗
1
(
(a1+u)(a2+w)−a2t¯2−wτ ∗1 (t¯2)
a22 − w2
)
f(u)du
+
∫ uτ∗1
uσ
∗
1
a1+u− t¯2+wλ1 (t¯2)
a2
f(u)du+
∫ uσ∗1
u
(
(a1+u)(a2+w)−a2t¯2−wσ∗1 (t¯2)
a22 − w2
)
f(u)du.
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Applying (3.32), (3.33), and (3.34) to this result and manipulating terms yields
E [Q2 (h
∗
1 (t¯2) , t¯2, u)] = Q̂2 −
X
a2X + wY
(
t¯2 − P̂2
)
+
a2 (a2 + w) + a2d12 + wv
a2X + wY
I
(B.16)
where X = a2 (a2 + d12) + w (v − w), Y = a2v + d22w, and I =
∫ u¯
uτ
∗
1
uf (u) du +∫ uτ∗1
uσ
∗
1
uf (u) du +
∫ uσ∗1
u
uf (u) du. Then, by the same arguments in subsections B.3.1
and B.3.2, we can show that I = 0 under h∗1 (t¯2), t
∗
1 (t¯2), and L
∗
1 (t¯2).
B.5 Relationship between the expected emissions of both
pollutants given emissions tax t¯2
In this section, we demonstrate Finding 2 in section 3.4. When pollutant 2 is
controlled by tradable permits L¯2, the emissions of pollutant 2 are fixed at L¯2. Thus,
the first relationship in Finding 2 is clear from (3.25) and Finding 1. Here we focus
on the case where pollutant 2 is regulated by an emissions tax t¯2.
From the notations defined by (3.40) and (3.41) and the results of (B.14) and
(B.16), we have
E [Q∗1 (t¯2)] = Q̂1 +
Y
a2X + wY
(
t¯2 − P̂2
)
; (B.17)
E [Q∗2 (t¯2)] = Q̂2 −
X
a2X + wY
(
t¯2 − P̂2
)
. (B.18)
As explained in subsection 3.3.2, X = a2 (a2 + d12) +w (v − w) represents the effects
of Q1 on its own marginal social costs. Combining (B.17) and (B.18) gives us
E [Q∗1 (t¯2)]− Q̂1 = −
Y
X
{
E [Q∗2 (t¯2)]− Q̂2
}
,
which, upon substitution of X = a2 (a2 + d12)+w (v − w) and Y = a2v+d22w, yields
(3.42).
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APPENDIX C
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 Derivation of the marginal value function, (4.24) through
(4.25)
C.1.1 The value function
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4.21) in section 4.2 tells us whether the industry will
increase its abatement capital stock in a period, given the realized value of θ. To derive
the explicit form of the decision rule, we need to derive the explicit form of V (K, θ).
However, this is not an easy task. Instead, we will derive certain characteristics of
V (K, θ) that will allow us to derive the explicit marginal value function in subsection
C.1.3.
To begin, suppose that in state (K, θ) no investment occurs. Then, (4.19) is
V (K, θ) = −S (K, θ; a¯, s, τ, Q) dt+ e−rdt {E [V (K, θ + dθ)]} ,
which can be written as
V (K, θ) = −S (K, θ; a¯, s, τ, Q) dt+ (1− rdt) {V (K, θ) + E [dV ]} (C.1)
By applying Ito’s Lemma, the expected change in the value function can be expressed
as
E [dV ] =
[
αθVθ +
1
2
σ2θ2Vθθ
]
dt. (C.2)
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Substituting (C.2) into (C.1), collecting terms and dropping terms involving (dt)2
allows us to derive the differential equation which V (K, θ) must satisfy:
1
2
σ2θ2Vθθ (K, θ) + αθVθ (K, θ)− rV (K, θ)− S (K, θ; a¯, s, τ, Q) = 0. (C.3)
Since θ has three cutoff values θF (K), θs (K) and θτ (K), and S (K, θ; a¯, s, τ, Q) has a
different form in each interval, we will derive the value function for each interval and
stitch them together at the cutoff values. Then, the general solution of (C.3) consists
of:
V (K, θ) =

A1 (K) θ
β1 + A2 (K) θ
β2 − c(K)θQ2
2(r−α) +
(Q−a¯)s
r
for θ ≤ θF
B1 (K) θ
β1 +B2 (K) θ
β2 + s
2
2(r−σ2+α)c(K)θ − a¯sr for θF ≤ θ ≤ θs
D1 (K) θ
β1 +D2 (K) θ
β2 − c(K)θa¯2
2(r−α) for θs ≤ θ ≤ θτ
E1 (K) θ
β1 + E2 (K) θ
β2 + τ
2
2(r−σ2+α)c(K)θ − a¯τr for θτ ≤ θ.
where β1 and β2 are solutions to
1
2
σ2β (β − 1) + αβ − r = 0. Given the assumptions
that r − α > 0 and r − σ2 + α > 0 (equation (4.3)), it must be that β1 > 1 and
β2 < −1. 1
As θ goes to zero, we assume that all emissions are abated because abatement
costs go to zero (see (4.1)), that is, a = Q. Thus, all issued permits L will be sold
back to the government. Therefore, it is unlikely that investment in extra capital
stock will occur as θ goes to zero. Therefore, we impose a boundary condition:
lim
θ→0
V (K, θ) =
s (Q− a¯)
r
=
sL
r
.
1For r − α > 0 and r − σ2 + α > 0, it can be shown that β1 =(
−2α+ σ2 +
√
8rσ2 + (σ2 − 2α)2
)
/2σ2 > 1 and β2 =
(
−2α+ σ2 −
√
8rσ2 + (σ2 − 2α)2
)
/2σ2 <
−1. The demonstrations are omitted to save spaces.
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Since β2 < −1, A2 (K) θβ2 goes to either ∞ or −∞ as θ goes to zero. This implie
that for this boundary condition to be satisfied, it should be that A2 (K) = 0. Then,
the value function V (K, θ) is expressed as:
V F (K,θ)=A1(K)θ
β1 − c(K) θQ
2
2 (r−α) +
s (Q− a¯)
r
for θ ≤θF (C.4)
V s(K,θ)=B1(K)θ
β1 +B2(K)θ
β2 +
s2
2(r−σ2+α) c (K) θ−
a¯s
r
for θF ≤θ≤θs (C.5)
V m(K,θ)=D1(K)θ
β1 +D2(K)θ
β2− c(K) θa¯
2
2(r−α) for θs≤θ≤θτ (C.6)
V τ (K,θ)=E1(K)θ
β1 +E2(K)θ
β2 +
τ 2
2(r−σ2+α) c(K) θ−
a¯τ
r
for θτ≤θ. (C.7)
At the three cutoff values θF , θs and θτ , we can derive six equations to specify
coefficients A1, B1, B2, D1, D2, E1, and E2. In addition, we have two more
equations from the optimality conditions to find the investment barrier. Although
we can’t specify some of coefficients explicitly, we can obtain enough information to
derive investment decision rules which define the barrier in each interval.
Expressions of some coefficients and relationships among all coefficients are found in
the process of stitching together (C.4), (C.5), (C.6), and (C.7). The demonstration
is given in the next subsection.
C.1.2 Connecting the value function for all regimes
In the previous subsection, we show that the value function has the expressions of
(C.4), (C.5), (C.6) and (C.7) depending on where the realized value of θ falls. Now we
will derive the explicit expressions of some coefficients and the realtionships between
the other coefficients in (C.4), (C.5), (C.6) and (C.7). These results will be used when
we derive the investment decision rules in the next subsection. There are three cutoff
values of θ; θF (K), θs (K) and θτ (K). From Dixit (1993), the value function for each
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regime (C.4), (C.5), (C.6) and (C.7) must be tangent at the cutoff values. Thus, at
θ = θF (K):
V F (K, θF ) = V
s (K, θF ) ;
V Fθ (K, θF ) = V
s
θ (K, θF ) .
By solving these equations using (C.4) and (C.5), we can express B2 (K) and A1 (K)−
B1 (K) as follows
B2 (K) =
θ−β2F
β1 − β2
(
1− β1
r − α −
1 + β1
r − σ2 + α +
2β1
r
)
sQ
2
; (C.8)
A1 (K)−B1 (K) = θ
−β1
F
β1 − β2
(
1− β2
r − α −
1 + β2
r − σ2 + α +
2β2
r
)
sQ
2
.
At θ = θs (K), we need
V s (K, θs) = V
m (K, θs) ;
V sθ (K, θs) = V
m
θ (K, θs) .
From (C.5) and (C.6), we can derive the expressions of B1 (K)−D1 (K) and B2 (K)−
D2 (K) as follows
B1 (K)−D1 (K) = − θ
−β1
s
β1 − β2
(
1− β2
r − α −
1 + β2
r − σ2 + α +
2β2
r
)
sa¯
2
;
B2 (K)−D2 (K) = θ
−β2
s
β1 − β2
(
1− β1
r − α −
1 + β1
r − σ2 + α +
2β1
r
)
sa¯
2
. (C.9)
Finally, at θ = θτ (K), we need
V m (K, θτ ) = V
τ (K, θτ ) ;
V mθ (K, θτ ) = V
τ
θ (K, θτ ) .
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From (C.6) and (C.7), we can derive the expression of D1 (K)−E1 (K) and D2 (K)−
E2 (K) as follows
D1 (K)− E1 (K) = θ
−β1
τ
β1 − β2
(
1− β1
r − α −
1 + β1
r − σ2 + α +
2β1
r
)
τ a¯
2
;
D2 (K)− E2 (K) = − θ
−β2
τ
β1 − β2
(
1− β1
r − α −
1 + β1
r − σ2 + α +
2β1
r
)
τ a¯
2
. (C.10)
Solving (C.8), (C.9), and (C.10) gives us explicit expressions of B2 (K), D2 (K),
and E2 (K). However, we are unable to find the explicit expressions of A1 (K), B1 (K),
D1 (K), and E1 (K). They will be replaced with relationships that are obtained from
solving the optimal investment strategy.
C.1.3 Derivation of the marginal value function
In this subsection, we will derive the expression of VK (K, θ) in each interval of θ
as shown by (4.22) through (4.25) in section 4.2.
C.1.3.1 When aggregate abatement reaches Q.
If a new investment in abatement capital is required, when the price floor s binds
and aggregate abatement achieves the unregulated emissions Q, given K, a trigger
point of θ∗ should be less than the cutoff value θF (θ∗ ≤ θF ). Then, following Dixit
(1991), Sarkar (2009), and Hagspiel et al. (2012), (C.4) will be used to make an
investment decision. The optimality conditions at a trigger point θ∗ are
V FK (K, θ
∗) = w; (C.11)
V FKθ (K, θ
∗) = 0. (C.12)
(C.11) is known as the value-matching condition and it implies that marginal value
of investment should be equal to the unit cost of investment. (C.12) is the smooth-
pasting condition which implies at the boundary θ∗, two functions V FK (K, θ
∗) and w
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should be tangent with respect to a random shock θ. By applying (C.11) and (C.12)
to (C.4), we have
∂A1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 − 1
r − α
1
2
c′ (K) θ∗Q2 = w; (C.13)
β1
∂A1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1−1 − 1
r − α
1
2
c′ (K)Q2 = 0. (C.14)
By isolating ∂A1(K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 in (C.14), we have
∂A1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 =
1
β1
1
r − α
1
2
c′ (K) θ∗Q2.
By substituting this result into (C.13) we obtain (4.22); that is,
V FK (K, θ) = −
β1 − 1
β1
1
r − α
1
2
c′ (K) θQ2 = w.
C.1.3.2 At the price floor.
If investment to increase capital stock is required when the price floor s binds but
aggregate abatement does not reach the unregulated emissions Q, a trigger point θ∗
must be between two cutoff values θF and θs (θF ≤ θ∗ ≤ θs). Then, (C.7) is used to
make the investment decision. The optimality conditions at θ∗ are:
V mK (K, θ
∗) = w; (C.15)
V mKθ (K, θ
∗) = 0. (C.16)
Applying (C.15) and (C.16) to (C.5) gives us the following equations to solve:
∂B1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 +
∂B2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2 − 1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) s2
2c (K)2 θ∗
= w; (C.17)
β1
∂B1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1−1 + β2
∂B2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2−1 +
1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) s2
2c (K)2 (θ∗)2
= 0. (C.18)
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By multiplying (C.18) by θ∗ and isolating ∂B1(K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 , we have
∂B1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 = −β2
β1
∂B2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2 − 1
β1
1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) s2
2c (K)2 θ∗
.
Substituting this result into the left-side of (C.17) yields
∂B1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 +
∂B2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2 − 1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) s2
2c (K)2 θ∗
=
β1 − β2
β1
∂B2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2 − β1 + 1
β1
1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) s2
2c (K)2 θ∗
= w. (C.19)
Since we integrated the two optimality conditions, the last step to derive the
investment decision rule for θF ≤ θ ≤ θs is to find the expressions of ∂B2(K)∂K in
(C.19). Then, from (4.15) and (C.8), we have
∂B2 (K)
∂K
=
β2θ
−β2
F
β1 − β2
(
1− β1
r − α −
1 + β1
r − σ2 + α +
2β1
r
)
sQ
2
c′ (K)
c (K)
.
Substituting this result into (C.19) gives us
β1 − β2
β1
∂B2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2 − β1 + 1
β1
1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) s2
2c (K)2 θ∗
=
β2
β1
(
1−β1
r−α −
1 + β1
r−σ2+α+
2β1
r
)
c′(K)Qs
2c(K)
(
θ∗
θF
)β2
−β1+1
β1
1
r−σ2+α
c′(K)s2
2c(K)2 θ∗
= w.
Since
β2
β1
(
1− β1
r − α −
1 + β1
r − σ2 + α +
2β1
r
)
=
1
β1
(
β1 + 1
r − σ2 + α −
β1 − 1
r − α
)
> 0,
we obtain (4.23), that is,
V sK(K,θ)=
1
β1
(
β1 + 1
r−σ2+α−
β1−1
r−α
)
c′(K)Qs
2c(K)
(
θ
θF
)β2
−β1+1
β1
1
r−σ2+α
c′(K)s2
2c(K)2 θ
= w.
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C.1.3.3 None of price controls bind.
When θs ≤ θ∗ ≤ θτ , (C.6) is used to make an investment decision. In this case
the value matching and smoothing pasting conditions are
V mK (K, θ
∗) = w; (C.20)
V mKθ (K, θ
∗) = 0. (C.21)
By applying (C.20) and (C.21) to (C.6), we have the following:
∂D1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 +
∂D2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2 − 1
r − α
1
2
c′ (K) θ∗a¯2 = w; (C.22)
β1
∂D1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1−1 + β2
∂D2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2−1 − 1
r − α
1
2
c′ (K) a¯2 = 0. (C.23)
By multiplying (C.23) by θ∗ and isolating ∂D1(K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 we find
∂D1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 = −β2
β1
∂D2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2 +
1
β1
c′ (K) θ∗a¯2
2 (r − α) .
Then, by substituting this result into (C.22), we have
∂D1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 +
∂D2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2 − 1
r − α
1
2
c′ (K) θ∗a¯2
=
β1 − β2
β1
∂D2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2 − β1 − 1
β1
1
r − α
1
2
c′ (K) θ∗a¯2 = w. (C.24)
Using (4.13), (4.15), (C.8), and (C.9), we have
∂D2(K)
∂K
=
β2
β1−β2
(
1− β1
r − α −
1 + β1
r − σ2 + α +
2β1
r
)(
sQ
2
c′(K)
c(K)
θ−β2F −
sa¯
2
c′(K)
c(K)
θ−β2s
)
.
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Substituting this result into (C.24) gives us (4.24), that is,
V mK (K, θ)
=
1
β1
(
β1 + 1
r−σ2+α−
β1−1
r−α
)[
sQ
2
c′(K)
c(K)
(
θ
θF
)β2
− sa¯
2
c′(K)
c(K)
(
θ
θs
)β2]
−β1−1
β1
c′(K)θa¯2
2 (r−α)
= w.
C.1.3.4 At the price ceiling.
When θ∗ ≥ θτ , the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions are:
V τK (K, θ
∗) = w; (C.25)
V τKθ (K, θ
∗) = 0. (C.26)
Applying (C.25) and (C.26) to (C.7) gives us
∂E1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 +
∂E2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2 − 1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) τ 2
2c (K)2 θ∗
= w; (C.27)
β1
∂E1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1−1 + β2
∂E2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2−1 +
1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) τ 2
2c (K)2 (θ∗)2
= 0. (C.28)
By multiplying (C.28) by θ∗ and isolating ∂E1(K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 we have
∂E1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 = −β2
β1
∂E2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2 − 1
β1
1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) τ 2
2c (K)2 θ∗
.
Substituting this result into (C.27) gives us
∂E1 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β1 +
∂E2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2 − 1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) τ 2
2c (K)2 θ∗
=
β1 − β2
β1
∂E2 (K)
∂K
(θ∗)β2 − β1 + 1
β1
1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) τ 2
2c (K)2 θ∗
= w. (C.29)
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From (4.13), (4.14), (4.15), (C.8), (C.9), and (C.10), we have
∂E2 (K)
∂K
=
β2
β1−β2
(
1−β1
r−α −
1 + β1
r−σ2+α+
2β1
r
)(
sQ
2
c′(K)
c(K)
θ−β2F −
sa¯
2
c′(K)
c(K)
θ−β2s +
τ a¯
2
c′(K)
c(K)
θ−β2τ
)
.
Substituting this into (C.29) gives us (4.25), that is,
V τK (K, θ)
=
1
β1
(
β1 + 1
r−σ2+α−
β1−1
r−α
)[
sQ
2
c′(K)
c(K)
(
θ
θF
)β2
− sa¯
2
c′(K)
c(K)
(
θ
θs
)β2
+
τ a¯
2
c′(K)
c(K)
(
θ
θτ
)β2]
− β1 + 1
β1
1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) τ 2
2c (K)2 θ
= w.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 1
In this section, we will prove Lemma 1 in subsection 4.3.1, which characterizes the
shape of VK (K, θ) with respect to θ. First, in parts (a) to (d) of subsectin C.2.1, we
will show that three of the four expressions for VK (K, θ) ((4.23), (4.24), and (4.25))
have stationary points and two of them are local maxima and the other one is a local
minimum. However, these stationary points are not always manifested in our model.
In order for these stationary points to show up in our model, they must be located
in the relevant interval where the matched expression of VK (K, θ) is defined. Thus,
in parts (e) to (g) of subsection C.2.2, we will show the relationships among these
stationary points from which we can infer the shape of VK (K, θ). The proof will be
completed by examining the limitd of VK (K, θ) as θ goes to 0 and∞ in part (h) of
subsection C.2.2.
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C.2.1 Stationary points of VK (K, θ)
Part (a). When aggregate abatement reaches Q.
From (4.22) we have
∂V FK (K, θ)
∂θ
= −β1 − 1
β1
c′ (K)Q2
2 (r − α) > 0;
∂2V FK (K, θ)
∂θ2
= 0,
which implies that V FK (K, θ) is monotonically increasing as θ increases in the interval
of (0, θF ] and the slope of V
F
K (K, θ) with respect to θ is constant, given the capital
stock K.
Part (b). At the price floor.
By differentiating (4.23) with respect to θ, we have
∂V sK(K,θ)
∂θ
=
[
β2
β1
(
β1 + 1
r−σ2+α−
β1−1
r−α
)(
θ
θF
)β2+1
+
β1+1
β1
1
r−σ2+α
]
c′(K) s2
2c(K)2 θ2
.
(C.30)
Let the first part of ∂V sK (K, θ) /∂θ in square brackets be
gs (θ) =
β2
β1
(
β1 + 1
r − σ2 + α −
β1 − 1
r − α
)(
θ
θF
)β2+1
+
β1 + 1
β1
1
r − σ2 + α.
Denote a stationary point of V sK (K, θ) as θ
s
0; that is, ∂V
s
K (K, θ
s
0) /∂θ = 0. Then, since
the last term of (C.30) is always strictly negative; that is, (c′ (K) s2) /
(
2c (K)2 θ2
)
<
0, θs0 is a solution to g
s (θ) = 0, which implies
θs0 = θF
[
−
β1+1
β1
1
r−σ2+α
β2
β1
(
β1+1
r−σ2+α − β1−1r−α
)] 1β2+1 = θF [1
2
(
1− 1
β2
)] 1
β2+1
> θF . (C.31)
The last inequality in (C.31) always holds because β2 < −1.
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Since the last term of (C.30) is always negative the sign of ∂V sK (K, θ) /∂θ is
completely determined by the sign of gs (θ); that is,
sign
[
∂V sK (K, θ)
∂θ
]
= sign [−gs (θ)] .
Since ∂gs (θ) /∂θ > 0 for all θ, gs (θ) is a strictly increasing function of θ and becomes
zero at θ = θs0, which implies that
gs (θ)

< 0 for θ < θs0
= 0 for θ = θs0
> 0 for θ > θs0,
and thus,
∂V sK (K, θ)
∂θ

> 0 for θ < θs0
= 0 for θ = θs0
< 0 for θ > θs0.
(C.32)
Therefore, θs0, the stationary point of V
s
K (K, θ), is a local maximum.
Part (c). Neither of price controls binds.
By differentiating (4.24) with respect to θ, we have
∂V mK (K, θ)
∂θ
=
{
β2
β1
(
β1 + 1
r−σ2+α−
β1−1
r−α
)[(
Q
a¯
)2(
θ
θF
)β2−1
−
(
θ
θs
)β2−1]
−β1−1
β1
1
r−α
}
c′(K)a¯2
2
.
Let the first part of ∂V mK (K, θ) /∂θ in braces be
gm (θ) =
β2
β1
(
β1 + 1
r − σ2 + α −
β1 − 1
r − α
)[(
Q
a¯
)β2+1
− 1
](
θ
θs
)β2−1
− β1 − 1
β1
1
r − α.
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Since β2 < −1 and Q/a¯ > 1, (Q/a¯)β2+1 − 1 < 0, which implies that gm (θ) is a
decreasing function of θ. Denote a stationary point of V mK (K, θ) as θ
m
0 ; that is,
∂V mK (K, θ
m
0 ) /∂θ = 0. Then, θ
m
0 is a solution to g
m (θ) = 0; which implies
θm0 =θs
 β1−1β1 1r−α
β2
β1
(
β1+1
r−σ2+α− β1−1r−α
) [(
Q
a¯
)β2+1−1]
 1β2−1 =θs[1
2
(
1+
1
β2
)
1
1−(Q
a¯
)β2+1
] 1
β2−1
.
(C.33)
Since c′ (K)Q2/2 < 0, the sign of ∂V mK (K, θ) /∂θ is determined by the sign of g
m (θ);
that is, sign [∂V mK (K, θ) /∂θ] = sign [−gm (θ)] . Since gm (θ) is a decreasing function
of θ and becomes zero at θ = θm0 ,
gm (θ)

> 0 for θ < θm0
= 0 for θ = θm0
< 0 for θ > θm0 ,
and thus ∂V mK (K, θ) /∂θ is
∂V mK (K, θ)
∂θ

< 0 for θ < θm0
= 0 for θ = θm0
> 0 for θ > θm0 .
Therefore, θm0 , the stationary point of V
m
K (K, θ), is a local minimum.
Part (d). At the price ceiling.
The derivative of (4.25) with respect to θ is
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∂V τK (K, θ)
∂θ
=
β2
β1
(
β1 + 1
r−σ2+α−
β1−1
r−α
)[
sQ
2θF
(
θ
θF
)β2−1 1
θF
− sa¯
2
(
θ
θs
)β2−1 1
θs
+
τ a¯
2
(
θ
θτ
)β2−1 1
θτ
]
c′(K)
c(K)
+
β1 + 1
β1
1
r − σ2 + α
c′ (K) τ 2
2c (K)2 θ2
.
By using the definition of θF , θs, and θτ from (4.7), (4.8), and (4.11) and collecting
common terms, we have,
∂V τK (K, θ)
∂θ
=
c′ (K) τ 2
2c (K)2 θ2
×{
β2
β1
(
β1 + 1
r−σ2+α−
β1−1
r−α
)[((
Q
a¯
)β2+1
−1
)(τ
s
)β2−1
+1
](
θ
θτ
)β2+1
+
β1+1
β1
1
r−σ2+α
}
.
Let the last part of ∂V τK (K, θ) /∂θ in braces be
gτ (θ)
=
β2
β1
(
β1 + 1
r−σ2+α−
β1−1
r−α
)[((
Q
a¯
)β2+1
−1
)(τ
s
)β2−1
+1
](
θ
θτ
)β2+1
+
β1+1
β1
1
r−σ2+α.
Denote a stationary point of V τK (K, θ) as θ
τ
0 , that is, ∂V
τ
K (K, θ
τ
0) /∂θ = 0. Then,
θτ0 is a solution to g
τ (θ) = 0, which implies
θτ0 = θ
τ
1
2
(
1− 1
β2
)
1
1−
(
1− (Q
a¯
)β2+1) ( τ
s
)β2−1
 1β2+1 . (C.34)
Since (c′ (K) τ 2) /
(
2c (K)2 θ2
)
< 0, the sign of ∂V τK (K, θ) /∂θ is determined by the
sign of gτ (θ); that is, sign [∂V τK (K, θ) /∂θ] = sign [−gτ (θ)] . gτ (θ) is an increasing
function of θ because
(
(Q/a¯)β2+1 − 1
)
(τ/s)β2−1 + 1 > 0:
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gτ (θ)

< 0 for θ < θτ0
= 0 for θ = θτ0
> 0 for θ > θτ0 ,
which implies that
∂V τK (K, θ)
∂θ

> 0 for θ < θτ0
= 0 for θ = θτ0
< 0 for θ > θτ0 .
(C.35)
Therefore, θτ0 , the stationary point of V
τ
K (K, θ), is a local minimum.
Through parts (a) to (d) we have shown that the expressions of (4.23), (4.24), and
(4.25) have the stationary points: θs0, θ
m
0 , and θ
τ
0 , respectively. In addition, θ
s
0 and θ
τ
0
are local maxima and θm0 is a local minimum. However, for these stationary points to
be stationary points of VK (K, θ), they should lie in the relevant intervals. That is, if
θF < θ
s
0 < θs < θ
m
0 < θτ < θ
τ
0 , then VK (K, θ) has two local maxima. However, there
are other possibilities if these relationships do not hold. In the next subsubsection
C.2.2, we derive conditions to determine the locations of these stationary points from
which we can complete the proof of Lemma 1.
C.2.2 Conditions for the shape of VK (K, θ)
Part (e). Relationship between θs0, θs, and θ
m
0 .
To derive the relationship between θs0, θs, and θ
m
0 , suppose at first that θ
s
0 ≤ θs.
Then, from (C.31), we have
[
1
2
(
1− 1
β2
)] 1
β2+1 ≤ θs
θF
=
Q
a¯
, (C.36)
which can be rearranged to be
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12
(
1 +
1
β2
)
≤ 1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1
. (C.37)
Since 0 < (Q/a¯)β2+1 < 1, applying this result to (C.33) yields the following:
(
θm0
θs
)β2−1
=
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
1
1− (Q
a¯
)β2+1 ≤ 1, (C.38)
which implies that
θm0 = θs
[
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
1
1− (Q
a¯
)β2+1
] 1
β2−1
≥ θs, (C.39)
because β2− 1 < 0. In addition, (C.36) through (C.39) hold with equality only when
θs0 = θs. Therefore, if θ
s
0 ≤ θs, then θm0 ≥ θs. On the other hand, if θs0 ≥ θs, then the
directions of all the inequalites in (C.36) through (C.39) are reversed, which implies
that θm0 ≤ θs. We can take the same step from the assumption of θm0 ≥ (≤) θs to
derive θs0 ≤ (≥) θs. With these results, we can show that the conditions that specify
the locations of θs0, θs, and θ
m
0 are:
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
< 1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1
⇒ θs0 < θs < θm0 ;
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
> 1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1
⇒ θs0 > θs > θm0 ;
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
= 1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1
⇒ θs0 = θs = θm0 . (C.40)
Part (f). Relationship between θm0 , θτ , and θ
τ
0 .
To derive the relationship between θm0 , θτ , and θ
τ
0 , suppose at first that θ
m
0 ≤ θτ .
Then, from (C.33) we have
[
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
1
1− (Q
a¯
)β2+1
] 1
β2−1
≤ θτ
θs
=
τ
s
, (C.41)
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which can be rearranged to be
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
≥
[
1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1](τ
s
)β2−1
. (C.42)
This result can be manipulated further to be
1
2
(
1− 1
β2
)
≤ 1−
(
1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1)(τ
s
)β2−1
. (C.43)
Since 0 < 1−
(
1− (Q/a¯)β2+1
)
(τ/s)β2−1 < 1, applying this result to (C.34) gives us
the following
(
θτ0
θτ
)β2+1
=
1
2
(
1− 1
β2
)
1
1−
(
1− (Q
a¯
)β2+1) ( τ
s
)β2−1 ≤ 1, (C.44)
which implies that
θτ0 = θτ
1
2
(
1− 1
β2
)
1
1−
(
1− (Q
a¯
)β2+1) ( τ
s
)β2−1
 1β2+1 ≥ θτ . (C.45)
(C.41) through (C.45) hold as equalities only when θm0 = θτ . Therefore, if θ
m
0 ≤ θτ ,
then θτ0 ≥ θτ . On the other hand, if θm0 ≥ θτ , then the directions of all the inequalities
in (C.41) through (C.45) are reversed, which implies θτ0 ≤ θτ . We can take the same
steps from the assumption of θτ0 ≤ (≥) θτ to derive θτ0 ≥ (≤) θτ . With these results,
we can show that the conditions that specify the locations of θm0 , θτ , and θ
τ
0 are:
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
>
[
1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1](τ
s
)β2−1 ⇒ θm0 < θτ < θτ0 ;
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
<
[
1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1](τ
s
)β2−1 ⇒ θm0 > θτ > θτ0 ;
1
2
(
1 +
1
β2
)
=
[
1−
(
Q
a¯
)β2+1](τ
s
)β2−1 ⇒ θm0 = θτ = θτ0 . (C.46)
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Part (g). First part of Lemma 1
From the results of (C.40) and (C.46), possible combinations for the lcoations of
(θs0, θ
m
0 , θ
τ
0) and (θs, θτ ) are as follows:
1) If θs0 ≥ θs, then θm0 ≤ θs < θτ , which implies that θs0 and θm0 are not
stationary points of VK (K, θ). Thus, θ
τ
0 is the only stationary point,
implying that VK (K, θ) has a single maximum at the price ceiling.
2) If θs0 < θs and θ
m
0 ≥ θτ , then θτ0 ≤ θτ . This implies further θm0 and θτ0 are
not stationary points of VK (K, θ). Thus, θ
s
0 is the only stationary point,
implying that VK (K, θ) has a single maximum at the price floor.
3) If θs0 < θs and θ
m
0 < θτ , then θ
s
0, θ
m
0 , and θ
τ
0 are all stationary points of
VK (K, θ). Therefore, VK (K, θ) has two local maxima, one at the price
floor and the other at the price ceiling.
Having shown that there is at least one local maximum and at most two local maxima
of VK (K, θ), the last part of Lemma 1 describes the limit of VK (K, θ) as θ approaches
either 0 or ∞, which we prove in part (h).
Part (h). The last part of Lemma 1
As θ approaches 0, the limit of VK (K, θ) is determined by (4.22):
lim
θ→0
VK (K, θ) = lim
θ→0
V FK (K, θ) = lim
θ→0
(
−β1 − 1
β1
c′ (K) θQ2
2 (r − α)
)
= 0.
On the other hand, as θ goes to ∞, the limit of VK (K, θ) is determined by (4.25).
Since β2 < −1, all terms associated with θ in (4.25) converge to zero:
lim
θ→∞
[
c′ (K)Qs
2c (K)
(
θ
θF
)β2
− c
′ (K) a¯s
2c (K)
(
θ
θs
)β2
+
c′ (K) a¯τ
2c (K)
(
θ
θτ
)β2]
= 0;
lim
θ→∞
c′ (K) τ 2
2 (r − σ2 + α) c (K)2 θ = 0.
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Therefore,
lim
θ→∞
VK (K, θ) = lim
θ→∞
V τK (K, θ) = 0. (C.47)
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
C.3 Derivation of the marginal value function under pure
permit trading, (4.31)
In this section, we show the derivation of the marginal value function under pure
permit trading, V ppK (K, θ) ((4.31) in subsection 4.4.1). The derivation is accomplished
in the same steps as the derivation of VK (K, θ) in section C.1. Since we assume
that a random shock θ follows the same stochastic process described by (4.2), a
value function under pure permit trading (denoted as V pp (K, θ)) must satisfy the
differential equation,
1
2
σ2θ2V ppθθ (K, θ) + αθV
pp
θ (K, θ)− rV pp (K, θ)− Spp (K, θ; a¯) = 0.
The general solution to this differential equation is
V pp (K, θ) = E1 (K) θ
β1 + E2 (K) θ
β2 − c (K) θa¯
2
2 (r − α) , (C.48)
where β1 > 1 and β2 < −1 are solutions to 12σ2β (β − 1)+αβ−r = 0. Since aggregate
compliance costs go to zero as θ goes to zero, we impose the boundary condition
lim
θ→0
V pp (K, θ) = 0.
For this boundary condition to hold, E2 (K) in (C.48) must be zero because β2 < 0.
Thus, the value function under the pure permit trading is
V pp (K, θ) = E1 (K) θ
β1 − c (K) θa¯
2
2 (r − α) . (C.49)
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The explicit form of V ppK (K, θ) satisfies the value-matching condition V
pp
K (K, θ) = w
and the smooth-pasting condition V ppKθ (K, θ) = 0 at the boundary of the investment
and non-investment interval, θ∗ (K). With these two conditions, we can find (4.31):
V ppK (K, θ) = −
β1 − 1
β1
c′ (K) θa¯2
2 (r − α) .
C.4 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1 in subsection 4.4.2 proceeds in the following way.
Part (a): First we show that VK (K, θ) is always greater than V
pp
K (K, θ) for 0 <
θ ≤ θτ (K). Part (b): Then we demonstrate that there at least one value of θ at
which VK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ). Part (c): Parts (a) and (b) imply that every point at
which VK (K, θI (K)) = V
pp
K (K, θI (K)) occurs for θ > θτ (K). Part (d): We then
demonstrate that there is only one value of θ at which VK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ). This
completes parts 1) and 2) of the proposition. Part (e): Finally, we show that part 3)
of the proposition follows from previous elements of the proof.
Part (a).
Since VK (K, θ) takes a different expression in each interval, we will compare
VK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) in a piecewise fashion. We begin with comparing V
F
K (K, θ)
and V mK (K, θ) to V
pp
K (K, θ), respectively, because V
F
K (K, θ) and V
m
K (K, θ) have a
similar structure with V ppK (K, θ). In addition, the results from these comparisons
will be used in comparing V sK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ).
Part (a-i).
In the interval 0 < θ ≤ θF (K), from (4.22), we know that VK (K, θ) is expressed
as
V FK (K, θ) = −
β1 − 1
β1
c′ (K) θQ2
2 (r − α) .
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Since c′ (K) < 0 and Q > a¯, with (4.31), we have
V FK (K, θ)− V ppK (K, θ)
= −β1 − 1
β1
c′ (K) θQ2
2 (r − α) +
β1 − 1
β1
c′ (K) θa¯2
2 (r − α)
= −β1 − 1
β1
c′ (K) θ (Q2 − a¯2)
2 (r − α) > 0 for 0 < θ ≤ θF (K) .
Therefore, VK (K, θ) is strictly greater than V
pp
K (K, θ) in 0 < θ ≤ θF (K). Clearly,
there is no θ where VK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ) in this interval.
Part (a-ii).
In the interval θs (K) ≤ θ ≤ θτ (K), from (4.24), we know that VK (K, θ) is
expressed as
V mK (K, θ)
=
1
β1
(
β1 + 1
r−σ2+α−
β1−1
r−α
)[
c′(K)Qs
2c(K)
(
θ
θF
)β2
− c
′(K) a¯s
2c(K)
(
θ
θs
)β2]
−β1−1
β1
c′(K) θa¯2
2 (r−α) .
(Note that we are skipping the interval θF (K) ≤ θ ≤ θs (K) for a moment). The
difference between V mK (K, θ) and V
pp
k (K, θ) is
V mK (K, θ)− V ppK (K, θ)
=
1
β1
(
β1 + 1
r − σ2 + α −
β1 − 1
r − α
)[
c′ (K)Qs
2c (K)
(
θ
θF
)β2
− c
′ (K) a¯s
2c (K)
(
θ
θs
)β2]
. (C.50)
With our assumptions on the parameters of the distribution of θ (i.e, equation (4.3)),
it can be shown that
1
β1
(
β1 + 1
r − σ2 + α −
β1 − 1
r − α
)
> 0.
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Moreover, the term in the hard brackets in (C.50),
c′(K)Qs
2c(K)
(
θ
θF
)β2
− c
′(K) a¯s
2c(K)
(
θ
θs
)β2
=
[
Q
a¯
(
θs
θF
)β2
−1
]
c′(K) a¯s
2c(K)
(
θ
θs
)β2
=
[(
Q
a¯
)β2+1
−1
]
c′(K) a¯s
2c(K)
(
θ
θs
)β2
>0,
is also positive because (Q/a¯)β2+1 < 1 for Q/a¯ > 1 and β2 + 1 < 0. Therefore,
V mK (K, θ) > V
pp
K (K, θ) for θs (K) ≤ θ ≤ θτ (K) ;
that is, VK (K, θ) is strictly greater than V
pp
K (K, θ) in the interval θs (K) ≤ θ ≤
θτ (K).
Part (a-iii).
In the interval θF (K) ≤ θ ≤ θs (K), from (4.23), we know that VK (K, θ) is
expressed as
V sK (K, θ)
=
1
β1
(
β1 + 1
r − σ2 + α −
β1 − 1
r − α
)
c′ (K)Qs
2c (K)
(
θ
θF
)β2
− β1 + 1
β1
c′ (K) s2
2 (r − σ2 + α) c (K)2 θ .
Because VK (K, θ) is continuous at the cutoff values θF (K), θs (K), and θτ (K), from
the results for the intervals of (0, θF (K)] and [θs (K) , θτ (K)], we know that
V FK (K, θF (K)) = V
s
K (K, θF (K)) > V
pp
K (K, θF (K)) ; (C.51)
V mK (K, θs (K)) = V
s
K (K, θs (K)) > V
pp
K (K, θs (K)) . (C.52)
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Suppose that V sK (K, θ) meets V
pp
K (K, θ) between θF (K) and θs (K) and define θI (K)
as the first point such that V sK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ); that is,
1) V sK (K, θ) > V
pp
K (K, θ) for θF (K) ≤ θ < θI (K) ; (C.53)
2) V sK (K, θI (K)) = V
pp
K (K, θI (K)) .
Note that the direction of the inequality in (C.53) defines θI (K) as the first point
at which V sK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ) and the direction of the inequality is determined by
(C.51).
Part (a-iii-1). Let us now determine whether θI (K) occurs before or after the
stationary point θs0 (K). First, consider the case for θI (K) ≥ θs0 (K). As shown in
subsection C.2.1, θs0 (K) is a possible stationary point of V
s
K (K, θ). For this point
to be a local maximum of VK (K, θ) it must fall into [θF (K) , θs (K)]. If θ
s
0 (K) >
θs (K), then it is not a maximum point. Moreover, between θF (K) and θs (K) there
is no point of θ where V sK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ) because θs (K) < θ
s
0 (K) ≤ θI (K)
and V sK (K, θ) is defined on [θF (K) , θs (K)]. Therefore, we focus on the case for
θs0 (K) ≤ θI (K) ≤ θs (K). For θ ≥ θI (K), the slopes of V sK (K, θ) and V ppK (K, θ) are
∂V sK (K, θ)
∂θ
≤ 0 < ∂V
pp
K (K, θ)
∂θ
,
because V sK (K, θ) is decreasing in θ after its maximum point θ
s
0 (K) (as shown in
(C.32)) and V ppK (K, θ) is strictly increasing in θ. That is, after the first intersection
point θI (K), V
s
K (K, θ) is decreasing while V
pp
K (K, θ) is increasing as θ increases.
Therefore, for θI (K) < θ ≤ θs (K) there cannot be another point of θ at which
V sK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ). In addition, at θs (K), V
s
K (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) are such that
V sK (K, θs (K)) < V
pp
K (K, θs (K)) .
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However, this is a contradiction with (C.52). Therefore, θI (K) cannot exist after
θs0 (K).
Part (a-iii-2). Next, consider the case for θF (K) < θI (K) < θ
s
0 (K). From
(C.32) in subsection C.2.1, we know that for θ < θs0 (K), V
s
K (K, θ) has a positive
slope with respect to θ. Then, due to the definition of θI (K), at θI (K) the slope of
V sK (K, θ) should be less than or equal to the slope of V
pp
K (K, θ). Otherwise, θI (K)
can’t be the first point where V sK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) meet. In addition, V
s
K (K, θ)
is strictly increasing in θ before its maximum point θs0 (K). That is,
0 <
∂V sK (K, θI (K))
∂θ
≤ ∂V
pp
K (K, θI (K))
∂θ
.
If both ∂V sK (K, θ) /∂θ and ∂V
pp
K (K, θ) /∂θ have the same slope at θI (K), then for
θ < θI (K), the slope of V
s
K (K, θ) should be greater than the slope of V
pp
K (K, θ)
because for θF (K) ≤ θ < θs0 (K),
∂2V sK (K, θ)
∂θ2
=
θF
θ3
β2 − 1
β1
(
β1 + 1
r − σ2 + α −
β1 − 1
r − α
)[
β2
(
θ
θF
)β2+1
+ 1
]
c′ (K)Qs
2c (K)
< 0;
(C.54)
∂2V ppK (K, θ)
∂θ2
= 0. (C.55)
That is,
∂V sK (K, θ)
∂θ
>
∂V ppK (K, θ)
∂θ
for θ < θI (K) .
Since V sK (K, θI (K)) = V
pp
K (K, θI (K)), this implies that
V sK (K, θ) < V
pp
K (K, θ) for θ < θI (K) .
However, this is a contradiction with (C.53) in the definition of θI (K). Therefore, at
θI (K), the slope of V
s
K (K, θ) is strictly less than the slope of V
pp
K (K, θ); that is,
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0 <
∂V sK (K, θI (K))
∂θ
<
∂V ppK (K, θI (K))
∂θ
.
Because of (C.54), the slope of V sK (K, θ) decreases after θI (K) and becomes zero at
θs0 (K). Moreover, after θ
s
0 (K), V
s
K (K) is strictly decreasing in θ. On the other hand,
V ppK (K, θ) maintains the same positive slope at θI (K). That is, for θ ≥ θI (K),
∂V sK (K, θ)
∂θ
<
∂V ppK (K, θ)
∂θ
.
Therefore, after θI (K), there is no point of θ where V
s
K (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ). In
addition, this implies that at θs (K) , V
s
K (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) are such that
V sK (K, θs (K)) < V
pp
K (K, θs (K)) .
However, this contradicts (C.52). Therefore, the first point of θ where V sK (K, θ) =
V ppK (K, θ) can’t exist before θ
s
0 (K).
The results from cases for θI (K) ≥ θs0 (K) and θI (K) < θs0 (K) show that if θs0 (K)
is a stationary point in the interval θF (K) ≤ θ ≤ θs (K), then θI (K) cannot lie
before and after θs0 (K)in the interval. As a result, there is no point of θ where
VK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ) for θF (K) ≤ θ ≤ θs (K). Moreover, this implies that V sK (K, θ)
is greater than V ppK (K, θ) for θF (K) ≤ θ ≤ θs (K). To see why, suppose that there
is a point of θ where V sK (K, θ) < V
pp
K (K, θ) and denote this point as θ
′. Then, from
(C.51), we have the following relationships:
V sK (K, θF (K))− V ppK (K, θF (K)) > 0 and V sK (K, θ′)− V ppK (K, θ′) < 0.
Because both V sK (K, θ)and V
pp
K (K, θ) are continuous in θ, from the intermediate
value theorem, in the interval of [θF (K) , θ
′], there should be a point of θ where
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V sK (K, θ) − V ppK (K, θ) = 0. However, we have already shown that such a point
cannot exist. Therefore, there is no point of θ where V sK (K, θ) < V
pp
K (K, θ).
In summary, there is no point of θ where VK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ) and VK (K, θ) is
greater than V ppK (K, θ) in θF (K) ≤ θ ≤ θs (K).
Part (b). Existence of the intersection:
Thus far, we have proved that
VK (K, θ) > V
pp
K (K, θ) for 0 < θ ≤ θτ (K) .
Therefore, if there exists a θ where VK (K, θ) meets V
pp
K (K, θ), this point must be
strictly greater than θτ (K). From (4.25), we know that for θ ≥ θτ , VK (K, θ) is
expressed as
V τK (K, θ)
=
1
β1
(
β1 + 1
r−σ2+α−
β1−1
r−α
)[
c′(K)Qs
2c(K)
(
θ
θF
)β2
− c
′(K) a¯s
2c(K)
(
θ
θs
)β2
+
c′(K) a¯τ
2c(K)
(
θ
θτ
)β2]
−β1 + 1
β1
1
r−σ2+α
c′(K) τ 2
2c(K)2 θ
.
Let the maximum point of V τK (K, θ) be θ
τ
0 (K). Given K, V
τ
K (K, θ) is continuous in
θ, strictly decreasing in θ after θτ0 (K) and limθ→∞ V
τ
K (K, θ) = 0 from (C.47). Thus,
there is a point θ′ after θτ0 (K) such that
0 < V τK (K, θ
′) < V ppK (K, θτ (K)) < V
τ
K (K, θτ (K)) .
Then, at θτ (K) and θ
′, we have the following relationships:
V τK (K, θτ (K)) = V
m
K (K, θτ (K)) > V
pp
K (K, θτ (K)) ;
V τK (K, θ
′) < V ppK (K, θτ (K)) < V
pp
K (K, θ
′) .
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The first inequality is obtained from the results of part (a), and the second inequality
is derived from the facts that θ′ > θτ (K) and V
pp
K (K, θ) is increasing in θ. Then,
the difference between V τK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) have opposite signs at θτ (K) and θ
′,
that is,
V τK (K, θτ (K))− V ppK (K, θτ (K)) > 0;
V τK (K, θ
′)− V ppK (K, θ′) < 0.
Since both V τK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) are continuous in θ, by the intermediate value
theorem, there exists a point of θ between θτ (K) and θ
′ such that
V τK (K, θ)− V ppK (K, θ) = 0.
Therefore, there exists a point of θ > θτ (K) where V
τ
K (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ).
Part (c).
In part (a) we showed that VK (K, θ) > V
pp
K (K, θ) for 0 < θ ≤ θτ (K). In part (b),
we showed that there is at least one point of θ > θτ (K) where V
τ
K (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ).
Therefore, any point at which VK (K, θI (K)) = V
pp
K (K, θI (K)) occurs for θ > θτ (K).
Part (d).
In this part, we will show that VK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) intersect only once. To
complete parts 1) and 2) of the proposition, we need to show that there is only one
point of θ at which V τK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ). Define θI (K) as the first point of θ where
V τK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ). From the results of parts (a) and (b), θτ (K) < θI (K); that
is,
V τK (K, θ) > V
pp
K (K, θ) for θτ (K) ≤ θ < θI (K) ,
V τK (K, θI (K)) = V
pp
K (K, θI (K)) .
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Note that the direction of the inequality defines θI (K) as the first point at which
V τK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ) and the direction of the inequality is determined by
VK (K, θτ (K)) > V
pp
K (K, θτ (K)). Then, we will analyze cases depending on
whether θI (K) is greater than θ
τ
0 (K) or not.
Part (d-i).
Cases for θτ0 (K) ≤ θτ (K) < θI (K) and θτ (K) < θτ0 (K) ≤ θI (K): Suppose that
θτ0 (K) ≤ θI (K). Since V τK (K) is strictly decreasing in θ after θτ0 (K), and V ppK (K, θ)
is monotonically increasing in θ, V τK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) cannot meet again after
θI (K). Thus, θI (K) is the single intersection between V
τ
K (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) when
θτ0 (K) ≤ θI (K). In addition, combined with the definition of θI (K), this implies
that when θτ0 (K) ≤ θI (K):
V τK (K, θ) > V
pp
K (K, θ) for θτ (K) ≤ θ < θI (K) ;
V τK (K, θ) < V
pp
K (K, θ) for θ > θI (K) .
Part (d-ii).
Case for θτ (K) < θI (K) < θ
τ
0 (K): Suppose that θI (K) occurs strictly before
θτ0 (K). Then, by the definition of θI (K), we have
V τK (K, θ) > V
pp
K (K, θ) for θτ (K) < θ < θI (K) < θ
τ
0 (K) ;
V τK (K, θI (K)) = V
pp
K (K, θI (K)) .
Since θI (K) is the first intersection point, the slopes of V
τ
K (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) at
θI (K) should be
∂V τK (K, θI (K))
∂θ
<
∂V ppK (K, θI (K))
∂θ
. (C.56)
192
The case where V τK (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) are tangent at θI (K) can be ruled out by
the same logic as Part (a-iii-2) because for θτ (K) < θ ≤ θτ0 (K),
∂2V τK (K, θ)
∂θ2
=
{
β2 (β2 − 1)
β1
(
β1 + 1
r − σ2 + α −
β1 − 1
r − α
)[((
Q
a¯
)β2+1
− 1
)(τ
s
)β2−1
+ 1
](
θ
θτ
)β2+1
−β1 + 1
β1
2
r − σ2 + α
}
θ2τ
θ3
c′ (K) a¯2
2
< 0, (C.57)
∂2V ppK (K, θ)
∂θ2
= 0.
If there exists another intersection point after θI (K), at that point the slope of
V τK (K, θ) should be greater than or equal to the slope of V
pp
K (K, θ). Because of
(C.57), the slopes of V τK (K, θ) are positive but decreasing, become zero at θ
τ
0 (K),
and become negative after θτ0 (K) while the slope of V
pp
K (K, θ) remains the same.
Since the slope of V τK (K, θ) cannot become greater than or equal to the slope of
V ppK (K, θ) after θI (K), there is no θ where V
τ
K (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ) other than θI (K).
Therefore, θI (K) is the only intersection between V
τ
K (K, θ) and V
pp
K (K, θ) when
θI (K) ≤ θτ0 (K).
The results of parts (d-i) and (d-ii) show that θI (K) is the first point of θ at which
V τK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ) and it is actually the only such a point. As a result, we have
completed the proof for parts 1) and 2) of the proposition.
Part (e).
In part (a), we showed that VK (K, θ) > V
pp
K (K, θ) for 0 < θ ≤ θτ (K). In parts
(b) and (d), we showed that the only point of θ at which VK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ)
is strictly greater than θτ (K). To complete part 3) of the proposition, we need to
show that V τK (K, θ) > V
pp
K (K, θ) for θτ < θ < θI (K) and VK (K, θ) < V
pp
K (K, θ) for
θ > θI (K).
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Suppose that there is a point of θ in [θτ (K) , θI (K)] such that
VK (K, θ) < V
pp
K (K, θ), and denote this point as θ
′. Because both V τK (K, θ) and
V ppK (K, θ) are continuous in θ, by the intermediate value theorem, this requires
another point of θ in [θτ (K) , θ
′] at which V τK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ). However, this
contradicts the results of part (d) which showed θI (K) is the only point of θ at
which V τK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ). Therefore, there is no point of θ in [θτ (K) , θI (K)]
such that VK (K, θ) < V
pp
K (K, θ). As a result, combined with the results of part (a),
we have
VK (K, θ) > V
pp
K (K, θ) for 0 < θ < θI (K) .
Since θI (K) is the only point of θ at which VK (K, θ) = V
pp
K (K, θ), (C.56) implies
that
VK (K, θ) < V
pp
K (K, θ) for θ > θI (K) .
Therefore, part 3) of the proposition is proved. 2
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